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Notes for the Title of This Book 
I in none of these 
Find place or refuge; and the more I see 
Pleasures about me, so much more I feel 
Torment within me, as from the hateful siege 
Of contraries. . . . 
For only in destroying I find ease 
To my relentless thoughts. 
-John Milton, Paradise Lost, IX. 118-130, 
Satan in Paradise 
Without Contraries is no progression. 
-William Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell 
I wish I could say Tom was any better .... I am obliged to 
write and plunge myself into abstract images to ease myself 
of his countenance, his voice, and feebleness-so that I live 
now in a continual fever. It must be poisonous to life, although 
I feel well. Imagine "the hateful siege of contraries." 
-John Keats to Charles Wentworth Dilke, 
21 September 1818 
INTRODUCTION 
My EXPOSITION begins by quoting a British critic in an 
American quarterly for the winter of 1953. Not that his 
essay is a weak or unimpressive instance of the sort of 
contention that I wish to illustrate. On the contrary it is the 
most thoughtful instance of its genre that I know-not only 
expressing discontent with a certain externally identifiable 
school of criticism but naming the grounds of the feeling in 
considered theoretical terms. John Holloway's essay "The 
Critical Intimidation," in the Hudson Review. voiced a 
double complaint: namely, that American criticism in the 
tradition of Richards and Eliot was trying too hard to 
operate in a "scheme of things where science was the norm," 
and that in some way connected with this fault the same 
school of criticism had gone too far in the pursuit of the 
ironic principle. He thought it could not be right to liberate 
poetry from the restricted range of "picturesque lyricism," 
only to shackle it again to another restricted range, that of 
"paradox, ambiguity, and ironic contrast." He thought that 
certain American critics had made too easy a gift to science 
of the art of prose; they wanted to make poetry too separate 
a thing, whereas poetry is really just a refinement of a certain 
"straight-forward" kind of non-scientific or impressionistic 
"truth" which is shared by "ordinary" prose on many oc-
casions.1 
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Mr. Holloway, I think correctly enough, saw a close 
connection between the cognitive critical enterprise in 
America and the classic principle of reconciled opposites. 
But to pursue first the simpler part of the argument: so far 
as his essay expressed a deep misgiving about excess of 
cognitive effort-of thinking in criticism-he was far from 
being alone in his attitude at that date. In America, for ex-
ample, we had Leslie Fiedler's "Credo" in the Kenyon Review 
symposium of 1950-"Toward an Amateur Criticism." This 
was one of the earliest announcements of a sort of emancipa-
tion from criticism, a New Amateurism, a "passionate com-
mitment to not having any commitment," which was cele-
brated recurrently in articles and reviews in America during 
the 1950's. In England all along, the same views found 
ready expression. The traditional stance of the appreciators, 
the "art of praise," known so well to Gosse, Saintsbury, 
Raleigh, Quiller-Couch, and Garrod, was not to be easily 
abandoned. Professor Sutherland, for instance, in his In-
augural Lecture Delivered at University College, London, 
in 1952-The English Critic-began with an allusion to "gar-
gantuan American anthologies whose sheer weight must 
make the college boy in Indiana and Minnesota, his satchel 
in his hand, creep more unwillingly to school than ever 
before. . . ." And he proceeded to describe the English 
critical tradition as "urbane," "cheerful," "addressed to the 
common reader," aimed at communicating enjoyment, bio-
graphical, often "rambling and discursive," "amateur" rather 
than "professional," "impressionistic" rather than "scientific." 
As a parting shot at American criticism, Professor Suther-
land quoted with approval Mr. Fiedler's proclamation of 
1950. 
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During the later years of the decade the campaign in 
America was carried somewhat vociferously into the news-
papers-for example, into the New York Times Book Review. 
Thus: February 15, 1959, the novelist Saul Bellow's front 
article "Deep Readers of the World, Beware." ("The Search 
for Symbols ... Misses All the Fun and Fact of the Story.") 
Or December 13 of the same year, the poet Karl Shapiro's 
equally conspicuous "What's the Matter with Poetry?" 
("A 'diseased art'" -"for this he blames a bloc of 'critic-
poets' entrenched in the universities.") Or May 15, 1960, 
from a writer on the other side of the Atlantic, David 
Daiches: "A Critical Look at Our Criticism," a protest 
against critical cliches-somewhat undercut by his admission 
that "every age has its own cliches, and that sometimes 
cliches are not cliches, or at least not bad cliches." (When they 
are bad, when not, would have been a new-critical question 
which Mr. Daiches avoided.) During these years and for a 
good many years earlier the same vein of thinking, or anti-
thinking, might be conveniently sampled ~lmost any week 
in the Times Book Review on the page entitled "Speaking of 
Books," written by J. Donald Adams. And the counterpart 
of it all in a British publication could be supplied from the 
Times Literary Supplement-in almost any number. The 
following from December 2, 1960, is a good enough ex-
ample: 
In England, as in America, we are faced every day with the 
miserable prospect of more and more criticism which has less and 
less interest for the general reader or connexion with contempo-
rary literature. Pedantry's latest disguise is that of many-sided 
urbanity, and the kind of people who a generation or two ago 
would have been out of harm's way collating editions of Tottel's 
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Miscellany are today making a nuisance of themselves with 
owlish reflections about Paradox, Tension, and Ambiguity, not to 
mention ponderous ruminations over Wit and Irony. 
With these words of an anonymous belletrist I conclude my 
series of illustrations, but the passage calls for one special 
remark before being left. It is untypical of the school of 
anticriticism in one respect, for the author has gone strangely 
out of his way to make enemies. With his scorn for sober 
learning (collating Tottel' s Miscellany) he is bidding for 
the alienation of at least one large party of his most natural 
allies, the old-guard resistance to criticism in America. 
II 
IT IS PERHAPS not possible that criticism should give these 
sentiments of the scholars and appreciators the lie direct, or 
even the countercheck quarrelsome. Certainly honor does 
not require it. Perhaps some concessions, stopping short 
of the abject, might be part of a tentative retort. 
I think the critical theorist ought to be ready to say that 
he has nothing really against the exercise of amateurism in 
literary discussion-the celebration of poetry as a record 
of some kind of "total revelation" or "vague but full report." 
He ought to be ready even to grant that there are times 
when this kind of talk may be the most appropriate thing-in 
a classroom perhaps, or on the front page of the New York 
Times Book Review, in the Saturday Review, or in the Times 
Literary Supplement. The only reservation the theorist 
need have about such critical impressionism, or expression-
ism, is that, after all, it does not carry us very far in our 
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cogitation about the nature and value of literature. It is 
not a very mature form of cognitive discourse. And the 
critic will hold that cogitation about the nature of literature 
is a worthwhile activity of intellect. And if its real relation 
to critical judgment and the habit of poetic appreciation is 
understood, it should inform and tone the mind for the 
better exercise of the hours of amateurism. It should im-
prove the "man of taste" and "the public critic." 
The notion of poetry as a simple kind of fullness of 
experience or vivid sensation, or the very quality of experi-
ence, was after all not unfamiliar to the critics who thirty 
years ago were "new" in America. It was one of the escapes 
from theoretical criticism against which they were most 
explicitly reacting-whether in the British tradition of the 
scholarly appreciators, or in rhapsodic expressions of the 
self, like that of Anatole France, or in the bright acrobatics 
of latter-day art-for-art's-sake, the Smart Set or the American 
Mercury, or whether finally in the scientifically fortified 
version of sensationalist poetics which was the most impres-
sive in that era, the "literary mind" of the psychologist Max 
Eastman. Some of the recent objectors to criticism are like 
very late comers to a conversation who have not taken the 
trouble to find out what the beginning, or even the middle, 
was about. 
But then, I think the critic ought to be ready to say that 
there is often enough some justification for the complaint 
against pedantry in criticism-even if, too, there is often 
very little understanding behind the complaint. For there 
are both pedantic and unpedantic ways of conceiving and 
living with any critical principle at all. And often enough, 
in proportion to the theoretic success of a principle, the 
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pedantic and wooden applications, rather than the habit of 
living or thinking with it, follow. I fear it is just the 
irritated realization that his own seminal essays of the 1920's 
had helped to produce a formal school, a generation, or two 
generations, of classroom practitioners and trade journal 
critics-a sense of being followed and acclaimed by a legion 
of disciplined epigonists-which led Mr. Eliot in some later 
utterances, and notably in the Minneapolis speech of 1956, 
to attempt a partial repudiation of his own earlier views. 
(And that of course accounts for the merely academic 
sound, the flabbiness, the somewhat weary belletrism of 
these recantations.) It is possible-this has been amply and 
unhappily demonstrated-to use conceptions like "paradox" 
and "ambiguity" as simple keys to be inserted into poems, 
or as tags to be tied to parts of poems. But then, the critic 
must surely be allowed to add, that is possible with any set 
of critical conceptions at all, any principles. The crop of 
pedantries that has followed in our time on the acceptance 
of the ironic principle has been no more absurd than, for 
instance, the use of romantic touchstones-the greatness of 
the author's soul betrayed in a line, the honest feeling, and 
vivid imagery, and all that, which became so automatic 
and so tedious during a much longer period of time. 
The principle of ironic opposition is nowadays flourished 
in its boldest distortions, not by practical critics hardening 
a pedantic routine, but by fiery didactics, the younger 
brethren of Prometheus and Ore. In sections II and III of 
the first essay in this book I have attempted to distinguish 
what I consider an inevitable and proper literary interest 
in the contraries from certain extreme gestures of the current 
Prometheans, certain loud, wild neighings of the "horses of 
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instruction." I illustrate the same theme at other places in 
the book and return to it emphatically in the last section 
of the last essay. 
The movement of the New Amateurism in American 
criticism ran a course of about ten years. Its ideas are still 
heard, but I believe not so loudly or so exultantly.2 The 
reason for this is not that there is no longer any audience 
for the ideas, or that the main targets of the attack, the 
critics "entrenched in the universities," are not still en-
trenched, or that there is not even a measure of truth in the 
accusations of the amateurs. The reason is simply that, 
having had their say, these anticritical voices no longer have 
anything to say. That is the nature of anticriticism. Or, so 
far as it is not merely an assault but pauses to "defend" 
itself, it does so with weapons other than its own "igno-
rance."3 Anticriticism is the end of something or aims to be. 
It proclaims a defeat. And maybe there has been a measure 
of defeat. Criticism has never, in this age or any other, 
triumphantly demonstrated its propositions and swept the 
board. But the effort to be critical, that is, to add to our 
enthusiasm for literature a measure of reflection about the 
experience and thus to justify it to ourselves and even to 
improve it, seems no more likely than literature itself to be 
permanently quelled. 
xix 
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HORSES OF WRATH: 
RECENT CRITICAL LESSONS 
IT IS NOT EASY to trace the steps by which we have 
arrived at a situation in literary criticism, or the steps by 
which critics in the past arrived at any one of their situa-
tions. At whatever moment in the past we elect, or chance, 
to begin our narrative, a good many things have to be taken 
for granted. Let me begin the unambitious story which I 
intend, or let me make a hasty departure into it, with 
German romanticism at about the time of Schiller, the 
Schlegels, and Schelling. This was a criticism, or a theory 
about poetry and about general reality, which occupied 
the most elevated intellectual ground of that day and 
probably the most elevated that any literary criticism within 
Western history has ever occupied. This was the time of 
the reaction, first strongly asserted by Kant, against analytic 
scepticism-the time of the visionary reshaping when think-
ing became creation, and philosophy hence became poetry 
or, in some versions, poetics or aesthetics. Poetics, history, 
folklore, and comparative religion came together; Friedrich 
Schlegel and Schelling rediscovered and explored the au-
thority of myth. After the hard, flat era of the eighteenth 
century, poetry along with metaphysics was revindicated 
as an exuberant vital utterance, an expression of trans-
cendent interest and worth. 
It has always been difficult, however, to make poetry the 
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whole of higher knowledge, the whole of moral, religious, 
and political authority. The romantic theory was in effect 
a highly ambiguous and double claim-a claim both for 
poetic freedom and for poetic responsibility. It was thus 
the cloud-capped starting point for certain quite opposite 
lines of poetic theory that come down through the nine-
teenth century toward our own day. One of these, moving 
from Kantian disinterest, formality, and beauty, through 
French academic aesthetics and then early symbolist and 
Parnassian poetics, was what we look back on as art-for-art's-
sake-the end-of-the-century gilded celebration of auton-
omous poetic power. At the level of general aesthetics and 
linguistics, the philosophy of Benedetto Croce is the vora-
ciously systematic expression of this view.1 Not so far 
removed from art-for-art's-sake as we might like to think, 
and in some phases part of it, was the movement, technically 
so much more subtle and more interesting to us, which came 
out of romantic "imagination" and "symbol" and became 
symbolisme. This seems to have come not so much from the 
German philosophers directly as through Coleridge and Poe 
(and probably Heine) to Baudelaire, and thence to the era of 
Mallarme and Wagner. Here was a much more subtle 
"music" of "ideas" than the neoclassic theory of painting 
the passions had conceived-and a new quasi-spiritual reac-
tion against the philosophy of science. 
But those kinds of theory, both pure art and symbolism, 
were directly at odds with three main kinds of theory that 
developed the opposite accent of the romantic heritage-not 
the accent on autonomous privilege but that on moral and 
social power and evolutionary responsibility. Here were 
three kinds of didacticism: one, the earliest and most fully 
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romantic, we may call the rhapsodic, the bardic, the 
prophetic, which is brandished for instance in the Defense 
of Poetry by Shelley or the Heroes and Hero Worship of 
Carlyle; a second, the most nearly allied to a proper literary 
interest, the classical humanism, severity, and loftiness, both 
German and French in origin, which is fully expressed in 
English by Matthew Arnold; a third, owing much to 
Hegelian dialectic, getting under way more slowly but more 
modern and more resolute, the Franco-Russian complex of 
ideas under the heads of the real, the natural, the social or 
the sociological. This last was the most didactic and the 
most confidently evolutionary of all. Tolstoy is the greatest 
literary artist who gave himself to this kind of theory. The 
vigorous retractation of a whole literary career which he 
wrote in his old age shows the social and equalitarian 
conscience at its closest to a genuine literary concern. 
Tolstoy on what is true and telling in literature, on what is 
effete, jaded, hedonistic, and merely aristocratic, hits hard, 
and we may have to take him into account in a way in which 
we do not have to take into account Zola on the novel as an 
experiment in a social-science laboratory or Marxist critics 
on literature as a blueprint of the new order. 
But in order to manage this little history, let me begin to 
pull it in now toward ourselves, toward the English lan-
guage, and toward America in the past forty years-and even 
toward the academic. (In academic criticism you see less 
genius than in some other kinds, but more deliberacy, 
self-consciousness, program, literalism, and repetition. When 
a critical conception arrives at academic status, it is a public 
fact, an established part of history.) 
Looking around the American critical scene during the 
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first decades of our century, you notice for one thing the 
flashy tail ends of the art-for-art' s-sake tradition, the cos-
mopolitanism of the Smart Set and the American Mercury 
writers. You notice also the continuation of Arnoldian 
humanism in the long influence of P. E. More and Irving 
Babbitt, and the approximate end of that humanism in the 
twin detonations of the anthologies for and against it in 
1930. You can see, too, the socio-real tradition, under the 
names of naturalism and Responsibilities of the Novelist, and 
the uglier name of Muck-raking, and also the coming of 
age of honest America, a matter of smoke and steel, the 
prairie schooner, and slabs of the sunburnt West. And then 
the most acutely didactic accent, the Marxist criticism of 
the 1930's-rampaging until it became obvious to the literary 
intelligences connected with it that this kind of thing would 
never do. International events, from the Finnish war on 
(whether relevantly or not), played their part here. 
Turning now to some issues other than that most directly 
drawn between freedom and didacticism, you can find, 
during the years between the wars, plenty of psychologism, 
and most obviously the Freudian kind, in the shape of moti-
vations for novels and poems pulled from the unconscious, 
and literary biographies rewritten into case histories and 
ordeals. Plunging for tragic and comic motives into depth 
psychology and anthropology goes back through Freud to 
Nietzschean rhapsody and repose and Hegelian conflict of 
ethical substance. And then there is the quieter kind of 
affectivism, the equipoise, the beautiful harmony of impulses, 
promoted by Richards and his colleagues in the twenties, 
which slips back through the exquisitely refined hedonism 
of Santayana to the affectivism connected with utilitarian 
Horses of Wrath 
ethics during the nineteenth century. J. S. Mill's two essays 
on poetry, for instance, show how this eighteenth-century 
heritage might get into criticism; they echo the way it had 
already done so in Wordsworth and Coleridge. 
But by and large, the literary discussion of the nineteenth 
century, unlike that of the eighteenth, had not been notable 
for any systematic affectivism. And when this romantic and 
aesthetic plea reappeared with Richards in the 1920's, it 
had so much to say about the mere incipience of impulses 
and their equipoise that it was a new witness for something 
like a classical disinterest or detachment. With all its up-
to-date paraphernalia of verbal analysis, Richardsian aes-
thetics was readily available or at least convertible for 
purposes of cognitive literary talk, and for that reason 
Richards became a venerable name in the schools and among 
analysts and grammarians, persons who recognized their 
business to be not the fanning nor the feeding and watering 
of emotions but the explication of the sources of emotion 
in the uses of language. 
All this connected of course readily enough with "neo-
classicism." I have been delaying only through purposes of 
climax and emphasis, not through absentmindedness, to say 
that looking around the critical landscape of that now remote 
period, one notices too the conspicuous figures of Pound 
and Eliot, deriving attitudes from the philosopher T. E. 
Hulme, from the precise grammatical statements of Gaur-
mont, and from the whole tide of the French symbolist and 
musically ironic poetics. (With Pound there is the thing 
called "imagism" too, and at least a flourish of something 
supposed or pretended to be due to the fact of Chinese 
ideographic writing. But that can hardly be important.) 
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Impersonality, craftsmanship, objectivity, hardness and clar-
ity of a kind, a union of emotion with verbal object, a norm 
of inclusiveness and reconciliation and hence a close inter-
dependence of drama, irony, ambiguity, and metaphor, or 
the near equivalence of these four-such ideas made up 
the new system as it worked its way into practical criticism 
about 1935 or 1940. And, however far short it fell of being 
able to convince old-line literary historians or to demon-
strate beyond appeal that this or that poem meant this much 
or that much or was excellent or not, the arrival of this kind 
of criticism was a good thing and meant a new technical 
and objective interest in poetry. 
II 
BuT CRITICAL IDEAS, somewhat like poetry itself, do not 
stand still very long. The past twenty-five years on the 
English-speaking critical front have seen several new, or 
newish, large critical claims making headway. 
The most academic, the most professional, the most schol-
arly of these has perhaps been the kind of graduate-school 
study which seeks to substitute for the poem, not the author, 
as in former decades, but precisely and deliberately the 
audience for which the author may in any sense be proved 
to have written the poem. If we look back to the mid-
eighteenth-century, at the first clear start of the modern 
historical method, in such documents as Thomas Warton's 
Observations on the Faerie Queene of Spenser, Bishop 
Hurd's Letters on Chivalry and Romance, or even Johnson's 
Preface to Shakespeare, we can see that the incipient his-
toricism of these authors, their sympathy for the Gothic or 
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the Elizabethan, hesitates somewhat between a plea for 
tolerance of antique authors, despite the barbarous ages 
in which they wrote, and a plea for appreciation of the 
inspirational opportunities afforded by those very ages. But 
the decisive concept for the time was personal "genius"; 
that is, criticism was on the side of Shakespeare in spite of 
his Elizabethan handicaps. In the nineteenth century there 
was nationalism, folklorism, and cultural determinism-the 
race, milieu, and moment of Taine's History. But literary 
studies, especially in England, tended to marshal such 
interests rather squarely behind the author. That is, they 
were important because they showed the mind of the author, 
what made him write the way he did. Sainte-Beuve's 
profession of intense interest in the author's boyhood, his 
brothers and sisters, his parents and his grandparents, is an 
extreme yet typical instance of such Shandeyan depth in 
criticism. Despite the cultural massiveness of Courthope's 
History of English Poetry, it is mainly right to say that 
English and American literary research (following good 
continental models) continued until fairly recent years to 
be a pursuit of the author, his whole history, both internal 
and external, and his habitat. It requires perhaps only a 
tilt of the mirror to turn the habitat into the author's 
audience. And the audience had of course all along received 
attention. It was clearly one name for the socio-real focus. 
But to shift the accent of value in academic research (the 
accent on both the value of poetry itself and the value of 
research into poetic history) was yet another step, and that 
has been a fairly recent one-and perhaps only halting. 
Until recently it had been the normal aim of academic 
research to be able to announce: "And thus we prove what 
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the author was trying to say," "thus we prove his learning 
and his accuracy," "thus we prove his sincerity," or "thus we 
prove his deep feeling." But a new mode, prominent during 
the later 1940's and the 1950's, seemed to entertain the aim 
of announcing: "And thus we prove that the author's poem 
was addressed to the audience of his day, or to the real 
audience, or to the audience that mattered," "thus he knew 
what he was doing, and thus he was a good author." This 
was not just a rumor out of the realms of higher conversa-
tion but an actually discernible phenomenon. Numerous 
articles in journals and books from university presses had 
titles referring to Shakespeare's Audience, to the Restoration 
courtier, to The Theatrical Audience in the Time of Garrick, 
to the rise of a reading public, to the number of Victorian 
persons who bought Macaulay's History of England or Ten-
nyson's Maud. A thoughtful account of the theoretical 
implications of this trend appeared in F. W. Bateson's book 
of 1950, English Poetry: A Critical Introduction. The es-
sential function of poetry is "the expression in language of 
the sense of social solidarity." And Bateson believed, "on the 
evidence of the poetry," that "at any one period" there was 
"only one social group in England that was functioning 
healthily." If we modern readers want to understand a 
poem of the past, "we need to be able to identify ourselves 
as far as possible with its original readers, the poet's con-
temporaries, whose ideal response to the poem in fact 
constitutes its meaning." 
A violent clash between such views and those of the 
school of close analysis would seem not to have been 
strictly necessary. The musings of at least one analyst, 
William Empson, had all along been likely to fray out into 
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the loose ends of what this or that person in the seventeenth 
century may have been thinking, and his book of 1951, 
The Structure of Complex Words, in such chapters as that 
on the salon standard of wit in Pope's day, showed a very 
refined social orientation. On the other hand, one was also 
likely to encounter a certain simpler kind of social con-
textualism, an open-air view of poetry such as that ex-
pounded by the Marxist critic Edwin Berry Burgum in his 
article on "The Cult of the Complex in Poetry" in the issue 
of Science and Society for the winter of 1951. The notion 
here is that we put the words of a poem not so much 
together and against one another as naked and alone or 
in very small clumps against the special yet open context 
of their cultural origin. The word earth in a passage of 
Aeschylus is itself, and especially for the Greeks, a complex 
value, and the word Zeus another and antithetic value. 
"The simplest idea becomes complex when related to human 
experience." Thus a kind of evaluative atomism results from 
facing the audience. Or, a somewhat different emphasis in 
historical study might produce a kind of evaluative diffusion. 
Roy Harvey Pearce's "Historicism Once More" in the Kenyon 
Review (Autumn, 1958), makes a plea for a new radical 
relativism and at the same time for something so innocent 
as merely a greater concreteness or existential fullness of 
sympathy for the various moments of the historic past, "the 
authentic existence of the other." 
In a poem there is outline, texture, form; and there is something 
happening ... something still happening .... As it still happens, 
it brings, inseparably, the life of its culture with it. If we accept 
the form, we accept the life. If we accept the life, we accept 
the culture. This is historical understanding and historical 
knowledge. 
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We have come, therefore, to the deep end of historical criticism.2 
To put the import of this kind of historicism briefly: The 
old "New Critics" were now accused of being not scientific 
enough because in their fear of history they would not face 
the facts. But it turned out also that they were being too 
scientific, in that their categories did not pay enough respect 
to the inviolable concreteness of history, the authentic 
existence. A sort of counterpart to Mr. Pearce on the other 
side of the Atlantic was, I should say, Miss Helen Gardner 
in her two series of lectures (London, 1953; Durham, 1956) 
-where she seemed to wish to register a kind of plain 
reader's protest against criticism, a plea for the warm and 
life-like fullness of an author or work and thus for the 
enlargement of our own imaginative life, and for something 
which she called "style" in literature (but which, strangely 
enough, she supposed to be quite different from "form") 3 
-all this of course in opposition to the modern excess of 
both symbolism and analysis in critical reading. 
There is an obvious affinity between this kind of his-
toricism and the New Amateurism which I have described 
in my Introduction. At the same time, Miss Gardner par-
ticipated in the more usual complaint of the literary historian 
against modern critics-that the critic, through insufficient 
recourse to the dictionary, was unaware of the author's 
literal and primary meaning. Consult, for instance, Miss 
Rosamond Tuve, or the late C. S. Lewis in his Studies in 
Words. In this version of the complaint, the historian stands 
forward as a very severe purist, a champion of, and believer 
in, a very refined degree of abstractionism, of word-splitting, 
of air-tight univocal meanings. It is difficult really to 
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reconcile these two kinds of historicism, though they march 
fairly close together. 
III 
THE ACTUAL bad conscience which developed during the 
1950's in some critics with regard to nice analysis was 
expressed not only in direct misgivings about analysis, or 
pleas for open contextual reading, but also partly in the 
form of proclamations about the need of doing justice to the 
overall structures of stories and dramas, their motives, plots, 
actions, tragic rhythms, their deeper, wider, and more bulky 
symbolism, their bigger meaning-in short, all that part and 
aspect of them which might be too massive and too im-
portant to be penetrated by verbal criticism. This kind of 
conscience had had a summary and in some respects quite 
impressive exposition a little more than a hundred years 
earlier in Matthew Arnold's Preface to his Poems of 1853, 
where he repented of the inaction or suicidally limited 
action of Empedocles, appealed to the great serious actions 
of the Greek tragedies, and thought Shakespeare enjoyed 
such rhetorical virtuosity that he had been a bad influence 
on romantic poets, notably on Keats. Keats, like a modern 
critic before the bar in Chicago, was too much interested in 
words and images.4 These ideas of Arnold's were part of his 
ambitious humanistic and moralistic program for literature, 
which, as we have said, was one branch of postromantic 
didacticism. Later on there had been a different criticism 
concerning prose fiction, not that of Zola, but that of 
Flaubert, James, and Ford, and this, I think, was not so 
far from the spirit of symbolist poetics. It does not appear 
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that Henry James was much afraid of being caught in the 
mesh of words or of piddling away his effort on the texture 
or surface of things. If a woman put her hand on a table 
and looked at him in a certain way, that was for James, or 
for one of his characters, an event. And the event inter-
locked with every other event in the world. The artist tried 
to conjure or pretend some kind of circle around it. It is not 
in these great theorists of prose fiction that you find scruples 
against dallying with the details of the medium. But you 
do, as I have suggested above, find it again more recently, 
and not only in high academic fortified places built on 
supposedly neo-Aristotelian principles, but faring forth in 
more momentous campaigns under the standard of myth 
and the ritual origins. Here metaphor is action, and big 
action. For the first time since Dryden and Le Bossu the 
literary gist is supposed to be big enough and solid enough 
so that you would think it could be rendered essentially 
from one language to another. The rhythm of the tragic 
idea-the going out in quest, the confrontation and passion, 
the discovery or education-is the big thing. One book that 
invests this theory with a very shrewd kind of persuasion, 
a most earnest drag, is Francis Fergusson's Idea of a Theatre. 
The action of the one little man, the Aristotelian protagonist, 
here becomes a community action or a "psychic motif." The 
real protagonist turns out to be the chorus-as presumably it 
does in some actual non-Aristotelian drama of today. 
But we have now named a thing which must be dis-
tinguished as another and no doubt the most important 
among recent critical trends. Surely the hugest cloudy 
symbol, the most threatening, of our last twenty-five years in 
literary criticism is the principle of criticism by myth and 
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ritual origin. It is true that this new mythopoeic interest is 
not always associated with any strong mistrust of rhetorical 
inspection. Rather the opposite. Expression and symbolism 
make a ready enough alliance with myth and ritual. This 
is in the nature of things. For all four are theories of the 
creative imagination, the fiat of the human spirit as deity 
or as participating in deity. Herder and Schelling and 
Cassirer (with Susanne Langer) join Levy-Bruhl and Frazer 
and the other Cambridge classical anthropologists (Harrison, 
Murray, Cornford) in the secularization of the spirit accord-
ing to the philosophy of myth or of symbolic form. Philip 
Wheelwright's Burning Fountain, one important book of the 
1950's in the mythic mode, was a magnificent synopsis of 
relations between a special semantics on the one hand and 
on the other ritual anthropology interpreted by the darkness 
visible of depth psychology. The semantics states the dif-
ference between a scientifically bare "steno-language" and 
the "plurisignations," the trans-logical "depth-language," com-
mon to poetry, myth, religion, and metaphysics. The an-
thropology dwells on hereditary and "preconsciously rooted" 
symbols-symbols of the "threshold," the world view of 
primitive man, the death and rebirth of the vegetation god. 
(The Fire Sermon of Buddha, the Oresteia of Aeschylus, 
the Four Quartets of Eliot may be cited to define the infra-
red range of illustration.) To a reader who had the new 
yearning for a grossly structural poetics, Wheelwright's book 
may well have looked like a deplorable recelebration of 
imagery and thematic "para-plots." And in its insistence on 
a special semantics for poetry and myth, it actually seemed 
to one reviewer (Meyer Abrams in the Kenyon Review) like 
a surrender to positivistic logic by allowing that logic to 
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prescribe that the grounds of a debate about poetry should 
be analytic and linguistic. 
But again, myth and ritual (as I have indicated we may 
read in Francis Fergusson's book) are patterns of action, 
and of large action. In that way they can have their easy 
enough connection with an antiverbal poetics. And they 
stress what is large and public about poetry, what can give 
it religious and social dignity and didactic claims. The 
validation for the new myth philosophy is thought to lie in 
the primitive racial unconscious, in the Jungian "archetypes" 
or "primordial images." Thus it eschews the risky appeal 
to objectivity, but plunges, in the vast teservoir of racial 
and prelogical unconsciousness, for a base that is intersub-
jective or at least collective. It arrives at the phase of 
prophetic, of total apocalyptic, vision. (All literature is a 
displaced or indirect mythology, and all literary works are 
parts or moments of one total apocalyptic work. Literature 
is made of other literature. The one great literary work or 
vision is the total of man's divinely human, created reality.) 
Along with the Greeks and the Indians (from whom Fried-
rich Schlegel also once drew inspiration) there is Milton, 
there is Blake, there is Melville, there is Yeats (supplying 
his own theoretical Vision of primary and antithetic cul-
tures), there is Eliot, there is Joyce, and maybe there is 
Faulkner. It is now time to notice what both myth and gross 
poetic structure have in common with the recent academic 
orientation toward the poetic audience. The three new 
trends have in common a horizontal or folkways alignment 
(in contrast to the vertical and aristocratic alignment of the 
Eliot formalism) . All three show to some degree the didactic 
and evangelizing interest which was prepared in the nine-
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teenth-century socio-real tradition. Despite the fact that 
sociology does come out of the nineteenth century, the 
humanism and the literary theory in English and French 
during the century were mainly inspirational, individualistic, 
and heroic. It is the present century, as we all know, which 
is the century of the common man, the realization of the 
Revolt of the Masses. The literary trends I have named 
conceive men, whether common or elite, in large multiples, 
thinking and responding in classes. At the same time the 
romantic lyric focus in literary criticism has given way to a 
newly intense interest in, and reliance on, the largest and 
most readily mythologized forms of literature, epic, drama, 
and the prose novel. 
Some of the ideas of the arch-mythopoeist of our time 
have been foreshadowed, in fact appropriated, in the pre-
ceding paragraph. Northrop Frye's Fearful Symmetry (1949) 
announced in the last chapter the Blakean inspiration of an 
apocalyptic construct which came to realization in his Four 
Essays entitled Anatomy of Criticism ( 1957). Earlier drafts 
and later applications are collected in his Fables of Identity 
( 1963). The Anatomy, especially in its "Polemical Introduc-
tion," is written from an exceedingly keen awareness of the 
history of criticism and of the problems for criticism which 
we have just been surveying. It intends to escape from 
the main problem of criticism-that of literary evaluation-by 
the announcement of a very bold separation-that is, simply 
a separation of the act of "criticizing" literature from the 
act of valuing it. 
This is something like what both Eliot and Richards at 
moments in their thought during the 1920's had touched 
upon, but it now appears with a surpassing starkness and 
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insistence. I refrain from saying "with systematic insistence," 
because, although the whole volume is an astonishing 
invention, I believe that the confrontation of the concepts 
of value and criticism is never in fact squarely made, and 
not only that the Four Essays themselves are in fact heavily 
charged with value assertions and implications, but that the 
Polemical Introduction, where the main argument about 
value is carried on, is notable for a series of finely disguised 
contradictions in this respect. 
This is an Introduction which manages to talk at one 
place about the "greatest classics," the "profound master-
pieces" (those which best exhibit the primitive mythic 
formulas), and to distinguish these from "mediocre work," 
and yet in another place to say that historical criticism 
ought to develop towards a "total and indiscriminate ac-
ceptance," and that "on the ethical level ... criticism has no 
business to react against things, but should show a steady 
advance toward undiscriminating catholicity." Mr. Frye 
recognizes that we will have our valuing of poetry, we must 
have it, and it does mean something. Yet it is all subjective 
and just a part of the history of taste and something which 
may be called "public criticism" -which has been carried 
on by Lamb, Hazlitt, Arnold, Sainte-Beuve. What we have 
never yet had and what we need is a scientific criticism, an 
objective conceptual system which (in a strictly purified 
literary way) will "establish an authority" -for the public 
critic and the man of taste-though at the same time it will 
not be concerned at all with good and bad in literature and, 
most surprising of all, must never get itself mixed up with 
the actual "experience" of literature . 
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Like the beaver, which according to some sort of bestiary, 
and no doubt archetypal, tradition would, when pursued, 
bite off certain parts of its anatomy and throw them to the 
pursuers, this kind of theory makes a radical gesture of 
sterilizing itself of the usually troublesome value attach-
ments. At the end of his Polemical Introduction, the author 
stands before us in the shining white garments, the rubber 
gloves, of the anatomist-the passionately neutral dissector. 
Frye's book, as I have suggested, stands at the summit of 
mythopoeic criticism to date. It achieves some sort of 
maximum of hyper-Aristotelian, minutely subdivided con-
ceptualization, rampant pigeonholing, an earnest prolifera-
tion, a supedoetation of archetypal phantoms, of heroes, 
myths, modes, cycles. And the values which it consistently 
promotes are all the "great" values of the archetypal patterns 
of human experience. There is a legitimate sense in which 
the book represents all that the resurgent amateurs and 
appreciators, the professed anticritics of the 1950's were 
protesting against. On the other hand, there is a sense in 
which it is the achievement of all that any amateur could 
dream. For, as one reviewer, again Meyer Abrams, in the 
University of Toronto Quarterly, has put it, the categories 
of Frye are not really scientific, but belong rather to imagina-
tive metaphysics, the "monistic compulsion of the human 
spirit." Seeing these categories is like seeing the whole 
world to be full of Sir Thomas Browne's quincunxes, rather 
than like finding four-leaf clovers in a field. "Could even 
an initiate," asks Abrams, "predict, in advance of publication, 
that Frye would discover" a "displaced" form of the "dragon-
killing myth in the cave episode in Tom Sawyer?" 
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IV 
0NE IMPORT ANT THING to be noted about this moment in 
mythopoeic criticism is a certain kind of infidelity to its 
origins. In America it is strongly oriented toward the 
apocalyptic tradition in English poetry-Milton and Blake 
specifically-and nowhere more than in Frye, who first got 
considerable notice by his book on Blake the prophet, the 
title of which, Fearful Symmetry, looks in retrospect as if it 
should have been saved for the later Anatomy. The mul-
tiplication of entities in the Anatomy, the tables and levels 
of meaning, are in one sense a fair enough parallel to and 
extension of the Blakean prophetic universe. Yet they 
represent too a certain important contrast to the more largely 
molten, cloudy, and indefinite universe of Blake. What 
another critic has called the inherent or "built-in haziness" 
of myth criticism," gives way in Frye's system to a super-
complication and crisscrossing of categories, like lines of 
many colors across an ordnance map, what one might call 
a certain built-in maziness of "new" myth criticism. 
The energy which keeps the categories molten in Blake 
is of course the fire of the contraries. The Marriage of 
Heaven and Hell is in no danger of ever hardening into any 
permanently recognizable image. Frye, as I have indicated, 
inhabits the Blakean furnace comfortably enough; he knows 
all about that. Perhaps he would say it is simply to be taken 
for granted. And perhaps so. A generation of critics today, 
especially in America-the younger evangelists of Blake and 
of Yeats-is not likely to suffer from absentmindedness 
regarding the lovely colors of combustion, the fiery perma-
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nent discontent which may be generated by contemplating 
the gospel of contraries. 
The idea of harmony in spite of conflict, or simple recon-
ciliation of apparent or superficial conflict, is a staple Greek 
and Roman, Medieval and Renaissance, idea. The idea of 
harmony, or at least of some desirable wholeness or sanity 
or salvation, only because of or through some kind of strife 
of contraries may not at first sound much different, but the 
difference between these ideas is actually profound-the 
difference, for example, between Satan and Prometheus. 
Creative conflict is the heart of romantic poetics and in 
particular of Blake's poetics. It is perhaps a good enough 
heart of a poetics. At the same time, this doctrine lends 
itself peculiarly to a certain grand obscurity about the rela-
tion of poetics and poetry to the life of actuality. Blake 
himself is an excellent model for confusion among our 
present critics. His most brilliantly mysterious tabloid of 
the doctrine is his Marriage of Heaven and Hell.6 
The Tygers of Wrath are Wiser than the Horses of Instruction 
Perhaps they are-at least sometimes. But what feeds the 
wrath of the tigers? The Marriage of Heaven and Hell in 
one of its phases celebrates rebellious energy in its own 
right, making rebellion a creative and sufficient principle 
of reality and human action, but then, moving inevitably to 
a complementary phase, this philosophy turns out to be, just 
like any other rebellious philosophy, only a preface for the 
supplanting of orthodoxy. 
The whole creation will ... appear infinite and holy .... This 
will come to pass by an improvement of sensual enjoyment . 
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A certain obscurity in Blake's philosophy-about the differ-
ence between his own mind and the whole universe, about 
the difference between what it is to understand and face 
the fires of strife and what it is to live for and rejoice only in 
them-may go far to account for the corruption of a certain 
amount of his poetry. To take the shortest kind of example 
available, I will advance the opinion that such lyrics as 
"The Ecchoing Green" and "London" are good poems, and 
one thing that makes them good is that they stay inside the 
real world-the village scene, the London scene. Such ideas 
of paradox and discord as these poems generate are not 
forced and elected but faced and delicately rendered out 
of the very materials of the poems. On the other hand I will 
make the assertion that such a poem as "My Pretty Rose 
Tree" is a weak little poem, and that the reason is that here 
the mythographer of contraries has altogether lost his footing 
in reality and has ascended into the stratum of whimsy. 
We may be able to discern some features of reality behind 
this garden fable, but they are the features of a comedy of 
manners, and they wear all too uncomfortably this solemn 
and arbitrary prettification. 
Coleridge's passage on the reconciliation of opposites, 
which was quoted in 1918 by Alice Snyder in a monograph 
on that subject, and then by Eliot, and by Richards, and 
latterly has been quoted by almost everyone else, is perhaps 
too well known to need further mention here. But another 
English romantic poet who was much absorbed in "the 
hateful siege of contraries" was Keats.7 
Though a quarrel in the Streets is a thing to be hated, the 
energies displayed in it are fine; the commonest Man shows a 
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grace in his quarrel. ... This is the very thing in which consists 
poetry. 
Perhaps too easy, somewhat too simple. Perhaps not enough 
attention is paid to the opponent. Perhaps Keats did not 
live long enough to achieve a maximum theoretical realiza-
tion of what is so delicately caught in the fabric of his great 
odes or what can be consulted as raw life experience, the 
anguish of choice, in so many of his letters. 
Probably it was no one English romantic poet, but their 
greatest prophetic inheritor, W. B. Yeats, who knew, before 
the end, as deeply as any, all that was at stake-neither the 
easy solution of the witness of a street fight nor the equally 
easy celebration of the eternal Ore. Yeats knew the experi-
ence of prolonged frustration, he knew the poetry that 
could come of this; and he knew the felicity of Solomon and 
Sheba, he knew the dangers of this to the man as poet. 
Probably no man has kept up, eked out, teased along so 
successfully, through closing phases of a long career, the 
sense of uncertainty and noncommital, of ironic unrest. Out 
of this sprang the vital utterance of the aging poet. 
The Soul. Look on that fire, salvation walks within. 
The Heart. What theme had Homer but original sin? 
Homer is my example and his unchristened heart. 
I must lie down where all the ladders start, 
In the foul rag-and-bone shop of the heart. 
Yeats I think may be said to have attained to something like 
a maximum technical knowledge of how the cultivation of 
the contraries is maintained . 
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v 
LET us ASK ourselves a blunt question: Is a theory of litera-
ture as tension of opposites a theory of literary autonomy? 
or a didactic theory? A charter of literary freedom? or a 
directive of moral choice? Richards the psychologist with 
his tenderly balanced scepticisms and his norm of "sincerity," 
Eliot with his "demon of doubt which is inseparable from 
the spirit of belief," and the New Critics, with their repeated 
major premises of "interest," "drama," and "metaphor" ad-
vancing often enough to an emphasis on "inclusiveness" and 
"maturity," have tended at moments unhappily toward the 
didactic. 
Murray Krieger, in his book entitled The New Apologists 
for Poetry ( 1956), asked some difficult questions about the 
"self-containment" of the poetic "context" and its relation 
to the world of reality. Krieger has always made a strenuous 
effort, and perhaps more successfully than anybody else, to 
sharpen the dilemmas of critical dialectic to a feather edge. 
In the final chapter of a later book The Tragic Vision ( 1960), 
he persists in his earlier line of inquiry, carrying it this time 
to the level of what he calls "thematics"-the philosophic 
commitments of poetry. And thus: 
It may, of course, seem at best silly and at worst heretically 
presumptuous for a critic to argue for an intolerable world view 
just to satisfy the needs of an aesthetic and a literary method. 
But ... it is really a commonplace to say that every poet must, 
at least provisionally, be something of a Manichaean. This is but 
a way of our asking him not to stack the cards .... But if he does 
no more than this-if, that is, he submits his thesis to the hellfires 
of antithesis with no doubt of the issue and only to allow his 
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thesis to be earned the hard way-he is in no more danger of 
heresy than is any profound version of Christianity that is willing 
to take into account all worldly imperfections without reducing 
the extent or the goodness of God's sway .... this position, 
however mature and qualified, cannot finally make literature 
more than "Platonic," bearing its propositional thesis. 
This is making things about as difficult as they can be made 
for either a poet or a critic who wishes to retain, along with 
his aesthetic noncommitment, the feeling of a practical 
human being. And perhaps it will have to be conceded 
that within the pure literary perspective the claims of belief 
and action are difficult enough. But larger offstage questions 
do make a clamorous demand and will be heard from the 
wings. 
The following collocation of materials has been arranged 
by me with the special design of provoking the Prometheans. 
Of course they will cry "unfair." It must be unfair. But if 
any Promethean will make the effort to explain why it is 
unfair, much, very much may be explained. 
James Brown, 45 years old, of Devon, was sentenced to life in 
prison today for the strangling of a high school girl last October . 
. . . A confession read to the jury during the trial told how Brown 
became aroused as he watched the girl knitting during a com-
mittee meeting at the Devon County Grange last October 20 .... 
Brown followed the girl in his car after the meeting .... 
-From a New England newspaper, during the spring of a 
recent year (names and dates adapted). 
He who desires but acts not, breeds pestilence. 
Sooner murder an infant in its cradle than nurse unacted desires. 
-William Blake again, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell . 
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There are two alternatives to nursing an unacted desire. One 
is to suppress the desire; the other is to act it. I take it there 
can be no doubt as to which Blake thought he meant, if he 
had to mean either. The verbal achievement of this "Prov-
erb of Hell" is that the starkness of a choice is covered in 
the ugly word nurse. 
The Manichaean, the Dionysian, the Nietzschean note 
which creeps into so much criticism can be listened to much 
more thunderously (and perhaps more instructively) in 
certain chapters of Russian fiction . 
. . . you must go and deny, without denial there's no criticism 
and what would a journal be without a column of criticism. 
Without criticism it would be nothing but one "hosannah." 
But nothing but hosannah is not enough for life, the hosannah 
must be tried in the crucible of doubt .... I ... simply ask for 
annihilation. No, live, I am told, for there'd be nothing without 
you. If everything in the universe were sensible, nothing would 
happen .... Suffering is life. Without suffering, what would be 
the pleasure of it? It would be transformed into an endless 
church service; it would be holy, but tedious. 
I know, of course, there's a secret in it, but they won't tell me 
the secret for anything, for then perhaps, seeing the meaning of 
it, I might bawl hosannah, and the indispensable minus would 
disappear at once, and good sense would reign supreme through-
out the whole world. And that, of course, would mean the end 
of everything. 
These words are spoken, of course, by the Devil-the alterego 
of Ivan Karamazov-the night before his brother's trial for 
murder, as Ivan lapses into a brain fever. Through pride, 
perversity, and ironic mistrust of self, he will sabotage his 
own testimony and thus bring about the notable "miscar-
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riage of justice" which is the grotesque climax of that 
terrible story. 
Or let us listen to a more severely abstract idiom-that of a 
writer in the Philosophical Review for July, 1957. This 
writer devotes some pages to urging what might seem to a 
casual reader a rather bald matter, namely, that there is an 
important difference between "moral worth" and "moral 
credit." 
We enjoin persons (including ourselves) not only to perform 
right acts but also to develop in themselves dispositions to per-
form right acts from good motives, to do those things which are 
morally worthy. But we do not enjoin anyone to perform 
morally creditable acts, for this would mean saying to him, 
"Perform morally worthy acts against unfavorable circumstances." 
If unfavorable circumstances are present, we shall hold up the 
ideal of performing morally worthy acts in spite of such odds, of 
course, and this is one of our most highly valued character ideals. 
But if morally creditable acts as such were directly commanded 
or enjoined, agents would be under an obligation to set up such 
odds for themselves in order that these might then be overcome. 
Many writers have commented on the moral absurdity of such an 
ideal.8 
Self-administered doses of division-this enterprise may be 
respectable enough so long as it is neurotic. The more 
deliberate and coolly elected the anguish is, the sillier it 
seems. In the large world of reality around us, if the stakes 
are set high enough, we will not have much difficulty in 
coming to the conclusion that hesitation and bewilderment, 
endless debate and conflict, are not actually viable objects 
of human choice. In the intensely reflexive conflicts, the 
introspective depths, of literature it is perhaps less easy to 
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see this. But it is not impossible. In the age of Johnson, Sir 
Joshua portrayed Garrick courted simultaneously by the 
Muses of Tragedy and Comedy: One side of his face in a 
comfortable gloom, the other lit by a queasy smile. "How 
happy could he be with either, were t'other dear charmer 
away." An illustration in Arthur Koestler's Insight and Out-
look shows how in more recent days the same external effect 
is achieved by the selective application of galvanic charges 
to the muscles of the human jaw. 
VI 
BuT LET us back off and reapproach some of these problems 
at an easier pace. One part of the difficulty about the myth 
and ritual claims has all along been their solemnity-the deep 
cathartic function and the vast canonical subject matters, the 
cycles of death and rebirth, the contrasts of celestial and 
demonic, which they impute to or prescribe for the poetry 
of serious worth. These ideas may be called unhistorical. 
Like eighteenth-century Gothicists and Druidists, the myth 
critics want to push us back into some prelogical and hence 
preliterary supposed state of very somberly serious and mys-
terious mentality. And hence they are forgetting where 
they are in history and are overlooking at least two great 
types of lesson: the lesson of religion, especially that of the 
Hebrew and Christian religion-which is the true lesson of 
solemnity-and the lesson of accomplished poetry, in Homer, 
let us say, in Horace, in Dante, Shakespeare, Pope, which is 
surely a different kind of lesson. I will run the risk of 
seeming frivolous by saying that it is much less like a lesson 
of solemnity than a lesson of strife and fun. And to round 
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out our pattern of competing principles, let me add a third 
modern lesson, that of abstract philosophy. 
The ancient and pagan division of poetry into tragic and 
comic, while it is a division, is also an inclusion and a 
suggestion that the two things may be complementary. On 
the other hand, there is Plato, especially in the Philebus or, 
as the Cambridge translation of 1945 calls it, Plato's Ex-
amination of Pleasure, saying that the pure kind of pleasure 
arising, for instance, from the knowledge of geometric 
forms is better than the impure pleasures offered by com-
edy and tragedy which arise from pain and certain kinds of 
triumph over pain (as in life itself, which is at once tragic 
and comic). This kind of Platonism, the numerical and 
geometric, may be traced here and there down through 
the centuries, in Augustine and Boethius (where the orienta-
tion is musical), in eighteenth-century reasoners on order 
and harmony like Hutcheson, where the orientation may be 
again visual. During the early part of our own century the 
same thing, with frequent appeals to Plato's Philebus, has 
appeared in the aesthetics of "significant form." The ideas 
of Bell, Fry, and Wilenski, or of Jay Hambidge, on painting 
and sculpture have a clear enough resemblance to art-for-
art's-sake in the phase of Whistler and Wilde, and this whole 
school of formalism (intent on the "significance" of the cube, 
the "significance" of the cylinder, as well as on the porcelain 
nicety of certain French verse forms) has contributed a 
shade of meaning to the term "formalist" when it has been 
used in a merely polemic way during the recent course of 
literary debate. Nevertheless, the school of significant form 
provides us with a legitimate and sufficiently sharp modern 
contrast both to literary taste and to critical analysis accord-
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ing to the principles of tension, drama, metaphor, paradox, 
irony, and wit. Another early modem solution to the prob-
lem was the opposite of the Platonic, and just as extreme. 
This was the eighteenth-century resolution by surrender to 
feelings-whether dismal or tender. The analysis of wit has 
been equally an opponent of that. Thus I find no difficulty in 
explaining to myself a liking for the American school of 
ironists and for what they have in common with the theory 
that prevailed in the time of Coleridge and the Germans. 
Yet I am ready to admit also that the norm of irony 
gives me some difficulty in relating my thoughts about poetry 
to my thoughts about the rest of life. The reconciliation of 
opposites as it was meditated by Schelling and Coleridge 
had a largely metaphysical bearing. How to get subject and 
object together and yet explain their distinctness; how to 
unify inner and outer, general and particular, thought and 
emotion, art and nature, or a longer series of almost any 
such opposites one might name-this was the speculation that 
preoccupied these deeply introspective, transcendentally-
minded men. An irony of a more darkly moral coloring, a 
sardonic self-transcendence, was known to Friedrich Schlegel 
and others. The twentieth-century American irony of poetic 
inclusiveness, looking back to conversational ironic sym-
bolism, and finding a theoretical hint in quotations from 
Coleridge by Eliot and Richards, has had a strongly emotive 
and at times a moral accent. There is a direct concern with 
human affairs and human values here (human "interests"), 
good and evil, pleasure and pain, rather than precisely with 
the mysteries of knowledge and creation, the activity of 
that "synthetic and magical power" the imagination. It 
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seems to me that the recent ironists have put a hard problem 
very compellingly. 
Pain and destruction are the two great components of 
the problem. You can show that pleasure is only an elusive 
and phantasmal byproduct of things and qualities; it cannot 
be pursued in itself with any success; and you can subsume 
pleasure under the head of interest, which is the general 
affective counterpart of knowledge and objects. But pain is 
not like that; it can sometimes be avoided (that is, it does 
not always increase through flight, as pleasure diminishes 
through pursuit); and when it cannot be avoided we wish it 
could be. It is one of the most positive experiences we have. 
On the other hand, destruction is clearly negative, the 
termination of experience, being, and interest. But then 
the question here is: Why? There is a religious answer that 
speaks of patience and atonement. This answer is not at 
odds with poetry, but neither is it available to poetry as a 
formal solution to the poetic problem. 
Let us say that we recognize the fact of material con-
creteness in human experience, and though matter itself 
be not evil (as in the Persian scheme), yet it does seem the 
plausible enough ground for some kind of dualism, division, 
tension, and conflict, the clash of desires, and evil and pain. 
Spirit and matter, supernatural and natural, good and evil, 
these tend to line up as parallel oppositions. Even so rarefied 
and geometric a material concept as that of symmetry has 
its danger for the concept of beauty in unity. How could 
symmetry be part of the definition of beauty? Think, says 
Plotinus, what that doctrine leads us to: "Only a compound 
can be beautiful, never anything devoid of parts" ( I.vi.l) . 
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But parts and composition (and decomposition) seem to be 
inescapable in the human situation, and on the modern view, 
art, especially verbal art, confronts this fact. We say that 
art ought to have the concreteness of recognition and 
inclusion; it ought to have tension, balance, wholeness. 
Anybody can see that there could never be any drama or 
story, either comic or tragic, without evil. Nor for that 
matter (though this may not at first glance be so obvious) 
could there be any pastoral or idyllic retreat, any didactic or 
satiric warning, any lyric complaint-or any lyric rejoicing-
so far are the springs of human rejoicing buried in the pos-
sibility, the threat, the memory of sorrow. About hallelujahs 
in Heaven we know next to nothing. 
Of course we will say that we don't call evil itself, or 
division, or conflict, desirable things. We only call facing 
up to them, facing up to the human predicament, a desirable 
and mature state of soul and the right model and course 
of a mature poetic art. And I think there is some comfort 
in this answer-though again, with a certain accent, it may 
sound somewhat like telling a boy at a baseball game that 
the contest is not really important but only his noticing that 
there is a contest. The great works and the fine works of 
literature seem to need evil-just as much as the cheap ones, 
the adventure or detective stories. Evil is welcomed and 
absorbed into the structure of the story, the rhythm of the 
song. The literary spirit flourishes in evil and could not get 
along without it. And so, unless I am mistaken, we face 
here some kind of problem concerning The Marriage of 
Heaven and Hell. 
If we take the relatively cautious course of saying that in 
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poetry there has to be an ironic balance of impulses, rather 
than clear Fourth of July choices and celebrations, it will 
sound, and I fear with some reason, to a moralist like Yvor 
Winters as if we entertained only wavering beliefs and 
purposes, no moral commitments. And if we talk more 
boldly about evil being "reconciled" in poetry, we are going 
to sound to a commentator on T. S. Eliot like Marshall 
McLuhan, and I fear with some show of reason on his side, 
as if we were propitiating evil, giving some dark earth spirit 
its rightful place in the scheme of things. Mr. McLuhan 
will call us, along with Eliot, a generation of Manichaean 
dualists, split personalities, pagans trying to stand on tiptoe. 
At this point no doubt Faulkner's Fable ought to be inter-
rogated. It appears that a critic ought to inquire whether in 
Faulkner's Fable reconciling good and evil has not taken the 
form of making God Himself something capacious enough 
and something ambiguous enough to include both good and 
evil and to make atonement for his own evil-as in the last 
reveries of the humanist philosopher Paul Elmer More. 
So far as I am pushing any thesis in this part of my essay, 
I am trying to suggest that the inveterate desire of the 
literary theorist for some kind of substance, as opposed to 
either Platonic idea or Platonic semblance, is closely tied 
to, and may even be a cover for, a deeper desire that literary 
art should embrace something which we cannot very well 
imagine human substance as being free from, the fact of evil, 
both as suffering and as destruction. This kind of embrace 
may very well be a thing that is more necessary to verbal 
art than to any other. I think there may well be certain 
truly Platonic forms of fine art-notably drawing and carving, 
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arts which Plato himself was apparently concerned to purify 
in the geometric direction. But verbal art can scarcely be 
interesting in that way. 
And I have been touching on the idea that if verbal art 
has to take up the mixed matter of good and evil, its most 
likely way of success, and its peculiar way, is a mixed way. 
And that means not simply a complicated correspondence, a 
method of alternation, now sad, now happy, but the oblique 
glance, the vertical unification of the metaphoric smile. To 
pursue the ironic and tensional theories in the way most 
likely to avoid the Manichaean heresy will require a certain 
caution in the use of the solemn and tragic emphasis. Dark 
feelings, painful feelings, dismal feelings, even tender feel-
ings move readily toward the worship of evil. And they 
have the further disadvantage that they run readily into 
pure feeling itself, its indulgence and the theory of that, as 
in the eighteenth century. There was a girl in Mrs. Thrale's 
set at Streatham who could weep so prettily that she was 
sometimes called upon to give a parlor demonstration. It is 
true that pure laughter too has its limitations. It may be 
idiotic. But bright feelings and the smile go with metaphor 
and wit, and when playing on serious topics, wit generates a 
certain mimicry of substance which is poetry. There was 
another member of the Streatham set who in a Preface to 
Shakespeare noticed that "Shakespeare has united the powers 
of exciting laughter and sorrow not only in one mind, but in 
one composition." By this line of suggestion and by quoting 
further authorities of this tenor we might arrive at a theory 
that sounded too much like the homely formula "grin and 
bear it," or perhaps like a prescription for The Most La-
mentable Comedy and Most Cruel Death of Pyramus and 
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Thisbe. But the theory also could be made to sound more 
like a phrase in Aristotle's Poetics-the four words anodunon 
kai ou phthartikon-not painful and not destructive, a 
description which Aristotle meant for the comic object as 
distinguished from the hideously suffering tragic object. 
But the phrase, even in Aristotle's system, can easily be lifted 
so as to operate not only at the level of poetic object but 
at that of poetic utterance, poetry itself, and then it will 
refer not only to comedy but to tragedy too. 
VII 
THus I ARRIVE at a concluding part of my effort, the exposi-
tion of critical alternatives. And here, since I am an invin-
cible Ramist and visualist in these matters, maintaining that 
as theorists we can make no progress unless in the direction 
of clarity (even though a certain deep obscurity and mystery 
be intrinsic to our materials), I resort to the use of a diagram. 
This, however, is so simple that it almost does not have to 
be drawn. It represents two oppositions and their point of 
intersection, and hence it has five positions or places, repre-
senting what I conceive to be five main or even ultimate 
types of literary theory. Suppose we have number I, the 
theory or class of theories which may roughly be called 
"genetic"-that is, the theories that assert: "Poetry is, or 
expresses, a genuine experience of the author." Put this, let 
us say, at the top of the diagram. And suppose then number 
II, the "affective" theories: those that assert: "Poetry is what 
moves or pleases, or is relevant to the interests of, a certain 
audience." And put this at the bottom of the diagram. And 
suppose then number III, what we may call the "contentual" 
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poetic theory or group of theories. They can also be called 
the "didactic." They are all the theories that assert that 
poetry is a statement of some kind of true message~religious, 
moral, social, historical, scientific. Put these on one side of 
the diagram, let us say the left. And then opposite them, on 
the right, put number IV, a group of theories which we may 
call (with perhaps a certain customary inaccuracy regarding 
Aristotelian hylomorphism) the "formal" theories-or else 
the "technical" or the "stylistic." These are all the theories 
that assert that poetry consists in technique, style, texture, 
structure, or form: that poetry is "beautiful language," or 
"effective language." 
III 
"Contentual" --7 
or "Didactic" 
I 
"Genetic" 
v 
"Tensional" 
t 
II 
"Affective" 
IV 
~"Formal" or 
"Stylistic" 
And then, finally, in the center, about equidistant from 
each of the other four (And for emphasis let us draw a box 
around the area), put number V, a type of theory which may 
be called for the moment simply the "tensional," and which 
I describe roughly as a theory which asserts that "Poetry is 
the expression of a relation between subject and object: 
dramatic, metaphoric, involving complexity of values. Poetry 
is more than beautiful language, and less than (or at least 
different from) religious, moral, and social truth." 
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I have not tried to include here every possible specific 
theory of poetry or of art-every theory that has a name 
and a place in the history of theories. Certain readers will 
be likely enough to note the absence of the theory of art 
as play (to name a few examples nearly at random), the 
theory of vivid sensory realization, the theory of empathy, 
or the contrary theory of aesthetic distance, or the most 
specific recent theory, that of poetry as myth. My opinion 
is that all other theories than the five I have presented either 
reduce to one of these five or else are rather easily put aside 
as not fitting the facts. Numbers I, II, III, and IV are 
extreme or pure theories-each I believe asserting some 
truth about poetry-and all perhaps being points of reference 
for the more complicated theory, Number V-though all four 
will not be equally conspicuous or equally available in the 
discussion of every particular poem. Let us observe that 
Numbers I and II form the axis set up both by the intensive 
historical method in literary studies and by affectivism of 
both the Freudian and the Richardsian types. On the other 
hand, Numbers III and IV form the axis of pure, classical 
cognitive study. That is, despite the difference between the 
didactic and the formal, these two kinds of theory have in 
common that they look to something conceived as outside 
both specific author and specific audience-some referential 
truth on the one hand, or on the other some verbal 
character. 
Numbers I and II are theories which lean more or less 
heavily toward subjectivism and relativism. In my opinion 
they are not really theories of poetry, but theories of its 
origins and results. However, these theories may actually 
pose difficult problems for cognitive theory, and they may 
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well represent (or distort) dimensions which (as we shall 
see) the cognitive theorist cannot get along without. 
As for theories of type III, the cognitive but simply 
contentual, I remark: Nowadays nobody holds seriously and 
overtly for poetry as a vehicle of historical and scientific 
truth. ( Strabo's view that Homer is valuable because he 
teaches the geography of the Mediterranean region may be 
mentioned as a classical instance of such a view.) But nowa-
days many persons do take quite seriously the view that 
poetry conveys religious, moral, or social truth. During the 
Renaissance, moralism or didacticism in poetic theory meant 
a certain kind of thing: namely, that poetry was to recom-
mend, adorn, or otherwise enforce or assist a doctrine; 
doctrine, however, was determined by other than poetic 
norms (by philosophy and revelation) . The same thing 
holds for a great deal of modern sociological and realistic 
theory, and notably for the Marxist kind. But in romantic 
and postromantic theory other than the social, the didactic 
virtue of poetry is conceived, on the contrary, as autonomous. 
That is, poetry itself creates moral and religious norms; it 
takes the place of philosophy and religion (as in the justly 
celebrated prophecy of Matthew Arnold). Or, all so-called 
revelation has always been really poetry. 
On the other hand, theory of type IV, the stylistic or 
formal, corresponds to at least one of the subclasses of what 
was known during the nineteenth century as art for art's 
sake. Nowadays there seem to be very few students of 
poetry who will overtly and completely confess to this 
theory. We almost all want somehow to be deeper than 
that. The accusation that somebody else is in fact a mere 
"formalist" is, however, heard not infrequently. Sometimes 
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that somebody else is a critic of the dramatic and tensional 
school (a practitioner of theory V in my diagram). Some-
times he is a neo-Aristotelian, one of those who talk most 
emphatically about the poem as an "object," a whole object, 
an Aristotelian synolon. As the purpose of my essay is more 
expository than polemic, I am not much interested in arguing 
here that the label "formalist" is affixed with more justice 
to either one of these schools, though I do not try either to 
disguise even for a moment my inclination toward position 
V in my diagram. 
What in fact does anybody have against "form," "style," 
"structure," "beauty"? Nothing-of course. Let us sum-
marize a few things which everyone knows. Certain arts of 
visual design, abstract and arabesque, and perhaps certain 
kinds of music, strongly invite being described in a purely 
formal way. But poetry is an art of words. And words have 
meanings. And characteristically, in its greatest instances, 
poetry has dealt with all the most intense, the hottest, human 
experiences and problems: with love and hate, sex, war, 
murder, youth and age, sickness and death, scepticism and 
faith-with religion. There is a certain sense in which 
religion is the only theme of important poetry. To tell your 
audience in the classroom or critical journal that despite all 
':his warmth and depth of content, the only thing that 
matters, the defining character, is something called "form," 
or "structure," or "beauty of language" -this will be a fairly 
cold device, a kind of sellout, a maneuver almost cynical. 
Structure of meaning, texture of meaning (form, style, 
technique) are of course actually parts of meaning-im-
portant factors in constituting the whole meaning. This is 
bound to be so-except on the supposition that "meaning" 
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includes only something severely abstract and doctrinal or 
something practical. You cannot structure a supposed given 
meaning now one way, now another way, without affecting 
the actual whole meaning. 
But then set against that kind of truth an opposite kind:-
the truth, namely, that it has always been diffcult, wildly 
paradoxical, self-defeating to try to affirm a complete union 
or identity of poetic and moral or religious (social or 
political) values. Such affirmations almost necessarily tend 
to be either rigorously moralistic, and hence exclusive of 
great batches of the world's recognized literature, or else 
so exceedingly flexible, latitudinarian, and inclusive, as to 
be quite ambiguous from any definite moral or religious 
(or political) point of view. 
Thus sketching briefly, perhaps even assuming, some of 
the main reasons against the simple cognitive theories of 
both types III and IV, the didactic and the formal, I arrive 
at the observation that the tension between these two types 
of theory has in fact tended, throughout literary history, to 
keep either one from ever clearly triumphing. At the same 
time, Number V, the tensional theory also is a very difficult 
thing to maintain. And thus most cognitive theories do in 
fact tend to be reducible to one of the extremes, the simply 
didactic or the simply formal. 
VIII 
LET ME NOW attempt to add some reasons or perhaps only 
to develop those already implied, in favor of the more 
complicated and central kind of cognitive theory, the ten-
sional. This is a theory which says that a unification or 
resolution of theories III and IV, the contentual and formal, 
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will operate not flat and straight along a line of abstractly 
purified cognitive theory, but with a kind of parenthetical 
bulge or reach, both up and down. This unification will 
conceive something of both a speaker and an audience in 
a verbal transaction-though not strictly the speaker, or 
author, of the poem, and not strictly the historically de-
terminable audience for whom he may have uttered the 
poem most directly. The theory tries to use a certain kind 
of claim coming in from the direction of I and II (speaker 
and audience) to exert a pull upon III and IV (doctrine and 
form), and thus both to complicate the two claims of mes-
sage and form and to implicate them with each other-to 
turn the means and end of the ordinary pragmatic, rhetorical 
relation in language into the parts and whole of the dramatic 
and aesthetic relation. Different persons, different interests, 
different feelings, different values, different rhetoric, differ-
ent metaphor. Metaphor is the holding together of opposi-
tions. The logical impurity of metaphor is a ready slant, a 
twist, of abstract idea toward the inclinations of speaker or 
audience or of both. 
One way to put the dramatic thesis would be to say: All 
poetry (even, for instance, a deeply meditative lyric, or a 
didactic verse essay) has something of that element of 
tension or struggle which we easily enough think of as 
necessary to a novel or a stage drama. And through this 
tension poetry gives a fresh vision of reality, a fullness, 
completeness, concreteness of experience. It will be an 
experience that includes pain as well as pleasure, evil and 
ugliness as well as beauty and good, an experience where 
tragic and comic can be discriminated but where they show 
a complementary and an easily mixed relationship. 
One technical difficulty with the theory will sometimes 
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be that of locating the dramatis personae, the speaker and 
the audience-especially the audience. The speaker may 
not be so obvious as Browning's inmate of a Spanish Cloister 
or the melancholy poeta ignotus, 11 Pensoroso, of Gray's 
Elegy, or the blind bard of Paradise Lost; he may be almost 
fully universalized, like the gentlemanly ethical rationalizer 
of Pope's Essay on Man. Still we more or less readily accept 
the notion that some speaker, some persona, some mask, 
even though nearly transparent, some special voice, some 
tone, is there. We may often feel less sure that that tone 
entails the idea of any special audience. Poems addressed 
to a coy mistress, to Dr. Arbuthnot, to Death, to the West 
Wind, may he too special. It would be all too easy to 
multiply instances of meditative poetry where the reflective, 
the philosophic, the sensitive and superior speaker is talking, 
even though somewhat emotively, only to himself-or, what 
is much the same thing, to anybody at all or to anybody or 
everybody who is interested in listening. And that might be 
thought a reductio ad absurdum of the theory. But I think 
even that is not such a reduction. For if and when a poem 
is an address of the speaker to himself, the poem still by 
that very fact is different from science and metaphysics, 
which properly, I believe, are not addressed to anybody at 
all, but are simply and purely uttered. (On the other hand, 
practical discourses are addressed to somebody, but then 
they are practical-that is to say, informative or persuasory.) 
The most inclusive and incontrovertible formula for the 
dramatic aspect of the theory will be achieved in the state-
ment that the self-consciousness of the poem, in any event, 
always unites both speaker and "mock-audience." The two 
parties to the drama are joined in the consciousness of the 
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actual audience, the good reader. And thus reflection 
transcends and envelopes emotive response. 
The term "thee" in stanza 24 of Gray's Elegy ("For thee, 
who, mindful of th' unhonor'd dead") refers to the same 
person as the "me" of stanza 1 ("And leaves the world to 
darkness and to me"), and this person is any sensitive, 
melancholy unknown poet, any "youth to fortune and to 
fame unknown," and hence again, by extension, any person 
at all who happens to be reading the poem. The addition 
to the poem of the last nine stanzas, including the epitaph, 
and the revision of four other stanzas, have on the one hand 
created a phantom research puzzle for literal detective 
minds and on the other have produced the critical opinion 
(to be sure, a minority opinion) that Gray spoiled his poem 
by a merely personal appendix to an initially marmoreal 
statement of something universal. But the truth, I believe, 
is that Gray remarkably fortified his poem by that addition 
and revision-completing the personal promise of the first 
stanza, giving depth and resonance to the "universal" by the 
dramatization of the "I" in its complementary and respond-
ing image, the "thou." He thus made his famous Elegy, the 
only successful serious poem he ever wrote, something like 
a special paradigm of the dramatic, reflexive act of saying 
and knowing which is basic to the whole poetic business. 
But a second kind of difficulty for the dramatic and 
tensional theory-a dissatisfaction and a protest, and perhaps 
a more heavily weighted one-will relate to that danger of 
Manichaeism to which I have alluded in earlier sections of 
this essay. The question which the technical moralist or 
the poetic theorist with a moral and theological concern 
(Murray Krieger or his orthodox opposite, for instance) seems 
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most likely to keep asking will run about as follows: Just 
how is it possible for the poet to give ample and fair play, 
not only to faith and control, but to the contagious opposites 
which prove and intensify those virtues-how possible, that 
is, without either adulterating a pure philosophy about 
these matters or creating at least moments of imagery which 
are a yielding and a seduction? The Knight of Temperance 
in the second book of Spenser's Faerie Queene breaks up the 
bower of the enchantress Acrasia, but the feat requires his 
first getting safely past a few stanzas of very superior pinup 
girl art. The requirement, moreover, is hardly accidental to 
the poetic needs of the passage. If these stanzas were not at 
least potentially seductive, it may well be questioned if they 
would constitute the necessary poetic features at that place 
in the plot. This example is conveniently allegorized for us 
by the poet himself into something like a type of what we 
are talking about. Much more natural and exciting examples 
might easily be multiplied. It may be said, with as much 
certitude as anything about literature can be said, that the 
poet does not write even a moderately good poem about 
sheer control or about sheer indifference-any more than 
about sheer sensate experience. Again, Milton does not 
achieve his Paradise Lost by making Satan a weak or unim-
pressive figure. It is a well-known scandal that critics have 
all along tended to read Milton as himself "of the Devil's 
party." The theologian may not find it directly edifying 
(though Mr. Empson may) that Hell in the poem is a more 
convincing place (a more interesting kind of poetry) than 
Heaven. Examples, either backward in time to Dante's 
Commedia or forward to Tennyson's In Memoriam, to the 
difference between Newman as a poet and Hopkins, or to 
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Eliot's Waste Land, are too easily multiplied to make the 
experiment interesting. A serious poet seems always likely to 
be engaged either in some division or mixture of sympathy 
or in expressing some doubt about the actual prevalence of 
some value in a given part of the natural world. And when 
this doubt reaches total, or cosmic, and hence religious, 
proportions, it may readily enough slide into some doubt or 
hesitation about the actual rightness of the supposed value. 
But again (and here an apparently slight difference may 
be the turning point in a large argument), the poetic conflict 
is one which may well be deeply fraught with theoretical 
ambiguity, doctrinal inscrutability. Eliot's Waste Land may 
have been during the 1920's, to persons of a settled religious 
thought and habit, a somewhat shocking poem. On the 
other hand, to persons of already sceptical, agnostic, or 
troubled temper, we may well suppose the same poem to 
have been a source of something like a dim religious light. 
Milton's portrait of Satan has that kind of dramatic solidity 
which makes its interpretation depend in part on the temper 
of the interpreter. It is true that a poet always has a 
perspective, and this perspective (correct or incorrect) is 
not a mere accident or addition to the dramatic conflict, but 
an intrinsic part, a condition, of any conflict at all. The 
confrontation of human motives is not like the mere contrary 
pull of bundles of hay to the donkey. Yet the perspective 
as such is not a doctrine, not a didactic stance, and on the 
other hand the perspective as such, or alone, is not what 
makes the poetic virtue. The perspective may even be 
wrong from the moralist's point of view, and the idea of 
poetic tension explains how it is possible nevertheless for 
the poem to have its own validity . 
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Most likely we attempt to excuse the poem of full 
philosophic commitment by an appeal to dramatic realiza-
tion (which is a kind of image). At the same time, most 
likely we also attempt to excuse the poem of full responsi-
bility for vivid realization by an appeal to some more theo-
retical kind of knowledge. But this paradox is, I believe, 
no more than that. 
The defender of poetry will say on the one hand that the 
poet does not in fact conduct his tensional discourse as a rival 
pair of peep shows-one of the flesh and one of Heavenly 
(or Utopian) light and grace. Nor does he conduct it as a 
school dispute, nor yet as any kind of philosophical melo-
drama-truth and falsity disguised as personages and fighting 
out their duel to one only canonical conclusion, the triumph 
of truth. The theater of poetic conflict is human substance 
itself, or, to enlarge this, "ethical substance," as Hegel put 
it. Not that the poet can deliberately or professedly move 
toward conflict itself as a goal. This is as much a self-defeat 
as any other direct move on a poetic goal. But the man 
speaking in the poem will move, toward whatever his goal 
is, honestly, with a sense of the obstructions and drags, the 
limitations, in a word, the wholeness of the experience. 
Poetry is not a direct mimesis of any pure kind of human 
value, either positive or negative. Rather, the literal drama 
of the mixed human experience is a kind of intensity and 
depth which is the opportunity for the poetic reality, the 
poetic objectification. The poetic dramatization is a special 
kind of vision, closely related to, and usually involving, the 
fullness and depth of the analogical or metaphoric vision-as 
Milton's or Dante's Hell and Heaven are elaborate reverse 
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images of each other, as Joyce's Dublin is a dilapidated 
speculum of the Western tradition. 
Neither the poem nor the poet himself (of course) need 
be in the position of saying that the virtues themselves, such 
as chastity, charity, courage, justice, or pure faith and perfect 
love of God (or whatever the given poet conceives as 
virtues) are not real goods, to be sought in real life as 
intensely as may be. Among the modern critics who, moving 
from poetry to life, talk about "earning" a genuine faith or 
view of life by knowing the opposites, there are none I 
suspect who really believe or would suggest that chastity 
is a virtue which is worthless without the experience of 
adultery, or charity and justice, without an experience in 
murder or in robbery. ("Woe unto the world because of 
offences, for it must needs be that offences come, but woe to 
that man by whom the offence cometh.") About faith and 
scepticism, as about Marxist and post-Marxist liberalism, the 
dialectic of our times may well leave us more in doubt. 
But to present the argument of the critic in its necessary 
and I believe correctly guarded form: He will say that the 
human condition is intrinsically a material and mixed con-
dition, where faith and love of God and fellow man can 
scarcely occur except in a milieu that is full of the possi-
bility of their opposites. And this possibility, however it is 
minimized and pushed to one side by the discipline of the 
saint, the austerity of the cell, the devotion of the ritual 
(or the laws of the party), is still a tensional element that 
is part of the moral quality of the experience. Religious 
philosophy recognizes this fact clearly enough in its account 
of faith as an act of the intellect, but directed by the will . 
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Let us utter here the platitude that there is no moral quality 
in an assent to the Pythagorean theorem, or in either a 
doubt or a belief that Mars is habitable. 
Let me conclude with a broader kind of observation but 
one which I believe has at the same time, compared to the 
mere poetics which I have been expounding, a special 
relevance to the exact place in history where we find our-
selves. I think one might summarize the best poetic debates 
of the past thirty years in America with the observation 
that the theory of poetic tension is likely to be involved in 
difficulties with two main kinds of simplification: on the one 
hand, with the simplifications of hedonistic and utilitarian 
science and sociology, and on the other with the simplifica-
tions of theological and moral doctrine. For the fact is that, 
no matter how correct anyone may conceive a given doctrine 
to be, it is still an abstraction and a simplification. At the 
same time, the religious doctrines have a backing of depth 
and substantial mystery-whereas the naturalistic are in the 
end phenomenological, sensate, and flat. So the religious 
mind would seem, in the end, to be more hospitable to 
the tensional and metaphysical view of poetry than the 
naturalistic mind is able to be. And this is borne out in 
recent history. The metaphysical criticism which was "new" 
in the 1940's (working by the norms of wit, irony, metaphor, 
drama, tension) has had some of its strongest champions 
among poets and critics of the Anglican school and has 
enjoyed for the most part at least a friendly reception in 
Roman Catholic schools and journals. The same school of 
criticism has met with strong disapproval from Marxist and 
other socially oriented thought and in general from the 
naturalistic Saturday and Sunday popular press . 
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TWO MEANINGS OF SYMBOLISM: 
A GRAMMATICAL EXERCISE 
THE TERM "symbol" as it is used in modern times 
represents a large field of meanings, with two poles exerting 
complementary semantic energies through the whole. For one 
thing, there is symbol in the general sense of verbal sign (or 
any other deliberate human sign), the sign that is related 
to the world of things by an expressive act of the mind and 
which just in virtue of this act differs from signs in the merely 
symptomatic order of cause and effect (smoke, for instance, 
as a sign of fire). The symbol-sign represents things, or 
stands for them, or takes their place as an object of negotia-
tion. Symbol conceived in this way, with a further stress 
on the creative power of the symbol-making human mind, 
is the key to several recent forms of idealistic thinking-
philosophies arguing that the act of expression, and most 
properly the act of linguistic expression, is the primary 
reality, from which all else is scientific abstraction. Lan-
guage "produces and posits" its own world of reality. 1 That 
formula would fit, I think, without great unfairness (if a few 
qualifications were kept in mind) the ideas of Croce, 
Cassirer, W. M. Urban, or Mrs. Langer. In certain state-
ments by Cassirer, and in various more special theories of 
symbolism (in English, the literary theories of Eliot, Pound, 
or R. P. Blackmur, for instance), the claim stops short of full 
idealism. Symbols are assigned only a quasi-creative status; 
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they are unique halfway points of control between man and 
his experience, stabilizers and carriers of experience, medi-
ated presentations. These moderate notions are likely to be 
applied in a special way to the literary use of language2 
rather than to language in general, but in any case they tend 
to cast a light in the direction of language in general. This 
whole group of notions constitutes, if you like, some sort of 
analogy to the ancient doctrine of the Logos. 
But in the second place, to turn back to more ordinary 
ways of thinking, there is "symbol" in the far more restricted 
sense of some special kind of thing or event in the world of 
reality-a flower or a flame if one happens to look at these in 
a certain way. And from this meaning there is also "symbol" 
in the sense of some special detail of a painting or some 
special word or group of words in a writing, a literary symbol 
in the full or proper sense, the words that refer to the flower 
or the flame. 
It may be worthwhile dwelling for a few moments on the 
great variety of logic which such symbols are capable of 
showing. Sometimes they work in a fairly simple way from 
the specific to the general and from the concrete to the 
merely abstract. If a novelist describes a character riding 
in a Cadillac or wearing a big diamond pin, those objects 
will be identified by the critic as symbols of the character's 
affluence and power. (Such symbolism is the ordinary 
reliance and the ordinary limitation of the nineteenth-
century propagandist method known either as realism or as 
naturalism.) But again, symbols may work along various 
associational lines, synecdochic and metonymic. They may 
also work along the horizontal lines of the logician's tree,3 
from concrete object to comparable concrete object, from 
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species to species, as, for instance, do the numerous sexual 
symbols or the father symbols which are so interesting to 
psychologists. This is like metaphor, the difference lying in 
the fact that metaphor is an image called in for illumination 
of some object already in focus as part of a story or 
argument, whereas symbol is itself in focus as part of a story 
or argument, though in such a way as to show significance 
beyond itself. Characteristically, symbol combines both the 
vertical abstractive movement and the horizontal meta-
phoric. It works both from the individual toward the 
universal and from the object of less interest to the object 
of greater interest, from the artificial to the natural, from the 
outer to the inner, from the physical to the psychological, 
the spiritual, and the transcendent. The concrete symboliz-
ing the abstract is not the same as the physical symbolizing 
the spiritual, but the two have a close relation, especially 
in neo-Platonic literature. They have in common a reference 
from the more tangible to the less tangible. Symbol can 
hardly work in directions opposite to these I have named. 
We do not speak of love symbolizing a flame, or of the 
maternal womb symbolizing a pottery vessel.4 
Sometimes the order of images in a story follows or 
apparently follows the lines of representational necessity or 
probability, though at the same time a symbolic significance 
is managed. Then we have realism, though realism of a 
superior sort, the poetic sort. Sometimes the order openly 
prefers the norms of symbolic meaning to those of repre-
sentation. Then we move off through various shades of 
romance, allegory, myth, and surrealism. 
Thus I conclude my diagram of the special symbol or 
literary symbol proper. 
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Let me now risk a preliminary and tentative statement 
that I do not believe the difference between the word-symbol 
in the poem and the thing-symbol outside the poem to be an 
important difference for literary criticism, at least not in the 
sense that one part of a critic's discourse can be directed 
to the word-symbol, another to the thing-symbol. The critic's 
effort must in this respect be all at one level. There are no 
flowers or flames or other things pasted into a poem as in a 
collage. The literary critic, like the poet, has to stop with 
the words. Or, to put the matter somewhat differently, the 
realm of thing-symbols can enter the poem only as that realm 
is mediated by words. 
The difference between the two main meanings which I 
have been defining, the symbol as verbal expression in gen-
eral and the symbol as special word naming a special thing, 
may in certain instances be so great that, as I have suggested, 
the term "symbol" seems to fall apart into two almost 
equivocally related uses. Nevertheless, the term does hang 
together and in a great deal of literary criticism manages to 
keep both meanings present without generating for most 
readers a sense of contradiction or cheating. The aim of this 
paper is to proceed, by a somewhat devious route, to show 
some relations between these two radical meanings of the 
term. 
II 
EVEN A CURSORY GLANCE at the history of symbolism will 
raise some difficult theoretical problems. It is not really my 
aim in this essay to take that glance. Yet I cannot continue 
without some reference to the fact that the origins of the 
. 54. 
Two Meanings of Symbolism 
symbolist tradition in patristic and medieval exegetic pro-
cedure bring us back to that difference between thing as 
special symbol and word as special symbol, a difference 
which does not seem to me important to the literary critic. 
The fact is, as we read for instance in Aquinas, that the 
Biblical exegetes were thinking directly about things, a 
universe of things, as special symbols. And a poet like Dante 
followed the exegetes, at least in his theorizing. That kind of 
thinking came down into fairly modern literary theory by 
the route of Renaissance nature philosophy and the doctrine 
of "signatures" or "correspondences" as entertained by vision-
aries like Boehme or Swedenborg. In mid-eighteenth-century 
England, the correspondences are illustrated for poetry by 
that curious figure Christopher Smart in his antiphonal 
commentary on the cosmos, Jubilate Agno, written in the 
madhouse. All through romantic literature, in the Germans 
from Herder on, among the English in Coleridge and 
Carlyle,5 and among Americans notably in Emerson, we trace 
ideas of the "great alphabet of nature," "universal signs ... 
diffused through nature," the "visual language of God." 
(These phrases are quoted from De Quincey, who was 
partly a sceptic in the matter, but they might be readily 
paralleled.) 6 It should be observed, however, that by this 
period, theories of imagination and of knowledge in general 
had been so far idealized, the outer objective world and the 
inner creative force of knowing had been so far unified, that 
these expressions no longer have quite the clean-cut meaning 
which once they might have had. The English idealist 
Bishop Berkeley at the beginning of the eighteenth century 
was a rhapsodic exponent of such symbolic doctrine. By the 
end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the 
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twentieth we have a situation such as Wallace Fowlie has 
recently reported to us, where Claudel, following both 
Aquinas and Mallarme, combines the notion that the poet 
names each object in the universe and gives it its rightful 
place with the further notion that the world is constantly 
reborn for the poet and that each poet "bears in himself . . . 
a subjective maze of images" corresponding to the endless 
metaphorical richness of the world. 7 
The thesis-taken at its most hardheaded, that is in a 
medieval or early Renaissance, rather than a postromantic, 
form-means (or at least involves the concept) that indi-
vidual things in the objective world and classes of things 
have more or less properly definable symbolic meanings or 
at least ranges of such meaning. For the purposes of the 
Scriptural exegete, it would appear to me (though I don't 
stake a great deal on this guess) that a simply traditional 
or revelatory fixation of symbolic meaning would be suffi-
cient. That is, if the individual object Jerusalem appears in 
certain documents in such a way that it stands for the 
Christian society or for Heaven, or if the specific object or 
substance water appears in such a way as to symbolize 
death and rebirth, then those meanings will legitimately 
enough tend to attach to the same objects in later works 
written in the same tradition. From the literary point of 
view some complication may be thought to occur through 
the fact of prefiguration-the individual and historical cor-
respondence of Old Testament persons and situations to 
those of the New Testament, a matter with which Scriptural 
exegetes are greatly concerned. But I am ready for the 
moment at least, to say that here is something that lies 
beyond or to one side of the question about poetic sym-
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holism. For I suppose that we ought to keep our poetic 
discussion of Dante-or for that matter our poetic discussion 
of the Bible-at a level where what we are talking about may 
be appreciated either with or without involving our Chris-
tian belief. The poetic discussion has to get along without 
appealing to the prophetic, the historical, the supernatural. 
The poetic universal is of a different sort from the historic 
and Incarnational. It is true that Professor Auerbach in his 
Mimesis and in other essays has recently shown the relevance 
of Scriptural figura or typology to medieval poetics and 
poetry. Extraordinarily rich adaptations of the method run 
through The Divine Comedy. The conjunction of humble 
and exalted in the exegetic tradition (harlot and Church, 
scarlet thread and blood of Christ) does help to explain the 
medieval indifference to the classically separate decora of 
comedy and tragedy. 8 But I think it is the adaptation of 
the Scriptural method by the secular poet, the overlay and 
more absh·act play of symbolic meaning, which mainly 
enters into the poetic problem. Dante's Comedy makes 
massive use of Scriptural materials. The poem is in some 
sense founded on history. We can, furthermore, talk about 
the solidity and realism of his narrative technique and can 
contrast it to the Platonic thinness of full allegory, the mere 
"allegory of poets" which he attempted in the Convivio.9 But 
the Comedy is after all not real history; it is a fiction (a bella 
menzogna) and only as such is it an object of full poetic 
criticism. 
III 
To PUSH ouR INQUIRY into the definition of symbolic mean-
ing very far we have to turn from individual historical 
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objects to natural classes of objects. The interpretation of 
such classes may no doubt be affected in traditional ways, 
but at the same time they put to us much more insistently 
than do individual objects the question, basic for the natural 
art of reading poetry, whether the world and its parts have 
symbolic meanings that are at all strictly determinate, 
whether the "book of nature" described by such authors as 
Saint Bonaventure in the thirteenth century and Drummond 
of Hawthornden in the early seventeenth, is written in one 
language, a scientifically specific language, or in the poly-
semous ambiguity of poetry itself. A quidditative and teleo-
logical view of the world invites, I suppose, some fairly 
restrictive theory of its symbolism. I have never read a full-
dress defense of such a theory by a modern poetic theorist. 
The "archetypal" and apocalyptic myths of which critics 
nowadays so often speak are qualities of "the collective 
unconscious" rather than of the physical universe.10 The 
blending of the old objective theory with shades of ex-
pressionism such as I have alluded to in Claude! would seem 
to be fairly normal even among neoscholastic writers-so 
long, that is, as they are looking at poetry rather than at 
interpretation of the Scriptures. As for secular criticism the 
thesis of a speaker at the meeting of the Modern Language 
Association in Detroit a few years ago seems to me perfectly 
sound-that the modern conception of fluid symbolism has 
much less in common than some may like to think with the 
fixed theories that appear in earlier times.11 
The defense of something like fixed, or correct, or at least 
central areas of natural symbolic meaning will proceed 
today, I suppose, along a line that one might term "total 
contextualism." The defender would say that we have to try 
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to see through the special and local contexts in which an 
object may be placed, so as to understand its place in the 
whole universe of space, time and spirit-so far as any of us 
may grasp that universe. He would say that a given class 
object or substance (like water) or a natural object of 
universal experience (like the sun) may have many momen-
tary and local meanings, but that at the same time it will 
have some more basic meaning or range of meanings. The 
sun over the Sahara desert may mean to somebody thirst 
and death, but universally, even to that person, it has or 
has had the meaning of life. Water may kill a man who 
drowns, but more universally it is a necessity of life. This 
defender would speak, I suppose, of antithetic and com-
plementary ranges or poles of meaning inherent in given 
objects, like life and death in water. And he would argue, 
presumably, that the poles are seen in the light of each other; 
especially the negative, by a kind of cosmic irony, in the 
light of the positive. And further, that all the marginal, 
momentary, vanishing, and more specially arranged mean-
ings with which objects in given verbal contexts may be 
invested always enjoy a part or shade of their character and 
interest in virtue of the substrate of their deepest natural 
meanings, along with which or against which the slighter 
meanings are implicitly interpreted. o The "irony is always, 
and only, a trick of light on the late landscape."12 
0 "All guidance to the right sense of the human and variable myths," 
said Ruskin, "will probably depend on our first getting at the sense of the 
natural and invariable ones. The dead hieroglyph may have meant this 
or that-the living hieroglyph means always the same; but ... it is just as 
much a hieroglyph as the other; nay, more-a 'sacred or reserved sculpture,' 
a thing with an inner language. The serpent crest of the king's crown, or 
of the god's, on the pillars of Egypt, is a mystery; but the serpent itself, 
gliding past the pillar's foot, is it less a mystery?" (The Queen of the Air, 
Lecture II. ) 
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I think the poetic theorist will have to confess a consider-
able respect for that argument, and it may be that the truth 
of it or of something like it is in the end all that can give 
the mind a grip or a starting point for a real evaluation of 
the myriad performances of poetic inspiration. At the same 
time, I think the poetic theorist will have to protest that 
such a general view of reality, such a confidence in an 
ultimately definable order and significance in things, does 
not provide a grammar of sufficient finesse for actually coping 
with the structure of poems. Keeping the universals too 
much in mind may even do something to obstruct the critic's 
experiments in reading. The universals are likely enough to 
run into tautologies. A tree is a widely used symbol of life 
-but only a live and flourishing tree. A dead or truncated 
tree is a symbol of death. 
IV 
CoNFINEMENT to a general theory of correct symbolism 
would of course be felt even more acutely by the poet 
himself. Formulary or stereotyped symbolism as a creative 
technique is a contradiction. It has always tended to fizzle 
out into the quaint conceptions of bestiary, lapidary, emblem 
book, or the debased patristic style of the Euphuist. It is 
clearly better to be wrong with the Ramistically inclined 
Sidney than to be right with his opponent, the Euphuist 
Casson. This is not to say that such writers as Dante, 
Chaucer, Shakespeare, or James Joyce, who have had a wide 
range of formulated and quasi-symbolist meanings at their 
command, have thereby suffered a handicap. The point is 
that they knew what to do with such knowledge. The twist, 
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the tum, the transformation, the hidden metaphor, the 
illusory conventionalism, are their pervasive principles. The 
observation is valid not only for specially symbolic words 
and phrases but for all the genres, figures, and other con-
ventions which learned inquiry into poems has always been 
so much concerned to identify. Literary scholars in recent 
years have no doubt been aided in their reading of Dante 
and other medieval poets by a knowledge of the famous 
four levels of interpretation; but I believe that so far as 
these scholars have tried to determine or limit, or in any 
way prescribe, their own readings of medieval poetry ac-
cording to their knowledge of these schemes, they have done 
their reading a disservice.13 I have in mind neither the plans 
of the medieval poet nor those of the medieval theorist but 
rather the actual accomplishment of the medieval poet in 
his shaping of the complex of words, symbols, and reality 
which are always the poet's medium. If we are going to 
criticize poetry at all, we have to take it insofar as it is 
something accomplished. What a dull poet Chaucer would 
be if he repeated half so literally and flatly as some modem 
commentators do all the gimcracks and formulas that in one 
way or another are assimilated into his poetry. How happy 
we ought to be that there is no law compelling us to remem-
ber the mazes of exegetical repertory through which recent 
scholarship has partly succeeded in compelling Piers the 
Plowman to plod his weary way. What a dreary business 
our reading of Dante would be if we really tried to take his 
Comedy as "allegory," if we really tried to follow at every 
step the directions for polysemous reading set forth in the 
letter (or supposed letter) to Can Grande.14 How lucky we 
always are that we have the poet in his poems and outside of 
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his own theoretical pronouncements and outside of any other 
contemporary (or classical) theories by which he may be 
supposed to be writing. 
There is a passage in the Quaestiones Quodlibetales of 
Aquinas which, along with the usual scholastic distinction 
between secular literature and the Scriptures, is not, I be-
lieve, taken seriously enough by modern students of medie-
val poetic theory, and indeed it may seem forbidding. It 
perhaps appears an oppressively simple view of the whole 
nature of poetry. Aquinas says in effect that it is wrong to 
look in secular poetry for any allegorical, any tropological, 
any anagogical meanings. The only kind of meaning to be 
found in secular poetry is literal meaning. In nulla scientia, 
humana industria inventa, proprie loquendo, potest inveniri 
nisi litteralis sensus; sed solum in ista Scriptura cujus Spiritus 
Sanctus est auctor, homo vero instrumentum.15 This, as I 
say, sounds bad for poetic theory, and it may be bad for a 
certain kind of retrospective critical intentionalism. But it 
seems to me to fit very well, or at least to be adaptable to, 
the needs of a correct modern theory. It is clear, for one 
thing, that by the term literal in this passage Aquinas cannot 
mean to rule out of poetry the range of natural metaphoric 
and analogical meanings which are actually there. (The 
places where he speaks of metaphor in poetry and compares 
it to metaphor in Scripture are often enough quoted now-
adays.) "Literal'' in this passage of the Quodlibetales is 
opposed quite strictly to the other three divinely intended 
levels, the allegorical, the tropological, and the anagogical. 
Human poetry might very well refer to these levels of mean-
ing, or point to them, and in some way involve them. Dante 
and many other medieval poets would show that this could 
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be done, and would easily theorize around any difficulties. 
But the human poet, not being at the divine level, could 
hardly speak down from it with a real message about divine 
meanings. The doctrine of Aquinas would seem to mean at 
least that we ought to avoid looking for intended messages 
in poetry; we ought to read it as accomplished or constructed 
symbolic art, an art where symbols have not a catalogued 
or correct meaning, but whatever meaning the poet is able 
to demonstrate dramatically in the very conjunction of 
symbols which constitutes his poem. The passage in the 
Quodlibetales may in fact leave a little to be desired if we 
try to take it as instruction for reading the secular poet at 
the appropriate "literal" level. Is the poet, even at this level, 
a message-intending authority? I should think not. Even 
there, Aquinas, if asked, would have had to say that the 
poet is not the same kind of authority as the writer of 
Scripture. Proprie loquendo, the poet doesn't have a message 
even at the literal level. 
v 
WHATEVER the metaphysics of the situation with which we 
are dealing, the attentive and conscientious reader of poetry 
must first of all be struck by the great variety and inde-
finability of the ranges of symbolic meaning that open in 
the poem before him. "My fair Starre (that shinde on me 
so bright)," writes Spenser in his funeral elegy Daphnaida, 
"Fell sodainly and faded under ground." Here I suppose we 
will say that a star symbolizes something like mutability, 
the uncertainty of fate, death and loss. "Dim as the Borrow'd 
beams of moon and stars To lonely, weary, wand'ring 
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travelers Is Reason to the soul," says Dryden in his Religio 
Laici. Here it seems to me the stars symbolize the uncer-
tainty or insufficiency of merely natural reason in religious 
inquiries. "Bright star, would I were steadfast as thou art .... " 
Here the well-known romantic symbol has a meaning nearly 
the opposite of Dryden's. "At the stars, Which are the brain 
of heaven, he" (Satan, in Meredith's sonnet) "look' d and 
sank. Around the ancient track march' d, rank on rank, The 
army of unalterable law." Something like the inscrutable 
and unalterable law of the universe might be the abstract 
name of the symbolic meaning here. "Lilac blooming 
perennial and drooping star in the west, And thought of 
him I love. 0 powerful western fallen star!" Here Whit-
man's meaning swings back quite close to that of Spenser 
in Daphnaida, yet the difference is important too. This is a 
"powerful fallen star," an assassinated democratic leader. 
The symbols of the poet are objects in all their qualities 
and in all their kinds of relationship-resemblance and differ-
ence, contiguity and association in time and space, causal 
operation and reception of effects. Add to natural and 
primary objects (like stars) the whole range of human 
artifacts. Think of Aeneas crossing the Styx in Charon's 
ferry in the sixth book of the Aeneid (or Dante not using 
Charon's ferry in the third Canto of the Inferno) and Walt 
Whitman "Crossing Brooklyn Ferry" or Edna St. Vincent 
Millay: 
We were very tired, we were very merry-
We had gone back and forth all night on the ferry; 
And you ate an apple and I ate a pear, 
From a dozen of each we had bought somewhere.16 
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Lastly, it seems to me that if we will experiment with 
working, neither inward nor heavenward from the external 
symbol to its psychological or spiritual meaning, but outward 
from our own directly known inner experiences toward 
objective correlatives for them, we can see even more readily 
the difficulties that lie in the way of putting limits to 
symbolic meaning. There is a poem by Emily Dickinson 
which compares memory to a house with furniture in it: 
Remembrance has a rear and a front,-
'Tis something like a house; 
It has a garret also 
For refuge and the mouse.17 
In Plato's Theaetetus memory is compared to an aviary full 
of various fluttering birds. Why couldn't I compare the 
memory to a menagerie full of prowling and menacing 
animals-the menagerie of our vices, as in Baudelaire's 
phrase? Or, if like Hamlet, I think of memory as the reposi-
tory of a freshly received injunction, the image I invoke may 
be that of a writing tablet. If like Titus Andronicus I nurse 
my resolves even more fiercely, I write on a "leaf of brass" 
with a "gad of steel."18 I look up memory in the index of 
Bartlett's Familiar Quotations, and I find that memory is 
green or has leaves, it clings, it has a grave, it is a light or 
a lamp or a morning star, it plays an old tune, it holds a 
"rooted sorrow," it is a "silent shore," it has caverns, it is a 
place where fantasies throng in, it is guilty of plagiarism, it 
is the "warder of the brain." But, you will retort, in each of 
these various instances memory is something different. We 
have different symbols, not for the same meaning, but for 
the different meanings. And, of course, I agree. But this 
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only shows the abstractionism involved in any attempt to 
give fixed interpretations to either natural or artificial classes 
of symbols or to prescribe symbols for given defined mean-
ings. The poet abstracts too in his own way, in his choices 
and juxtapositions, but he claims for his abstraction only the 
correctness of his momentary context. 
VI 
THESE EXAMPLES may not reveal anything profound. The 
existence of such instances, however, is the grammatical or 
technical ground for the expansive statements which we 
find everywhere in romantic theory: the cosmic speculation 
of A. W. Schlegel, for instance, that "everything signifies 
everything else, every part of the universe mirrors the 
whole."19 Or that of Emerson: 
The metamorphosis of Nature shows itself in nothing more than 
this, that there is no word in our language that cannot become 
typical to us of Nature by giving it emphasis. The world is a 
Dancer; it is a Rosary; it is a Torrent; it is a Boat; a Mist, a 
Spider's Snare; it is what you will; and the metaphor will hold, 
and it will give the imagination keen pleasure. Swifter than 
light the world converts itself into the thing you name, and all 
things find their right place under this new and capricious 
classification.20 
The concrete symbols of which the universe itself is 
composed are external to poet and poem, substantive entities 
which have their own basic natures and orientation in the 
universe, and hence have some kind of objective claim on 
our interpretation of them. Yet the poet can use these 
symbols only in conjunction with one another and with his 
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own interior experience, and he can lay hold of them only 
with words. And words, even the most usual and specific, 
those that name or may be supposed to name quiddities, do 
something to the things they lay hold of; they exert a pull 
and tear, a push and shaping power, an ordering and 
reordering energy which refuses to be limited by any de-
scription. In poetry we do not encounter things presented 
simply in their usual classifications, with some correct sym-
bolic meaning attached. We have a world of things and 
meanings shaped up by words, ever variously. It is this 
fact which leads the critic to talk very little today about the 
natural meanings of symbols. Through this fact we arrive at 
the modern preoccupation with the verbal symbol itself, the 
complex of words presenting or creating its own reality, the 
poem as "objective correlative" of an interior meaning, a 
state of mind, which has no other expression. 
The "tenor" and "vehicle" of the metaphorical situation 
tend to merge. These two modern terms have, in fact, 
arrived on the critical scene at a time when poetry itself has 
reached a stage in its development where it may be doubted 
whether the things the terms are supposed to stand for can 
any longer be separated. The knight on horseback tends to 
be absorbed into the landscape through which he rides. The 
plot is lost in its symbols. We have a phenomenal rather 
than a substantial symbolism. 
VII 
IN SHORT, I have started this paper by distinguishing two 
polar senses of the term symbol-symbol as specially con-
ceived and significant concrete object, or as name of such 
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object, and symbol as the creation or definition of reality in 
any expressive sign at all, and more especially in the verbal 
sign. I have tried to suggest how the resolute and dis-
criminating analysis of symbol in the first sense will sub-
jectively enrich the concept of symbol but will at the same 
time flatten it out so that it tends to become coterminous 
with all poetic expression, and conceivably with all verbal 
expression whatever. We move from the restricted notion 
of symbol as a special concrete object having an abstract 
significance, or a special physical object having a spiritual 
significance, to the general notion of verbal expression as an 
outer manifestation of the inner, the notion of the outer, if 
we like, as the disparate counterpart or metaphor of the 
inner. The grammatical exercise which I have attempted 
to perform strikes me as a miniature analogue or shorthand 
for the main development of modern philosophy from Galileo 
to Croce. The pattern may be more satisfactory for the 
theory of poetry than for the metaphysics of reality. I have 
seen it brilliantly suggested that the breakdown of respect 
for substantive quiddity which occurred in the late Renais-
sance was accompanied by a decline in the performance of 
poets.21 But this has by no means been demonstrated. Some-
thing almost like the opposite seems to me the truth. 
When a term tends to move in the way we have seen from 
one meaning to another, and when in certain contexts there 
is a further tendency for both meanings to appear, in a kind 
of telescoping or compression, we are likely to have some-
thing deeper than merely confused semantics to deal with. 
The two polar meanings of the term symbol which we have 
discussed may be considered the grammatical counterpart of 
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a dualism or unresolved ambiguity that seems always to 
have been involved in idealist and in formalist aesthetics. 
In the Enneads of Plotinus we find a passage saying that 
every being has unity and form and beauty, even so simple 
a being as a piece of stone. But in another passage, in order 
to illuminate or define the very concept of form, Plotinus 
has recourse to the example of a sculptor conferring upon a 
piece of stone the shape of a carved image.22 So in the 
neoidealism of Croce, an inverted form of neo-Platonism, we 
have the creative act of intuition-expression in its broad 
sense, which includes every act of concrete knowing (the 
knowing, for instance, of a small scrap of bronze), and we 
have the same intuition-expression in the merely quantitative 
difference which defines the act of knowing called Art with 
a capital A (the knowing of an elegant bronze figurine). So 
in some versions of neo-Thomist aesthetic, there is form and 
beauty in the general or transcendental sense, a character 
of everything and of all art work, and then there is some way 
in which works of fine art are specially turned back toward 
their genus or specially directed toward beauty. In the 
recent quasi-expressionist school of "symbolic form" we 
have symbols in general as the molders and creators of 
reality, and then we have the special class of "presentational'' 
or aesthetic symbols which, in a clearer way than merely 
"discursive" or scientific symbols, illustrate this molding and 
positing power.23 All these doublings, I think, betray weak-
nesses and difficulties in the systems that involve them. At 
the same time, as I have been suggesting too, such doublings 
may embody their own mystery and stand for their own 
truth which can scarcely be put in a more univocal way . 
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The two meanings of the term symbol and their parallels 
which I have cited, if we would relate them more clearly 
to a realistic and dualistic account of experience, may be said 
to center in the fact that all our verbal knowledge is to some 
extent also bound to be a knowledge of things. (This is the 
converse of the symbolic-form doctrine that all our knowl-
edge of things is a knowledge of words or other symbols.) 
Add to this the notion that there may be instances where 
thing knowledge and word knowledge are in a peculiar way 
brought together and intensified. I offer a final parallel in 
the word understand. "Understanding poetry" is a phrase 
which has recently made a notable appearance in the 
literature of teaching poetry in America. But understand in 
such a phrase would seem to have more than one simple 
meaning. We understand a word, in a foreign language, 
let us say, if we know the thing it refers to. But to under-
stand the thing itself may be a different matter, the degree of 
difference depending on the nature of the thing. Many types 
of verbal discourse do not involve a high degree of thing 
understanding. Certain things-an automobile, for instance, 
and the driving of it or the mechanics of it-may be under-
stood without any very distinguished use of words. Poetry, 
I suggest, is a type of discourse where a certain kind of 
thing knowledge is intimately dependent on word knowl-
edge, and compressed into it. The words are saturated with 
thing knowledge. This is equivalent to saying that poetry 
is a type of discourse where symbol in the special sense 
pervades the whole structure and invites the theory of 
symbol in the general sense. This has always been true of 
poetry, though it has remained for what is called in modern 
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times "symbolist poetry" to show it in a special way. And 
this fact-the difference between Dante and Claude!, Tenny-
son and T. S. Eliot in symbolic usage, and yet their com-
munity as symbolists-is the last version which I shall offer 
of the ambiguity which has been my theme . 
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OR ELSE 
PRoFESSOR Gerald F. Else's translation and commentary 
in depth, Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument (Cambridge, Mass., 
1957), has met with unanimous acclaim from the reviewers 
for his learning and the shrewdness of his reasoning. Just 
as unanimously these classical scholars have described the 
several "fundamental reinterpretations" which he has at-
tempted as more imaginative and bold than acceptable or 
convincing, "more likely to provoke thought than to change 
minds." His ingenuity has seemed exaggerated, "drastic," 
"daring," "startling," "bizarre," "a disaster . . . like a bad 
dream."1 The reasons urged against him have been sober 
and for the most part minutely philological. And as Else's 
peculiar strength does lie in close semantic and grammatical 
analysis, no doubt the pinpoint ripostes of which he is the 
target are in a measure justified. Only one reviewer, Thomas 
Gould, in Gnomon, December, 1962, has urged that a greater 
interest in the metaphysical vision which frames Aristotle's 
scrappy remarks on poetry might have guided Else's philo-
logical penetration to happier results. Gould observes, in 
what amounts to a pregnant short essay on the opposition 
between Aristotle and the father image of his teacher Plato, 
that Aristotle's philosophy of concretely emergent formal 
causes was a systematic revision of Plato's separatist and 
diagrammatic view of the forms, and that Aristotle's defense 
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of the truth and goodness of artistic (or humanly imposed) 
forms was a consistent part of that revision. This is instruc-
tive and relevant, even if scarcely novel. I do not see how a 
literary critic could ever have conceived the problem in any 
other terms. Accepting gratefully the large measures of 
philological intelligence placed at the general reader's dis-
posal by Else and by his reviewers, and not venturing spe-
cifically to contend against Else with his own weapons, I 
would nevertheless venture a short essay of inquiry into 
perspectives. The ulterior intent of the following respectful 
dispute with Else is to raise some questions about the 
relation of a critic's general human and literary perspective 
to the slant of his grammatical inquiry. Or, about what 
the amateur or general student of criticism is entitled to 
say when he is confronted by the historical and philological 
specialist on a foray of reinterpretation. What rights if any 
does the general literary student have? It would appear 
that specialist reinterpretation of a critical document can 
change, or threaten to change, our basic views about the 
document. If this document is important enough, specialist 
reinterpretation can hence threaten to change our views 
about a literary and critical tradition-and hence, to some 
extent, about the nature of criticism itself, and of literature. 
This is a serious matter. 
Two conspicuously novel parts of Else's "argument" which 
I select for examination are that concerning the venerable 
topic of tragic katharsis and closely tied up with that 
(especially as Else manages things), another concerning 
the hamartia (tragic error) and in a subsidiary way the 
anagnorisis (recognition or discovery) . 
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II 
THE katharsis in Aristotle's definition of tragedy has been 
from early times taken as an affective clause-concerning 
the aim and result of tragedy in the emotions of the audi-
ence. This is indeed plausible: because (as Gould in his 
review of Else has remarked) Plato delivered a two-pronged 
attack on poetry: ( 1) cognitive-poetry, he said, tells lies; 
and ( 2) affective-poetry (in part because it does tell lies) 
feeds and waters the passions. And Aristotle seems to have 
made a symmetrical retort to that attack: ( 1) poetry in 
some way gets at a high and universal kind of truth; ( 2) in 
some way, though it does arouse passions of pity and fear, 
tragic poetry does not arouse them harmfully but in fact 
produces a relief from them. The whole debate of the 
scholars through the centuries, therefore, has been con-
cerned not with any question whether or not by katharsis 
Aristotle meant an effect produced in the spectators' souls, 
but with the question what kind of effect he meant. Despite 
the compromises which the history of the debate has pro-
duced, there are basically two possibilities: ( 1) Hippo-
cratean, medical, purgative, katharsis as simply a discharge 
of bad emotions or bad emotive potential; and ( 2) the more 
refined version which we may call the religious or lustratory 
-katharsis as purification. On this latter view the passions 
themselves are improved or sublimed. Pity and fear are 
raised to something unselfish, a kind of cosmic awe in the 
face of suffering. This is a modern, a Butcherian view, a 
Renaissance view, perhaps also neo-Platonic. So far as it is 
a theory of what Aristotle actually meant, it seems to have 
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nothing in particular to support it. Truth, as Plato had said 
in the Phaedo, is a kind of katharsis of all such disturbing 
emotions as the pleasurable and the fearful ( alethes . . . 
katharsis tis ton toiouton pant on [ hedonon kai phobon] ) . 
Aristotle's phrase in Chapter VI of the Poetics, ten ton 
toiouton pathematon katharsin, sounds much like one of 
those polemic allusions to Plato which Gould believes are 
very important for understanding what he means about 
poetry. As Gould, once more, has very well observed, 
Aristotle's opinion about the benefits worked by poetry will 
be part of his general opinion about the benefits worked by 
human arts-more specifically, I should say, by the educative 
arts. Book VIII of the Politics deals with education. And 
Chapter 7 of that book maintains that the art of music 
should be studied for the sake of several benefits, and one 
of these is purgation-the purgation of religious frenzy, 
which some persons experience as a result of hearing sacred 
melodies. "Like experiences" avail for pity and fear and other 
emotions. "The word purgation we use at present without 
explanation, but when hereafter we speak of poetry, we will 
treat the subject with more precision. . . ." It is worth our 
while to recollect that not only did the term mousike 
embrace both instrumental music and verbal poetry (as in 
Plato's unfriendly discussion, Republic II and III), but 
instrumental music (despite Aristotle's severe intellectualism 
in the approach to poetry) was actually a part of the 
dramatic experience which he was discussing in the Poetics. 
S. H. Butcher's delicate development of the lustra tory 
version of katharsis may well be what most of us could wish 
Aristotle had said. It may do much more than other 
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versions of katharsis to promote a union of our minds with 
the play. The more plausible purgative reading of Aristotle 
inclines more or less inevitably toward the physiological. 
It is difficult to make anything of such a theory for critical 
purposes. As numerous theorists-Goethe, for instance, and 
F. L. Lucas-have pointed out, this kind of theory is some-
thing like an apologia for dancing with the argument that 
it is healthful exercise. This kind of theory may come down 
to recommending the drama as a preparation for a good 
night's sleep. The extreme or clinical version of the theory 
is nowadays (or was yesterday), I believe, known as Psycho-
Socio-H ypnodrama. 2 
It is easy therefore to understand and to sympathize with 
Gerald Else's drive to discover that Aristotle said something 
different. On the other hand, it may well be that Aristotle 
was not the perfect critic. He may simply have wished to be 
more Rotarian and more psychiatric about the benefits of 
poetry than we should like a pure literary critic to be. And 
the attempt to mend his idea of katharsis may (as we shall 
see) entail displacements in other and more valuable parts 
of his theory. My own view is that it is impossible for 
literary theory to make anything of any affective version of 
katharsis, but that the theory itself is a harmless enough 
psychiatric appendage to Aristotle's actual literary theory. 
We can take it or leave it. And to leave it just as it stands, 
even in the lowest pragmatic tradition, will be better than, 
in the interest of redeeming it, to twist a syllable of Aris-
totle's actual description of how tragic dramas were, or 
ought to be, constructed. 
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III 
IT SEEMS that there was a certain ancient, primitive, re-
ligious and moral (partly superstitious) Greek conviction 
(about killing) -a taboo, a fear-which survived as part of 
Athenian law. And this was to the effect that the very worst 
kind of killing was that which happened within the family. 
This was blood guilt. One might kill a thief or a rapist, or 
kill an enemy in war, or a fellow citizen in self-defense-or, 
for almost any reason, a slave. And that was all right. Or 
at the worst, one suffered no extreme punishment or attaint. 
But to kill one's father or brother was a profoundly different 
thing. The guilty person was polluted-subject to the ulti-
mate punishments. He might, however, be legally (or 
ritually) cleansed or purged. The principle of equity came 
in Athenian law to be invoked against that of pollution-
under certain circumstances-for example, very likely under 
that of some kind of ignorance on the part of the killer. 
This concept of religious and legal purgation is precipitated 
in the dramatic images of Athenian tragedy-in the Oresteia, 
for instance, and-Else thinks (though clearly I should 
think not in the same way) -in Oedipus the King. The chief 
document which Else draws upon for this part of his argu-
ment is the Laws of Plato, Book IX. And I should say that 
so far as the argument is a historical, cultural, and external 
one, it is convincing, ample, and interesting. 
The external, however, is invoked, as always, for the sake 
of its bearing upon the internal. Else's argument concerning 
katharsis bears hard upon several words in the Poetics. The 
crucial one, sufficient I believe for the present examination, 
is the word pathematon in the classic definition of tragedy 
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which we have already quoted in part from Chapter VI. 
Tragedy is a mimesis of a large and serious action, through 
pity and fear working out a purgation of ... something-
pathematon ( di' eleou kai phobou perainousa ten ton toiou-
ton pathematon katharsin). The word-we have been saying-
has traditionally been taken in the sense of emotions-the 
katharsis of suchlike emotions, the spectator's emotions. How 
is any other meaning conceivable? In this way-perhaps. 
This Greek word, pathema in the nominative singular, is 
synonymous with its cognate pathos, and that word appears 
and is defined in a different sense in an important later 
chapter of the Poetics. Chapter XI: "The pathos is a destruc-
tive or painful incident" (pathos de esti praxis phthartike e 
odunera). In the same vein, Chapter XIV: "The tragic inci-
dents take place within the context of family relationships" 
(en tais philiais eggenetai ta pathe). Else, who makes a 
specialty of detecting Aristotle's morning-after additions to 
his own text (see the Index Supplementorum), decides that 
the cathartic clause in the definition of Chapter VI is just 
such an afterthought, tucked in after the meaning of the 
pathos had been established in the later chapters. (It is an 
embarrassment for anyhody's theory that the tragic katharsis 
is not mentioned anywhere else in the Poetics.) 
Despite the fact that he himself makes such a sustained 
appeal to the Lau.:s of Plato in the anthropological part of 
his argument, Else lays great emphasis on the principle of 
internal criticism-the interpretation of the Poetics by close 
study of the text itself. At the same time, in a display of one 
of his most engaging Yirtues, he admits and underscores 
( p. 441) the fact that there is that passage in Aristotle's 
Politics (VIII. 7, which I have quoted above) telling heavily 
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in favor of the traditional identification of the pathemata 
with the spectator's emotions (or "feelings"). It is an oddity 
perhaps also deserving of mention that on pp. 434-36 of 
Else's book both pathemata and pathe appear in quotations 
from the Euderrnan Ethics, and both here mean "feelings." 
IV 
THE TRAGIC ACT, we know, takes place as a result, or under 
the circumstances, of a certain hamartia. (Chapter XIII: 
" ... suffering downfall not through evil or vice, but through 
a certain error [or fault], through a big error [or fault]"-
mete dia kakian kai mochtherian metaballon eis ten dustu-
chian alla di' hamartian tina . . . di' hamartian megalen. ) 
Two main kinds of emphasis in the interpretation seem 
possible. To simplify each one to its extreme: on the one 
hand, the view of hamartia as some kind of mistake, error, 
or blunder, an involuntary fault, scarcely, if at all, guilty 
or deserving of punishment-an appropriate mechanism of 
the drama of fate or inscrutable destiny. And on the other 
hand, the view of hamartia as a deliberate and morally 
culpable crime (a sin, as in the New Testament Greek). 
Something like this is a requirement for the neoclassic theory 
of poetic justice in the tragic outcome. (Among modern 
scholars who have advanced the view, one might notice 
Lane Cooper of Cornell and his pupils in the volume 
Aristotelian Papers. Antigone, for instance, is guilty of 
stubbornness and despair. Imagine another kind of character, 
imagine Ulysses, faced with the same dilemmas-in the cave, 
for instance.) 
Gerald Else's view of hamartia is by no means so unusual 
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as his view of katharsis. He adopts a fairly simple, straight 
version of the first extreme-hamartia as ignorant mistake. 
This is, of course, entailed by his theory of katharsis as purga-
tion of a crime by mistake. 
We are now in a position to attempt a summary statement 
of Else's view of the hamartia and the katharsis. In five 
stages: 
1. The protagonist performs his deed (a killing in the 
family). 
2. He finds out only later whom he has killed. 
3. He is stricken with remorse and shows appropriate 
signs of this (e.g., he puts out his eyes). 
4. This remorse convinces the audience of the pro-
tagonist's innocence. They recognize or discover his 
innocence. He is purged of his guilt in the judgment 
of the audience. Like the "judges at the Delphinion or 
in Plato's state," they reach the reasonable conclusion 
that he is katharos, free from pollution. 
5. As a result, the audience experiences pity (Fear is 
not mentioned) . This pity produces, or is, the pleasure 
proper to tragedy (the oikeia hedone of Chapters XIV 
and XXIII in the Poetics). 
The play still produces an "emotional end-effect." No 
escape from that. But that effect is now "pity" and "pleas-
ure." Katharsis, on the other hand, has been removed from 
the effect and is relocated as a "feature of the structure" 
of the play, a central mechanism-technical, legal and 
religious, a ritual, a specifically Hellenic element of the 
dramatic content. It seems worth saying firmly that Else 
is not simply insisting on something like a cognitive counter-
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part to an emotive effect of katharsis, an "objective correla-
tive," "scenes of pity and fear," as some have laid the 
emphasis. 
v 
WE HAVE SEEN katharsis and hamartia according to Else, 
and katharsis according to the classic commentary of the 
Oxford Hegelian S. H. Butcher ( 1895; 4th edition revised 
1907). It remains for us to consider what is by far the 
most difficult of the four main ideas that enter into the 
comparison I am making. What of hamartia according to 
Butcher? Here is a view of hamartia which seems to me 
superior, in subtlety and relevance, to all others with which 
I am familiar, but one which is seldom if ever noticed in 
recent discussions. 
This view is made possible by the fact that the Greek 
conception (or one important Greek conception) of faults 
and guilt was not, on the one hand: ( 1) just what we :find in 
Europe during the Christian era-a conception of free will 
or choice, and hence either merit or guilt. Nor, is it on the 
other hand: ( 2) the simple opposite of that: a Socratic ethic, 
the conception that all evil comes through ignorance-that 
knowledge is virtue. 
The main evidence (outside of the Greek plays) for any 
interpretation at all of Aristotelian hamartia is to be found, 
I think, in certain passages of his Nicomachean Ethics. Else, 
it is true, objects to the kind of invocation of the Ethics 
(especially a passage in V. 8) which I am now going to 
make-on the grounds that the rather complicated distinc-
tions drawn here by Aristotle apply only to the Athenian 
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legal situation (the five courts set up by Draco and Solon 
to judge crimes according to degrees of responsibility). But 
this argument (especially in view of Else's generous use of 
Plato's Laws and in view of his own invocation of the Ethics 
in a way to which I will refer a little below) seems to me 
to beg the question. 
In Ethics V. 8 Aristotle is discussing the topic of blabe-an 
injury inflicted by one person upon another. And he dis-
tinguishes four degrees of responsibility. The lowest is mere 
accident-as we might say, "contrary to reasonable expecta-
tion," a piece of bad luck, an atuchema. Next there is the 
kind of accident which happens, as we might say, through 
"culpable negligence," a manslaughter; Aristotle calls it a 
hamartema (The term refers to the physical deed resulting 
from a mental mistake, hamartia). Thirdly, there is the deed 
which is voluntary but not deliberate, a "second-degree 
murder" (done in passion), a simple injustice, as Aristotle 
calls it, an adikema; but in his phrasing, persons who commit 
such a deed are hamartanontes (committing a hamartema). 
And finally, there is the fully deliberate act, with "malice 
aforethought," first-degree murder, an injustice to which is 
added a vicious intent, mochtheria. From other passages in 
the Ethics, one of which (III. 2) Else would disallow on 
the ground that the usage is merely "colloquial,"3 it seems 
that Aristotle will sometimes associate the term hamartia 
even with mochtheria.4 
It seemed to Butcher, and I must say it seems to me, that 
these passages in the Ethics at the very least suggest a 
dubious and wavering relation between the term hamartia, 
along with its cognates, and the ideas of volition and re-
sponsibility. Some kind of kinship between these passages 
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and Aristotelian dramatic criticism is vividly suggested in 
the examples of hamartia which they adduce . 
. . . those injuries done in ignorance are mistakes (hamartemata) 
when the person acted on, the act, the instrument, or the end 
that will be attained is other than the agent supposed .... The 
person may be the striker's father, and the striker may know 
that it is a man or one of the persons present, but not know that 
it is his father. ( V. 8) 
Again one might think one's son was an enemy, as Merope did. 
(III. 1 )5 
True, there is a passage in Ethics III. 1 (heavily invoked by 
Else) where Aristotle remarks that from ignorance on the 
part of one who injures another person spring pain and 
repentance and hence also pity and pardon. Still it is a 
terrible thing even to be in a position to need such repent-
ance and such pardon. And there may always be some 
doubt, some wonder. 
The fact is, as Butcher noticed but as nobody nowadays 
seems to wish to notice, that Aristotle looked on good and 
bad luck as indexes of moral character. "Chance (tuche) 
and what results from chance are appropriate to agents 
that are capable of good fortune ( eutuchia) and of moral 
action generally. Therefore necessarily chance is in the 
sphere of moral actions . . . good fortune is thought to be 
the same, or nearly the same, as happiness, and happiness to 
be a kind of moral action, since it is well-doing" (Physics 
II. 6). "One must assume that accidents and strokes of good 
fortune are due to moral purpose; for if a number of similar 
examples can be adduced, they will be thought to be signs 
of virtue and moral purpose" ( Rhetoric I. 9) . In Rhetoric 
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I. 5 one of the examples of bad luck (dustuchia) is that an 
arrow is shot and hits the wrong man (The etymological 
meaning of hamartia, we may remember, is a missing of the 
mark with bow and arrow.) 
It would seem that we are dealing with a very ancient 
thought, a persistent human attitude. Indeed, "a man . . . 
cannot but be evil if he be overtaken by hopeless calamity; 
. . . any man is good in good fortune and bad in bad . . . 
they are best who are loved by the gods."6 Fortes Fortuna 
adfttvat. "When I hear a Man," says Joseph Addison, "com-
plain of his being unfortunate in all his undertakings, I 
shrewdly suspect him for a very weak Man in his Affairs. 
In conformity with this way of thinking, Cardinal Richelieu 
used to say, that Unfortunate and Imprudent were but two 
Words for the same Thing" (Spectator no. 293). The 
modern version of these ideas is part of the psychology of 
the unconscious. Freud's little book The Psychopathology 
of Everyday Life is a rich anthology of anecdotes about 
unconsciously deliberate slips, cultivated bad luck, accident-
prone persons. 
VI 
AT THIS POINT let us allude more specifically than we have 
so far to that peculiarly Aristotelian and technical conception 
the anagnorisis (the recognition or discovery). Else has 
bypassed some difficulties for himself by omitting from his 
volume the plotty, even rather Hitchcockian, types of 
anagnorisis (tricky mechanisms in the play) enumerated in 
Chapter XVI of the Poetics.7 But Chapter XIV tells us, in 
effect, that a superior kind of pathos (tragic incident) occurs 
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when the protagonist commits a deed (a killing in the 
family) in ignorance and only afterwards recognizes what 
he has done. Nevertheless: 
The question is how the catharsis is operated, and the answer 
is that it is operated ... by the plot (the mimesis). To some ex-
tent this is achieved by all that we see and hear about the hero 
in the play. All that we see of Oedipus assures us that he is a 
strong-willed, excitable, hot-tempered man, but also a kind, 
loving, and public-spirited one. Such a person cannot, we feel, 
have killed his father and married his mother in cold blood. 
But these reassurances are not enough .... It is Oedipus's self-
blinding, his transport of grief and remorse when he learns the 
truth, that finally assures us of his 'purity' and releases our tears. 
Thus recognition is the structural device which makes it possible 
for the hero to prove that he did indeed act di' hamartian tina 
and so deserves our pity. (Else, p. 438) 
In this crucial passage, Else has executed an extraordinary 
dual shift from the traditional view of anagnorisis: ( 1) from 
a discovery of guilt (a horrible discovery) to a discovery of 
innocence; ( 2) from a discovery by the protagonist to a 
discovery by the audience. (Or, the result is a confusion 
of one kind of discovery with the other.) Anagnorisis under-
goes a kind of displacement which is the complement of that 
undergone by katharsis. Katharsis, which was once in the 
spectator, is moved into the play. Anagnorisis, which was 
once in the play, is moved into the spectator. 
The legal-judicial situation which Else invokes as his 
model is actually rather different from the situation in the 
drama. Let us consider these steps: 
1. A man is awakened in the dark by a sound, as of an 
intruder. He reaches for his gun and shoots . 
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2. He "discovers" that the person he has shot is not an 
intruder, but his own father. 
3. The police come and take the shooter into custody. 
4. At the trial he convinces the jury (they "discover") 
that he killed his father by mistake. 
In the legal situation, the two moments of discovery are 
not simultaneous, and the jurymen (who have a real decision 
to reach) are not very much like spectators at a Greek play. 
The Greek play, by the peculiar economy and compression 
of its dramatic irony, managed things so that an audience 
who knew all along who Oedipus was and what he had 
done were ringside spectators of a moment when he was 
made to discover simultaneously both his own ignorance 
and his guilt-or the peculiar blend of ignorance and guilt 
which was his horrible lot. So far as the accent of the play 
is on discovery, it is on the discovery of horror. 
How does Oedipus, at the end of the play, appear in his 
own world, to himself and the persons around him? Consult 
the words of Creon, of Oedipus himself. Consult the chorus. 
Clearly Oedipus is a ruined, a polluted man. "The unclean 
must not remain in the eye of day." "Cast me away this 
instant." "Behold, this was Oedipus .... Behold, what a full 
tide of misfortune swept over his head." 
VII 
ONE coNSIDERABLE MERIT of Else's book lies, I believe, in 
his militant recognition that Aristotle's theory was not merely 
descriptive-but normative and ideal-and rather rigorously 
so. Aristotle seems to intend this meaning: 
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That the ideal poetry is drama. 
That the ideal drama is tragedy. 
That the ideal tragedy is that having a complex plot 
(that is, a peripeteia or sharp reversal and an anagnori-
sis). 
The complex plot, we may add, is a kind that affords a 
maximum exploitation of the kind of painfully dubious 
hamartia envisaged in the theory of Butcher. Many plays, 
it is true, exhibit various sorts of merit. But very few plays 
qualify as examples of the ideal-Oedipus the King and 
lphigenia Among the Taurians (in a rather different way-
where the discovery is made in time to prevent the painful 
act), and perhaps a very few others. 
Let us ask then a final question: What is the relation, 
what is the degree of correspondence, between Aristotle's 
Poetics and the actual play Oedipus the King? Or: How 
would Gerald Else's reinterpretation of the Poetics, if widely 
accepted, affect that degree of correspondence? Consider 
two alternatives. If Else is right, then either ( 1) Oedipus 
the play is far other than we have been thinking; or ( 2) 
Aristotle's Poetics is not so close to Oedipus as we may have 
been thinking. Else seems to believe that his theory of 
hamartia and katharsis fits both Aristotle and Oedipus. But, 
in a more general way, he would accept the second kind of 
alternative cheerfully enough. 
Tragedy in its greatest days comported things that were not 
dreamt of in Aristotle's philosophy. (Else, p. 446) 
This separatist idea-that a rather wide chasm opens 
between Aristotle and actual Greek tragedy-is one which I 
believe may be gaining a good deal of ground today. Bernard 
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Knox (Oedipus at Thebes, 1957) and Richard B. Sewall 
(The Vision of Tragedy, 1959) are two advanced humanists 
who might be cited in support of this guess. But an even 
better instance is Cedric H. Whitman, in the second chapter, 
"Scholarship and Hamartia," of his Sophocles, A Study in 
Heroic Humanism (Cambridge, Mass., 1951). A noteworthy 
difference between Else and Whitman appears in the fact 
that Whitman (on the evidence of those same passages in 
the Ethics which we have been considering) believes that 
Aristotle's idea of hamartia is a simply moral one-hamartia is 
a blamable fault. For just this reason, Whitman argues that 
Aristotle does not correctly describe Oedipus the King. For, 
he says, this play moves on a different principle from that 
of guilt and punishment-on a principle, that is, of sheerly 
human morality-against a backdrop of an irrational and 
unjustifiable universe-a chaos, not a cosmos. The morality 
of Sophocles is not that of theology or theodicy, but pre-
cisely that of heroic humanism. The world view is Pro-
methean. In such a context, the question about hamartia 
cannot even arise. Man is responsible for his acts only to 
himself. He comes to grief indeed-but without crime. 
It would seem obvious that to a critic of Whitman's 
temper, even Else's view of hamartia and purgation (if 
offered in place of usual interpretations) would not make 
Aristotle any more available. Whitman's Sophoclean hero 
can do without the gods and their justice. He can surely do 
without Else's discovery of pain and innocence-his expendi-
ture of pleasurable pity. 
We have then a crisis in which the custodians of Sopho-
clean drama, on the one hand, and the custodians of Aris-
totelian poetics, on the other, may well be moving in such 
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opposite directions that they threaten to put the theory and 
the poetry irremediably out of touch with each other. 
In one sense-on principle-! myself could hardly object 
to this. It is not my notion that the theory of a given age 
is ever necessarily a correct or best commentary on the 
poems of that age or adjacent ages. 
Still, I see no advantage in needlessly or wantonly working 
to dissolve an association, a critical focus, which has for so 
long a time seemed to afford so strong an illumination. The 
adequacy (or inadequacy) of the contemporary trend toward 
heroic humanism as an explanation of the greatness of Greek 
literature (The Iliad, for example, or Oedipus) is not the 
topic of the present essay. I have been trying to expound, 
however, some reasons why the more complicated view of 
hamartia defined by Butcher in his classic of 1895 (and 
perhaps developed a little in my own account) is closer to 
the truth about Aristotle than the novel view of Gerald 
Else. This older view has the advantage-obviously-of 
bringing Aristotle much closer to the mystery (the com-
plexity) of the Sophoclean Oedipus than either the simple 
theory of Aristotelian hamartia as innocent mistake (enter-
tained by Else) or the equally simple theory of Aristotelian 
hamartia as moral guilt (entertained by Whitman and, in 
fact, imputed by him to Butcher). I have been trying to 
pay a fair tribute to a learned and acute, an immensely 
valuable new commentary on Aristotle's Poetics, but at the 
same time to utter a plea for conservatism in our revisions 
of a handsome and fruitful critical tradition . 
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DEsPITE a classical tradition concerning miscarriage 
at the sight of Aeschylean furies, or bad conscience laid 
open, and despite a tearful indulgence that seems to have 
been fairly frequent with audiences in the eighteenth 
century, tragedy is nowadays hardly expected to produce 
even the commotion of tears. On the other hand, one of the 
most patent facts about comedy is that even the modem 
audience does laugh, and is apparently expected to. One 
recent writer on the subject has indeed considered it 
"very doubtful whether the end of comedy is to produce 
laughter." He observes that "many of the greatest comedies 
have a rather sobering effect." His argument may work 
especially well for the comic novel or the "comic" essay. Mr. 
Potts may be able to read Emma to himself without laugh-
ing.1 But a comic play at which people do not laugh sounds 
like an odd success, and this no doubt helps to explain both 
why the literary comic tradition centers on the stage, and 
why comic theory has almost always been implicated in 
theory of laughter. The phenomenon of laughter does offer 
an easily locatable, if perhaps only superficial, point of 
reference for talking about a literary species. 
At the same time, laughter has always been one of the 
chief embarrassments of the comic theorist. Theories of 
laughter, by definition, or by initial assumption and focus, 
are of course just that-theories of the laughing person and 
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his pleasure. It is possible to reduce the subjectivity of the 
theory even to a simple tautology, saying: To laugh at 
something is just to throw your laughter at it, thereby 
making it laughable. The laughable is just what you laugh 
at. And so have said such disparate figures as Samuel 
Johnson (in his Rambler 125) and Max Eastman (in his 
guidebook Laughter) appealing to the psychology of Mc-
Dougall for the concept of an innate laughing impulse, a 
primary humorous instinct. 
Even laughter theories of a more special content are not so 
various as might be feared. They are all subject-centered in 
a double sense, in that they all stress not only a subjective 
feeling but the aspect of an egoistic gratification. The 
essential is always some form of either "triumph" or "liberty." 
Thus Plato said in the Philebus that stage comedies give us a 
malicious feeling of gratification at seeing bullies and brag-
garts revealed as harmless pretenders. And Hobbes con-
ferred upon the early modern version of this theory the 
confident, bouncing name of "Sudden Glory." His formula-
tion is always worth quoting: 
Sudden Glory, is the passion which maketh those Grimaces called 
LAUGHTER; and is caused either by some sudden act of their own, 
that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some deformed 
thing in another, in comparison whereof they suddenly applaud 
themselves. (Leviathan, I, vi.) 
During the later nineteenth century the theory of triumph 
became crudified through various physiological, psychologi-
cal, and primitivistic analogies: the expression of the suckling 
infant, the laughter of children in barbarous games, the roar 
of the savage in victory, the smile on the face of tiger or 
Cheshire cat. 2 A more complex modern version appears 
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in the group of "oscillation" theories, which, beginning with 
the grossness of tickle, move towards the refinements of 
alternating emotions, attitude mixing, or mental hopping, 
and of correspondingly ambivalent objects-for example, the 
woman, towards whom we entertain dominant feelings of 
affection often interrupted by feelings of hostility.3 Hence 
an experience of mental tickling and laughter, and hence 
all those jokes about women which the theorist, who is 
usually a man, remembers so vividly. 
Again, Plato in his Republic and Laws warns us that 
laughter is a dangerous kind of escape. And Shaftesbury, 
giving us a revaluation of the old idea, says laughter is a 
liberating force in political and religious debate and a kind 
of aid to finding the truth.4 
The natural free spirits of ingenious man, if imprisoned or 
controlled, will find out other ways of motion to relieve them-
selves in their constraint; and whether it be in burlesque, mimicry 
or buffoonery, they will be glad at any rate to vent themselves, 
and be revenged on their constrainers. . . . 'Tis the persecuting 
spirit has raised the bantering one. (On the Freedom of Wit and 
Humour, I, iv.) 
True, laughter as freedom or frivolity in politics is today 
only an occasional subject of concern." But laughter as 
" Consult, for instance, H. 1v1. Kallen, "The Arts and Thomas Jefferson," 
Ethics, LIII (July, 1943), 282; and T. V. Smith, "The Serious Problem of 
Campaign Humor," New York Times Sunday Magazine, September 28, 1952, 
p. 11. Jefferson deplored the levity of the French and in 1789 worried 
about their capacity for a serious revolution. The most insidious modern 
attempts with laughter are perhaps being made in the comic strips. 
"Beneath the high notes of patriotism, we want to hear the low notes of 
laughter, always off-key, always true. Jagged, imperfect and lovely, the 
goal lies here. This is the estate of our independence" ( \Valt Kelly, The 
Incompleat Pogo [New York, 1953], p. 191) . 
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personal liberty has been much treated by psychological 
theorists. Certain very generalized and softened speculations 
are urged, for instance, by Auguste Penjon in the Revue 
Philosophique for 1893 and by his follower L. W. Kline 
in the American Journal of Psychology for 1907. A bit of 
bark in a fireplace blazes up, and persons seated dreamily 
about the embers smile. A big drop of rain falls into a pond, 
and boys sitting about gazing at the surface smile. Children 
snicker at nothing in the restraint of a school room. Spec-
tators laugh at almost nothing in a court room. "The func-
tion of the humorous stimulus consists in cutting the surface 
tension, in taking the hide off consciousness."5 
Can the triumph in laughter be distinguished from the 
liberty? Everybody will think of Freud's Wit and Its Rela-
tion to the Unconscious-the polite aggression, often sexual, 
of the tendentious joke, the psychic economy or easy irra-
tional leaps of idea which explain the pleasure of even the 
harmless joke, the dreamy art form of comedy where grown-
up people enjoy a regression to an infantile, arcadian id 
realm. 
The euphoria which we are thus striving to obtain is nothing but 
the state of a bygone time, in which we were wont to defray our 
psychic work with slight expenditure. It is the state of our 
childhood in which we did not know the comic, were incapable 
of wit and did not need humor to make us happy. 6 
In a book called The Origins of Wit and Humour, pub-
lished as recently as 1952, Albert Rapp argues that laughter 
is a dempbilization, a relief from tension, upon sudden 
triumph, and his archetype is the supposed mirthful guffaw 
of very early savage man enjoying a victory in hand-to-hand 
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conflict. Hence the laughter of ridicule, whether spon-
taneous or incited by words, and hence too the laughter of 
wit, which has an intermediate ancestry in such mental 
tussles or riddlings as may at one time have taken the place 
of more savage physical strife. Seeing the point of a joke is 
enjoying a sudden mental triumph. Jokes about sex or 
about Prohibition in America thirty years ago are easily 
enough explained as triumphs over suppression. Perhaps 
Mr. Rapp has more trouble when he tries to incorporate into 
his system the very common form of laughter which he calls 
"loving ridicule," or humor. The laughter itself remains just 
as aggressive as ever (the archetypal laughter of the mother 
at the child who toddles and falls, the laughter of the English 
audience at Falstaff), but in a happy transformation the 
selfish principle is fused, mixed, or merged with love. Thus a 
victory is gained by annexation or Anschluss with the oppos-
ing principle. The theorist has his own way by reasserting 
a definition. Laughter is just per se aggressive, no matter 
what you join with it, or in what nonaggressive forms it 
appears. 
Why do I laugh when my opponent trumps his partner's 
ace? when the wind blows off the parson's hat? when an old 
blind peddler stumbles and spills his pencils all over the 
street? I don't know. Maybe I don't laugh. But a Fiji 
Islander would! He will laugh when a prisoner is being 
roasted alive in an oven! Confident proclamations about the 
nature of anthropoid laughter are invested with importance 
by equally confident assumptions that reduction to the 
lowest common factor is the right way of proceeding. 
Civilized society discourages cruel jokes and brutal laughter, 
but what primitive society does is more important. Not 
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what I laugh at but what I don't laugh at is the critical clue 
to my laughter. Are such theories of hidden elements and 
forgotten origins supposed to increase my appreciation of 
jokes or comic situations? It would appear not. If I dwell on 
the explanations long enough, or let myself pretend to be-
lieve in them, I begin to be conscious of a distinct aversion 
to laughter. 
Here, at this terminus of sheerly affective theory about 
laughter, we are a long way from being able to frame any 
critical discourse about works of comic literary art. Happily, 
we may turn-or at least we may, with some effort, work 
our way-to another tradition. 
The more austere theories which have looked away from 
the laugher himself, or out from his consciousness or uncon-
sciousness as a laugher, toward the things he may be sup-
posed to laugh at, have always laid stress upon some kind of 
contrast. The Kantian incongruity between idea entertained 
and sensuously discovered object and the similar formula of 
Schopenhauer are among the most purified versions. 7 Obvi-
ously the basic notion calls for some kind of subtilizing. 
Yet attempts to subtilize it have often enlisted the aid of 
some markedly affective clause, as in the "tickle" and "oscil-
lation" theories, where we have noted already that some 
ambivalent figure like the woman is the cognitive counter-
part of a certain supposedly rapid alternation of feelings. 
Arthur Koestler's Insight and Outlook ( 1949) draws a 
"Geometry" of wit somewhat as follows: Imagine that there 
are "Operative Fields" of ideas (groups or systems of ideas 
that go together), and imagine two of these fields adjacent 
to each other, and a train of thought traveling through one 
of them. The thought comes to the border and happens to 
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encounter there one of those double-faced symbols or ambi-
guities so prominent in wit-work of all kinds-a "bisociated" 
link between the fields. Quick as a flash the thought jumps 
from one field to the other. But a load of emotion which was 
being carried along-more physical, lumpish, inert-is jolted 
off and left behind or shot to one side, discharged ( re-
cathected, as Freud would say) in laughter. And it is 
precisely the kind of emotion, the painful feeling of antago-
nism, which, being sidetracked by the witty jolt, determines 
the comic pleasure. If the emotion is of another sort, then 
the geometry of wit may just as well fit the case of "serious" 
poetry, or, for that matter, of scientific discovery. The 
thought structure is always the same. The emotions differ 
and determine comedy, tragedy, or science. Thus a resolute 
show of joining thought and emotion in the same diagram 
turns out to be a device of thoroughly affective implication. 
More successful attempts to complicate a theory of ludi-
crous contrast have moved in the social and moral direction. 
The tradition begins when Aristotle observes that comedy 
deals with characters inferior to those in real life, but that 
the comic defect (hamartema) is, unlike the tragic, not pain-
ful or destructive (anodunon kai ou phthartikon), and per-
haps there ought to be a happy ending. The latter clauses 
are the cognitive counterparts to a notion of laughter as a 
somewhat kindly movement. (On these clauses, in the long 
run, may well depend the most reliable kind of distinctions 
between the tragic and the comic.) Moliere, Pope, Swift, 
and Fielding spoke much, in harsh and punishing tones, 
about certain vices, follies, affectations, hypocrisies. But 
softer modern illuminations have occurred, as in German 
romantic criticism, or in Meredith's lecture (partly inspired 
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by Jean Paul) celebrating the "thoughtful laughter" excited 
in a competent observer by the combat between the sexes 
in the high society game, or again in Bergson's view of the 
laughable as failure of the elan vital, the suspension of 
vitality in any form of mechanism or stereotype-the phys-
ical automatism of stumbling, for instance, or the mental 
rigidity of absent-mindedness or bad habits. (The comic 
character comes to be seen as incapable of moving toward 
discovery of himself-fixed in mere postures of self-exposure.8 ) 
Most recently appear the refinements of Mr. Potts, though 
he does not believe in the happy ending-nor in laughter, 
as we have seen. Aristotle said that in tragedy the fable 
is the first principle; the characters come in for the sake of 
the fable. He did not say the opposite for comedy. But Mr. 
Potts is able to make it look as if indeed he might have, as 
if a more or less necessary chain of temporal events following 
on some blunder may be essential to tragedy, while a 
"spatial" pattern of characters significantly opposed and 
acting to reveal one another may be equally essential to 
comedy. The action follows the free whim of the characters. 
The tragic character is unusual but normal, whereas the 
comic character is just the opposite, abnormal or eccentric, 
but all too usual (as the psychologist tells us today that 
most persons are neurotic). Comedy is the spirit of humility 
and of measurement by the norm. Thus far Mr. Potts. 
In Aristotle, comedy does not enjoy a mythic status, for 
comedy is to deal not with heroes of myth but with low 
characters. It seems certain enough that any further Aris-
totelian remarks on comedy which may be lost did not argue 
a very cogent relation between comedy and symbol. Meta-
phor was for Aristotle a way of heightening poetic style-or 
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it could be a joke, if deliberately misused. But these facts 
in the history of literary theory do not make it impossible 
that ancient comedy should be found actually symbolic in 
structure, or even mythic, with "comic Oedipus patterns" 
and the like. At any rate, modern critics of myth and symbol 
(among whom Northrop Frye9 enjoys an extremely ad-
vanced position) practice a hugely expanded analogical 
mode which embraces with equal confidence both tragic and 
comic and their origins in ritual death or ritual resurrection, 
heroic quest and divine sacrifice, or carnival misrule and 
the "green world" of Robin Hood. Albert Cook's The Dark 
Voyage and the Golden Mean (1949) dichotomizes all hu-
man experience into mutually dependent "antinomic sym-
bols," the wonderful-instanced in the tragic quest-and the 
probable-instanced in the social norm from which the 
comic deviates into existence. Comedy and tragedy are part 
of an almost transcendental opposition which includes, at 
different levels, such various pairs as concept and symbol, 
sex and death, the beautiful and the sublime, success and 
failure, bourgeois and aristocrat. This kind of criticism 
seems as vastly removed as it is possible to be from all that 
concern with the convulsions of laughter and its stimuli 
which we encounter in Mr. Rapp and the other psycho-
logical writers. The structures of significance indeed are so 
manifold and so extensive that even a small incautious 
laugh here might set off thunderous and toppling reverbera-
tions. 
We have been speaking about theories of laughter itself 
and then about theories of what is laughed at so far as these 
two may be separately discernible. It must be admitted, 
however, that laughter and the laughable are not often 
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discussed separately for very long. (And here the critic's 
task is going to be greatly complicated-though at the same 
time his opportunities may be marvelously enriched.) The 
two kinds of theory tend to come together-the automatized 
object of laughter in Bergson's theory, for instance, looking 
a great deal like the comatose or mechanized subject just 
before he is awakened by laughter in the theory of Penjon-
the Platonic stage bully being, one fears, not so much unlike 
the ego of the audience which rises in the appropriate 
laughter of malice and triumph. There is much room in the 
laughing situation, much need, for "empathy." And this is 
especially true of the situation in comic art, for art is a 
reflexive work, a thing contrived of the human object only 
as this is caught in the light of responses thrown upon it. 
Comedy (to compress into one sentence a great deal that is 
important but in the climate of recent critical theory almost 
a truism) combines the accent of laughter and the accent of 
sympathy in a union of the laugher and his audience with 
the targets of laughter. Moliere in his Critique de l'Ecole 
des Femmes and Fielding, following him, in Joseph An-
drews, say that comic and satiric "history" is a glass where 
"thousands in their closet" may see their own faces. Swift 
in his Preface to The Battle of the Books says just the op-
posite, that "Satyr is a sort of Glass, wherein Beholders do 
generally discover everybody's Face but their Own." Each 
of these views is of course correct." 
" This neither accepts nor rejects, though it does assert the critical 
irrelevance of, the classic apology made by the satirist or comic writer that 
his function is to ridicule and hence to correct vice or folly-corriger les 
hommes en les divertissant. The distinction confidently made by Meredith 
and others between satire and comedy, so much to the advantage of the 
latter, may or may not come in. And the critic may or may not believe 
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The laugh of self-enhancement in the presence of the 
comic figure must always have been in danger of being 
itself the occasion of laughter to the nearest spectator-but 
that spectator has often, happily, been the self. The German 
romantic theorists dwelt much in the region where subject 
and object are one. And laughter was one of their best 
avenues for getting there. The theory of laughter was 
reflexively subtilized by Jean Paul in his Vorschule, by 
Friederich Schlegel, and by others into various shapes of 
self-criticism and sardonic transcendence. And after them 
comes Kierkegaard, in his double transcendence, by "irony" 
from the aesthetic to the ethical, and by "humor" from the 
ethical to the religious. "In order not to be distracted by 
the finite, by all the relativities in the world, the ethicist 
places the comical between himself and the world, thereby 
insuring himself against becoming comical through naive 
misunderstanding of his ethical passion."10 
But a too close union between the Iaugher and his object 
may be one of the main dangers to which metaphysical 
laughing theory has been exposed. Laughter (because of 
its unreliable tendency to slide from the aloof to the sym-
pathetic) is not a stern way of dealing with deviation. It is 
always somewhat too much like its object-undignified, friv-
-without special critical commitment in either case-that dunces and 
scoundrels were actually instructed or brought to repentance by the wit of 
Moliere or Pope. It would seem that in some more or less primitive 
societies, satire has been thought to operate with a magically destructive 
force-killing rats, raising blisters on faces, driving Lycambes and his 
daughter to hang themselves. ( Cp. Robert C. Elliott, "The Satirist and 
Society," ELH, A Journal of English Literary History, XXI [September, 
1954], 2:37-48; and The Power of Satire: Magic, Ritual, Art, Princeton, 
1960.) Terror of ridicule may be one of the most permanent human 
passions. But it is presumably not the same as aesthetic experience . 
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olous, inferior. Hence it happened during the Renaissance 
that Aristotle himself wa-i translated as saying that laughter 
is a form of baseness, a "fowling for the people's delight, 
or their fooling." And later on the romantic theorist in order 
to be superior had to be serious, looking at the comic in the 
light of the cosmic, and implicitly assigning to laughter a low 
place in his philosophy. "Reason does not joke," says 
Emerson in an essay on The Comic, "and men of reason do 
not." 
The essence of all jokes, of all comedy, seems to be an honest or 
well-intended halfness; ... The balking of the intellect is comedy; 
and it announces itself physically in the pleasant spasms which 
we call laughter. 
Pleasant spasms! "Peculiar explosions of laughter 
"Muscular irritation ... " "Violent convulsions of the face 
and sides, and obstreperous roarings of the throat."11 A note 
of patronage is clear. Another writer in English who leans 
toward the same predicament is Meredith, whose poems, if 
not his famous lecture on the "Comic Spirit," make a heavy 
linkage between laughter and the positivistic fetishes of 
nature, earth, brain, and blood. And here too, enjoying a 
high rank among sober laughers, appears Bergson, for whom 
the comic literary form reflects the limitation of its stereo-
typed and superficial objects, just as tragedy or serious art 
does the individuality and vitality of its own proper objects. 
Laughter is "a froth with a saline base. Like froth, it 
sparkles. It is gaiety itself. But the philosopher who gathers 
a handful to taste may find that the substance is scanty, 
and the aftertaste bitter."12 
And so we have swung back once more, rather toward 
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the embarrassments than toward the riches which laughter 
produces for the comic theorist and critic. And we have 
now to confess one more reason-or aspect of reasons already 
named-why the critic should, for the moment of his criti-
cism at least, look askance at the pleasure of laughing. This 
is related less to any lofty dilemma than to the need of 
criticism just to keep to its object. The critic has not come 
before his audience to tell jokes, to demonstrate to them 
in any way at all that he knows how to make people laugh. 
It has been mainly when he has been bent on taking direct 
hold on laughter itself rather than on its objects that he has 
felt impelled to some such foredoomed attempt. The lugu-
briously heavy Germanic jokes, about Jews, about sex, and 
the like, which encumber Freud's pages will come to mind. 
Even Meredith, alert intellect that he is, may be felt to 
stumble when he challenges the national mentality and tries 
to persuade us, at some expense of words, about two inci-
dents where the British would not laugh but should, and 
one where they would laugh but should not. Time and again 
the writer on the comic should have had his warning. 13 No 
matter how successful he is in other arenas as a wit, or 
perhaps all the more especially if he is a noted wit, he ought 
not to attempt the illustrated lecture. The general truth 
that there is no such thing as a scientific demonstration of 
the poetic is specially pointed up in the case of comedy by 
the sanction of laughter. 
II 
ONE oF THE MAIN VIRTUES of the volume of essays English 
Stage Comedy ( 1954) for which I wrote this essay as 
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Introduction is that no one of the six contributors"' anywhere 
attempts to quote his materials in illustration of how funny 
they are. Mr. Barber's brief-and I believe inoffensive-
allusion to laughter is a marked exception to the prevailing 
method of the volume. There is no implication, so far as I 
can see, in any of the essays that comedy should not or need 
not be funny. Yet a statement of the theses of the six authors 
(so far as their speculations admit being reduced to the 
simplicity of thesis) may sound severe enough: that Falstaff 
in the two parts of Henry IV is a character shaped on age-
old lines of ritual meaning, a saturnalian king of misrule 
and then a scapegoat; that Shakespeare's final comedy The 
Tempest is a romanticized softening of certain Plautine 
lineaments of intrigue, the good old master, the clever 
willing servant, and the bungling oaf; that Ben Jonson's 
realistic comedies achieve their unity and meaning by 
organization around certain bizarre central symbols-the 
fanatically morose noise-hater, for instance, symbol of revul-
sion from the whole clattering business of metropolitan 
false living; that the after-gleams of English manners com-
edy, Sheridan and Wilde, are but pale affectations com-
pared to the full social fire of Wycherley and Congreve; 
that the principle which makes Shaw's best comedies work, 
and which strives more or less ineffectually in his later 
comedies, is "Hegelian" dialectic; that T. S. Eliot's comedies, 
somewhat like his Euripidean models, aim at a religious 
conversion of secular, even farcical materials, but that, unlike 
Euripides, Eliot scarcely succeeds. Here, one might say, 
"C. L. Barber on Henry N; Bernard Knox on The Tempest; Ray L. 
Heffner, Jr., on Jonson's Silent ·woman; Marvin Mudrick on English comedy 
of manners; Katherine Gatch on Shaw; \"'illiam Arrowsmith on T. S. Eliot. 
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are no laughing matters. The accent is scarcely that of the 
silvery laughter which Meredith partly manages to share 
with the Comic Spirit of his classic lecture. There is not 
even any of the somber-lurid funniness which exhales like 
a flickering gaslight along the ways of Bergson's metaphysi-
cal discussion, nor of the lumbering guffaw which may be 
heard heavily as from an inner chamber of the Freudian 
clinic. There are those who will point out quickly enough 
the prepared slant which the discussion has received from 
the Eliotic return to the quasi-tragic and quasi-religious 
melodramas of Euripides, from the dialectic habits of the 
conversational Shaw, even from the sandpapery rub of the 
didactic universe of Bartholomew Fair. There will un-
doubtedly be some who respond with indignation at the 
attempt to sublime Falstaff into anything so canonically 
primitive as a ritual scapegoat, and at the superior gaze 
turned by one of our authors upon the "good-natured senti-
mental dramas of comic intrigue" which Sheridan is said to 
have concocted for a "passive audience ... bottle-fed on 
, 
sermons. 
All six of the essays are written in what may broadly be 
called the "classical" vein-as indeed every rebirth of English 
stage comedy has been in the classical vein. It was with 
a shrewd theoretical insight, if not with complete theatrical 
success, that T. S. Eliot in a plan to return verse comedy 
to the English stage went back to the point in the history 
of Greek drama where Euripidean melodramatized tragedy 
was falling off into the patterns of tender emotion, intrigue, 
mistaken identity, foundling and changeling plots from 
which the "New" Greek comedy, the form prevailing on 
the stage ever since, was to take its cue. In each new era 
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the comic writer's talent has been to reinvent some neglected 
formula. Herakles tippling and joking among the servants 
at the home of the bereft Admetus becomes, as Mr. Eliot 
himself had to point out to his commentators, the unrevealed 
psychiatrist at the ruined cocktail party of Edward Cham-
berlayne-with a "Toory-ooly toory-iley, what's the matter 
with One-Eyed Riley?" Prospero and Ariel reenact, in a 
strange new context of island enchantments, the Plautine 
negotiations of the benevolent master and crafty slave. 
Make the slave a willing but subordinate and perhaps not 
brilliant charismatic personality, and the master a patient, 
far-scheming, priestly psychiatrist, and you have the inter-
esting scene in Harcourt-Reilly's consulting room at the 
start of Eliot's second act: 
REILLY: It was necessary to delay his appointment 
To lower his resistance. But what I mean is, 
Does he trust your judgment? 
ALEX: Yes, implicitly. 
It's not that he regards me as very intelligent, 
But he thinks I'm well informed: the sort of person 
Who would know the right doctor, as well as the right shops. 
Besides, he was ready to consult any doctor 
Recommended by anyone except his wife. 
REILLY: I had already impressed upon her 
That she was not to mention my name to him. 
ALEX: With your usual foresight. 
But the essays in English Stage Comedy are classical in a 
wider and deeper sense than that they are concerned with 
picking up such parallels, and indeed Mr. Arrowsmith on 
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Eliot has not bothered that way at all. These essays are 
classical in the sense that they share the view which allows 
comic poetry and tragic poetry to be treated side by side 
in Aristotle's treatise on the Art of Fiction. 14 The implica-
tions of Aristotle's arrangement and of the Greek theatrical 
habit itself gradually shaded off into something different. 
As for comedy and satire, said Horace, we will inquire 
another time whether this kind of writing is really poetry 
or not. Of course he was joking, at least in part. But it has 
been along this line that later times, and especially our 
own, when laughter itself has become the object of a quasi-
literary theoretical inquiry, have tended to assign comic 
theory its own special and inferior place, apart from serious 
poetics. Metaphysical wit and irony have been recent 
avenues of serious realliance with the laughing spirit of 
poetry. But to be yet more inclusive and venture a concern 
even for the comic (not as Emerson did it, not as Bergson, 
not quite perhaps even as Meredith, but in the manner of 
some new critic-more or less I think in the manner of the 
six critics in English Stage Comedy) may be the most urgent 
requirement for a progressive criticism of poetry today. 
And lastly, there is another sense and a very important 
one in which the essays I have been alluding to are classical. 
Though they are all interested more or less overtly in 
symbols, and though two of them at least are in the full 
mythic and ritual mode, I believe that each of them keeps 
clear of that modern heresy which wants to make myth 
a new kind of canonical poetic subject matter or a guar-
anteed poetic idiom. As Jung at least (among the psychia-
trists) has recognized, there is a difference between a 
graceful and a clumsy dream, a well-made and an ill-made 
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myth or version of myth-between, let us say, a cliche myth 
and a real metaphoric utterance. This difference is carried 
over and written large in the world of poetry. At least two 
of the essays, the first and the last, are devoted to a formal 
insistence upon the critical significance of this kind of 
difference. It is through his recognizing and discussing this 
difference that the literary critic-whether of tragedy or of 
comedy-reveals that his concern is not specifically with 
anthropology and the analysis of myth but with criticism . 
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AN EXERCISE IN ABSTRACTION 
LET us FIRST of all confess that we do not have a 
novel view to proclaim. It is true that the view which we 
believe to be correct is often under attack today and is 
sometimes supposed to be outmoded by recent refinements. 
Its proponents too are often not sure enough of its actual 
character to defend it with accuracy. At the same time, a 
look into some of the most recent handbooks and critical 
essays reveals that there are some teachers and writers on 
our subject today who expound this view in a perfectly 
clear and accurate way. We have in mind, for instance, 
A Glossary of Literary Terms revised by Meyer Abrams for 
Rinehart in 1957 from the earlier work by Norton and 
Rushton, or the handbook by Laurence Perrine, Sound and 
Sense: An Introduction to Poetry, published in 1956 by 
Harcourt, Brace. In the lengthy Kenyon Review symposium 
on English verse, Summer, 1956,1 we admire the niceties 
of Mr. Arnold Stein's traditionally oriented discussion of 
Donne and Milton. There is also Mr. Stein's earlier PMLA 
article ( LIX [1944], 393-97) on "Donne's Prosody." In the 
Kenyon symposium there is, furthermore, Mr. Ransom. It 
would be difficult to frame a more politely telling, persua-
sive, accurate retort than his to the more extravagant claims 
of the linguists. 
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We are, therefore, in a position to do no more than take 
sides in a debate which is already well defined. Still this 
may be worth doing. Our aim is to state as precisely as we 
can just what the traditional English syllable-accent meter 
is or depends upon, to rehearse a few more reasons in its 
support, perhaps to disembarrass it of some of the burdens 
that are nowadays needlessly contrived for it. 
II 
Tms ESSAY is about the scanning of English verse. We want 
to consider two influential current schools of thought about 
scanning, and to examine critically a fundamental mistake 
which we believe is made by both of them, though in 
different ways. These two deviations from what we con-
sider good sense in metrics may be conveniently designated 
as on the one hand the linguistic and on the other the 
musical or temporal. The linguistic view, as it happens, 
has been authoritatively illustrated in the contributions to 
the Kenyon symposium of 1956 by Harold Whitehall and 
Seymour Chatman. The musical view has been very well 
represented in the more recent volume Sound and Poetry, 
English Institute Essays 1956, and especially in its intro-
ductory essay "Lexis and Melos," by the editor, Northrop 
Frye-and no less in the same writer's larger book Anatomy 
of Criticism, published at Princeton in 1957. 
Mr. Whitehall gives us an admirable summary of the 
linguistic system of George L. Trager and Henry Lee Smith, 
in part a reprint of his 1951 Kenyon review of their treatise, 
An Outline of English Structure ( 1951). But his essay is 
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more than a summary; it is a celebration. Indeed it makes 
a very large claim for what this system can contribute to 
the modern study of metrics: 
as no science can go beyond mathematics, no criticism can go 
beyond its linguistics. And the kind of linguistics needed by 
recent criticism for the solution of its pressing problems of 
metrics and stylistics, in fact, for all problems of the linguistic 
surface of letters, is not semantics, either epistemological or com-
municative, but down-to-the-surface linguistics, microlinguistics 
not metalinguistics. (Kenyon Review, XVIII, 415) 
To Mr. Chatman falls the pioneer task of showing how 
these extraordinary claims are to be substantiated. He 
presents us with a careful and interesting analysis of eight 
tape-recorded readings of a short poem by Robert Frost, 
one of the readers being Frost himself. Mr. Chatman's essay 
is full of passages of good sense. Still we have some 
objections to urge against him: the gist of these is that 
through his desire to exhibit the stress-pitch-juncture ele-
ments in spoken English, he shows an insufficient concern 
for the normative fact of the poem's meter. It is true that 
he does not deny that the poem has an "abstract metrical 
pattern," and he acknowledges the "two-valued metrics of 
alternating stresses" ( p. 422). But in his actual readings 
these seem to be of little interest. 
We are not quite sure we understand Mr. Chatman's idea 
of the relation between meter and Trager-Smith linguistics. 
One subheading of his essay, "Prosody and Meaning Resolu-
tion," probably ought to read "Intonation and Meaning 
Resolution." ("An 'intonation pattern'," let us note well, 
1s an amalgam of features of stress, pitch, and juncture 
which occurs as part of a spoken phrase." -p. 422) Mr . 
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Chatman has learned from Frost's reading of his poem the 
correct intonation and meaning of the phrase "scared a 
bright green snake." Very well. Correct understanding 
produces correct intonation, and correct intonation reveals 
correct understanding. And one may choose or may not 
choose to indicate the intonation by Trager-Smith notation. 
And this intonation (whether indicated by Trager-Smith 
notation or not) may or may not affect the meter in the 
given instance. In this instance there is nothing to show that 
what Mr. Chatman learned about the intonation did change 
the meter. The same observations hold for Mr. Chatman's 
discovery of the meaning and intonation of the concluding 
phrase of the poem, "and left the hay to make." Through 
recorded readings of a poem Mr. Chatman learns something 
that another person might know through boyhood experi-
ence on a farm, or through a footnote. But again no need 
for Trager-Smith. And no change in meter. The point is 
brought out even more clearly in another recent article by 
Mr. Chatman, in the Quarterly Journal of Speech. He makes 
a shrewd observation about a passage in Spenser's Faerie 
Queene (I.ii.13. 4-5): "And like a Persian mitre on her head/ 
She wore. . .. " "We must," he says, "resist the temptation 
to read And llke a P~rsian mttre." The obvious meaning is 
rather: "Like a Persian, she wore .... "2 Quite true. One 
stresses Persian a little more strongly, one pauses between 
Persian and mitre. But there is no change in meter, and no 
change in intonation that an old-fashioned comma will not 
provide for. 
One of the good things about Mr. Chatman's Kenyon 
contribution is that, like Victor Erlich, whose Russian 
Formalism ( 1955) he aptly quotes ( p. 438), Mr. Chatman 
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prefers a "phonemic" analysis to the now somewhat old-
fashioned total "acoustic" way of trying to study either 
language or metrics. (Phonemic differences, we can never 
remind ourselves too often, are those that make a real 
difference in the structure of a language, like the difference 
between d and t in English, rather than the difference 
between your pronunciation of t and mine.) Phonetic 
studies, observes Mr. Chatman, "before the discovery of the 
phonemic principle," were not really getting anywhere with 
the understanding of language. "It is unfortunately a truism 
that one cannot get more structure out of a machine than 
one puts in" ( p. 422) . We hold that for metrical study it is 
indeed necessary to remember the phonemic principle-in 
the broadest sense, the principle of linguistic significance in 
phonetic difference. But it is also necessary, while we work 
within that principle, to practice an even further degree of 
abstraction. Not just all or any phonemic features-not all 
or any intonational features-but a certain level of these is 
organized by the poet to make a metrical pattern. 
Let us turn for a moment to our other authority and point 
of departure for the present argument, Northrop Frye. Mr. 
Frye's chief emphasis, both in his English Institute essay 
and in his Anatomy, is on the similarity or continuity be-
tween the pentameter line of Milton or Shakespeare and 
the older (and newer) English strong-stress meter, Piers 
Plowman, Everyman, Christabel, The Cocktail Party. "A 
four-stress line," he says, "seems to be inherent in the 
structure of the English language" (Anatomy, p. 251; cp. 
Sound and Poetry, pp. xvii, xx). It is true that Mr. Frye does 
not identify the four-stress pattern of the pentameter line 
with its meter; he clearly thinks of the "stress" pattern 
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and the "meter" as two different things; for example, in a 
reading of Hamlet's soliloquy, "the old four-stress line 
stands out in clear relief against the metrical background" 
(Anatomy, p. 251). Nevertheless, it is also apparent from 
his neglect of any specific discussion of "meter" that he 
attaches little importance to it; he does not seem to believe 
that it has much to do with what he calls, in his special 
sense, the "music" of poetry. "To read poetry which is 
musical in our sense we need a principle of accentual 
scansion, a regular recurrence of beats with a variable 
number of syllables between the beats. This corresponds 
to the general rhythm of the music in the Western tradition, 
where there is a regular stress accent with a variable number 
of notes in each measure" (Sound and Poetry, p. xvii). 
Rather than object more emphatically to Mr. Frye's views 
at this point, we allow our difference from him to emerge, 
as we go along, in later parts of our essay. 
Let us round out our preliminary account of strong-stress 
rhythm by a return to Mr. Whitehall. Mr. Whitehall is much 
impressed by Kenneth L. Pike's principle (e.g., The Intona-
tion of American English, [Ann Arbor, 1945], p. 34) that 
in English "the time-lapse between any two primary stresses 
tends to be the same irrespective of the number of syllables 
and the junctures between them" (Kenyon Review, XVIII, 
418). Mr. Whitehall distinguishes a type of "rhythm" which 
he calls the isochronic: it "depends on equal time-lapses 
between primary stresses" ( p. 420). And he finds in a line 
of Gray's Elegy three "primary stresses" and hence three 
isochronic sequences of syllables. It is not wholly clear 
whether the term "rhythm," as Mr. Whitehall uses it, em-
braces, excludes, or nullifies the concept of "meter," for 
. 113. 
Hateful Contraries 
Mr. Whitehall eschews the latter term. But when we con-
sider his other technical terms, we can assemble a view very 
much like that of Mr. Frye. He speaks of syllabic "rhythms" 
( p. 420) and among these the isoaccentual, and he says 
that in Pope's Essay on Man there is "undoubtedly isoac-
centual counterpointed with isochronic rhythm," while "in 
much of Milton" there is "isochronic counter-pointed with 
isoaccentual rhythm." The nature of Mr. Whitehall's "pro-
sodic" observations might be made clearer if we were to 
substitute for one of his terms an apparent synonym: for 
"isoaccentual rhythm" read "meter," i.e., syllable-stress meter 
of the English pentameter tradition, Chaucer to Tennyson. 
In Pope and Milton there is both syllable-stress meter and 
an occasional pattern of strong stresses which can, if one 
wishes, be taken as a moment of the older strong-stress 
meter. 
Again: when Mr. Whitehall speaks of "isoaccentual" 
rhythms, and when he speaks of "isosyntactic" rhythms, he 
is talking about ascertainable linguistic features, and hence 
about ascertainable and definable metric patterns. But when 
he adds that "the other type [of non-syllabic rhythm] is 
isochronic," he has slipped into another gear. This term is 
not on all fours with the others. Isochronism, observes Mr. 
Whitehall himself on an earlier page, is "not mentioned in 
the [Trager-Smith] Outline"; it is "not directly a significant 
part of the English linguistic structure" ( p. 418). It is 
something which may or may not occur in correct English 
speech. 
At the same tlme, let us observe that if isochronism were 
a general principle, or even an approximate principle, of all 
English speech, it would clearly be a different thing from 
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meter. It would not serve to distinguish the metrical from 
the nonmetrical. Isochronism, according to the Pike theory, 
is not a special feat of language, managed by the poet, but 
a common feature of language. So long as a poet's lines had 
some strong stresses, and they always must have, the iso-
chronism would take care of itself. In the actual English 
meters of the poets, even in the old strong-stress Beowulf 
and Piers Plowman meter, something quite determinate and 
special always is added: an approximately equal number of 
weaker syllables between the strong stresses, "configura-
tional" heightening of the stresses, as by alliteration, and the 
syntactic entity of the lines and half-lines. 
III 
SoME, though perhaps not all, of those who approach the 
sound of poetry from the two viewpoints we are here 
debating will want to reply to our argument by saying that 
we have lost sight of the primary poetic fact, which, they 
will say, is always this or that reading of a poem out loud-
as by the bard with a harp, by the modern author for a tape-
recording, or by actors on a stage. What our argument 
takes as the object of scansion will be referred to disre-
spectfully as a mere skeleton of the real poem. Mr. Chat-
man, for example, "attempts to describe the verse line as it 
is actually 'performed.' " And he likes the Trager-Smith 
system because it "demands a comparison between actual 
oral performances of poetry and traditional meters." "It 
incorporates both formula and performance" ( p. 423). Let 
it be so. Let the difference between our view and that of the 
linguistic recorders be something of that sort. 
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There is, of course, a sense in which the reading of the 
poem is primary: this is what the poem is for. But there is 
another and equally important sense in which the poem 
is not to be identified with any particular performance 
of it, or any set of such performances. Each performance 
of the poem is an actualization of it, and no doubt in the 
end everything we say about the poem ought to be trans-
latable into a statement about an actual or possible per-
formance of it. But not everything which is true of some 
particular performance will be necessarily true of the poem. 
There are many performances of the same poem-differing 
among themselves in many ways. A performance is an event, 
but the poem itself, if there is any poem, must be some kind 
of enduring object. (No doubt we encounter here a difficult 
ontological question; we are not inclined to argue it. It 
seems necessary only to expose the fundamental assumption 
which we take to be inevitable for any discussion of 
"meter.") When we ask what the meter of a poem is, we 
are not asking how Robert Frost or Professor X reads the 
poem, with all the features peculiar to that performance. 
We are asking about the poem as a public linguistic object, 
something that can be examined by various persons, studied, 
disputed -uni vocally. 
The meter, like the rest of the language, is something 
that can be read and studied with the help of grammars 
and dictionaries and other linguistic guides. In this objec-
tive study, Trager-Smith principles, for instance, may be 
largely helpful. At the same time they may be in excess of 
any strictly metrical need. For the meter is something which 
for the most part inheres in language precisely at that level 
of linguistic organization which grammars and dictionaries 
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and elementary rhetoric can successfully cope with. So far 
as Trager-Smith is a refinement on traditional ways of indi-
cating intonation patterns (by punctuation, by diacritical 
marks, by spelling and word separation), Trager-Smith may 
well be a help to saying something about meter. On the 
other hand, it may well become only a needless fussiness of 
symbols by which somebody tries to be scientific about the 
ever-present, the ever-different disparities and tensions be-
tween formal meter and the linguistic totality. Our argu-
ment is not specifically against Trager-Smith, but against 
certain ways of combining Trager-Smith with multiple read-
ings. It is interesting to study the tape-recording of various 
performances of Frost's "Mowing." But we must not let this 
mass of data blind us to the possibility that some of our 
readers have failed to get the meter right. 
In the same way we argue against the temporal theorists, 
the timers. In the broadest sense, we define their theory 
as one which says that meter either consists wholly in, or 
has as an essential feature, some principle of recurrence in 
equal, or approximately equal, times-analogous to musical 
pulse. And we respond, in brief, that meter must be a 
character of the poem, but that timing is a character of 
performance: what is done or can be done by a reader, a 
chanter, or a singer. Mr. John Hollander, in a recent article 
("The Music of Poetry," Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism, XV [1956], 232-44) has warned us against con-
fusing a "descriptive" with a "performative" system of 
prosody. This is just what the timers have done since the 
beginning. Reciting poetry in equal times is a matter related 
to music, and there is no question, that music can be 
imposed on verse-very readily on some verse-and that 
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here and there in the history of poetic recitation music has 
been invoked to fill out what the meter did not do-where in 
effect the meter was insufficient. But the musician or the 
musicologist who comes in to perform these services or to 
point out their possibility ought to remember what he is doing. 
Discussion of English meters seems to have been badly 
misled for a long time now by a prevalent supposition that 
the two main alternative, or complementary, principles of 
English meter are time and stress. Karl Shapiro's handy 
guide to modern English metrical theory (A Bibliography 
of Modern Prosody, 1948) reports that this is indeed the 
major split in the whole field of English metrical theory (of 
which the two great champions are Lanier for the timers 
and Saints bury for the stressers), and Mr. Shapiro himself 
seems to welcome this alignment and to consider it more 
or less correct and inevitable. But the two main alternative 
principles of English meter, as we shall argue more in detail 
a little later, are actually two kinds of stress-strong stress 
(the Old English, the Piers Plowman tradition) and syllable 
stress (the Chaucer-Tennyson tradition). The difficulty of 
describing the difference between these kinds of stress meter 
and their occasional difficult relations with each other 
account in part for the experiments of the temporal theory. 
The basic arguments against the temporal theories of 
English meter are now almost universally accepted so far 
as one main branch of these theories is concerned, namely, 
the "quantitative" -the theory of long and short syllables, on 
the classical analogy. The history of English prosody affords 
the futile instances of the Elizabethan "Areopagus" and in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the luxuriance of 
theories described in T. S. Omond's sympathetic English 
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Metrists ( 1921). So far as the Greek and Latin patterns of 
long and short (dactylic hexameters, sapphics, hendecasyl-
labics or the like) have been successfully reillustrated in 
English, this has been done on strictly accentual (plus 
syllable-counting) principles: 
This is the forest primeval. The murmuring pines and 
the hemlocks . . . 
Needy Knife-grinder! whither are you going? 
Rough is the road, your wheel is out of order-
Bleak blows the blast;-your hat has got a hole in't, 
So have your breeches. 
0 you chorus of indolent reviewers, 
Irresponsible, indolent reviewers .... 
Syllables, number of syllables, and stresses, primary, second-
ary, and weak, are linguistic features which you can find in 
the English dictionary. But long and short syllables are not 
found in the English dictionary. Some syllables are, of 
course, often, perhaps nearly always, spoken more rapidly 
than others. But the length of the syllable is not a part of 
correctness or incorrectness in speaking English. Quantity, 
so far as it appears in any determinate way, more or less 
rides along with stress. We can drag or clip the syllables of 
English words, and we may sound odd, affected, or funny, 
but still we shall not be mispronouncing our words, or 
changing their meaning. Quantity is a dimension where 
you cannot make mistakes in pronouncing English. And 
where you cannot make mistakes, you cannot be right, as 
opposed to wrong. It follows that in such a dimension a 
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writer in English cannot create a public pattern. The English 
language will not permit a quantitative meter. 
It would seem, however, that some kind of quantitative 
assumption must inevitably reappear (or be added to the 
linguistic facts) whenever the other main kind of temporal 
theory, the "isochronic," is applied in an actual scansion of 
lines of English verse. Syllables which in themselves may be 
recognized as having no correct quantity, either long or 
short, now have quantity conferred on them by crowding or 
jamming ("accelerating and crushing together"-Mr. White-
hall's terms ) or by stretching, to meet the demands of the 
isochronic assumption. This kind of processing or adjust-
ment of syllables is taken as a justification for, and is sym-
bolized by, the use of musical notation, and such notation is 
sometimes called "scansion." 
Let us ask the question whether it is actually the case that 
readers of poetry always, or even generally, do perform their 
readings isochronically.a (That this can be done, by a 
sufficiently skilful, or a sufficiently musical, reader no one of 
course denies.) It may be that we have here to acknowledge 
a distinction between two rather different kinds of verse. 
Perhaps it is true that nursery rhymes and ballads, at least 
some ballads, are usually, and normally, and even best, read 
with an approximation to isochronism. (This may have 
something to do with their origin in close connection with 
music.) The most convincing examples of musical notation 
produced by the equal-timing prosodists are in this area: 
"Mary, Mary," -"0 what is that sound that so thrills the 
ear?" -"It was 'Din! Din! Din!'" But then a Shakespeare 
sonnet or Paradise Lost or a lyric by A. E. Housman is a very 
different kind of thing. 
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When a poem is set to music, definite values have to be 
assigned to its notes and rests, and consequently to its 
measures and phrases. And however this is done, we are 
introducing an extralinguistic element, a precision of timing 
that does not belong to the linguistic elements, the words 
and syllables, as such. Consider, for example, the opening of 
Ralph Vaughan Williams' setting of a Housman poem: 
On Wen-lock Edge the wood's in trou-ble 
Thus we make "on" twice as long as "Wen-," or "Edge" 
three times as long as "wood's." For another good example, 
compare a normal reading of Edith Sitwell's poems in Facade 
with the way she recites them to the accompaniment of 
William Walton's music. 
Both printed words and printed musical score are pre-
scriptions, or directions, for performance. Our point is that 
they are different prescriptions-perhaps complementary 
and cooperating, but still different and independent. One, 
the musical score, is not an explication or explanation (like 
diacritical marks) of the other, the words, but an addition 
to it.4 
Music-or at least music with bar-lines, which is all we are 
concerned with here-is precisely a time-measuring notation; 
it divides the time into equal intervals and prescribes a felt 
underlying "pulse."5 It calls for the metronome or the tap-
ping foot. If we ourselves wish to add to the poet's 
notation our own rhythmic pattern, say 
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4-
4 On Wen-lock Edge the wood's in trou-ble 
we are not scanning the verse, but either reporting on the 
way one reader performed it or else recommending that 
others perform it this way. Thus, Mr. Frye gives the follow-
ing analysis of a line from Meredith's Love in the Valley 
(Anatomy, p. 254): 
But another reader might, with equal plausibility, read it 
this way: 
~ J ..J ;: I~ ..J;: I! J. Ll~ n I..J· 
Couched with her arms be- hind her gol-den head 
Meter involves measurement, no doubt, or it can hardly 
with much meaning be called "meter." But all measurement 
is not necessarily temporal measurement-even when the 
things measured occur in a temporal succession. If a person 
walks along the street hitting every third paling in a fence, 
he sets up a pattern, but he may or he may not do this in 
equal lengths of time. Better still, let every third paling be 
painted red, and we have a pattern which our person does 
not have to set up for himself but can observe objectively. 
He will observe or experience this pattern in time, but not 
necessarily in equal lengths of time. In either case, that of 
striking or that of simply seeing, we may further suppose 
the palings for some reason to be spaced along the fence at 
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irregular intervals. Musical meter is a matching, or co-
ordination, of two patterns, stress and time. But poetic 
meter is only one of these patterns. Why does one kind of 
measurement have to be matched with another kind? or 
translated into it? The measurement of verse is determined 
by some recurrent linguistic feature, peg, obstacle, jutting 
stress, or whatever. If we read this recurrence so as to give 
it equal times, this is something we do to it. Maybe we 
actually do, and maybe this is a part of our aesthetic 
satisfaction; still it is not a part of the linguistic fact which 
the poet has to recognize and on which he has to rely in 
order to write verses. 
IV 
THE METER inheres in the language of the poem, but in 
what way and at what level? We hold that it inheres in 
aspects of the language that can be abstracted with con-
siderable precision, isolated, and even preserved in the 
appearance of an essence-mummified or dummified. An 
appropriate example is to hand and does not have to be 
invented. Back in the 1920's I. A. Richards was much 
concerned, and properly, to show that the movement or 
rhythm of poetry was closely inter-dependent with its other 
kinds of meaning. The movement, he argued, could hardly 
be said to occur at all except as an aspect of some linguistic 
meaning. Or at least it had no poetic value except as an 
aspect of some meaning. It is not quite clear which point 
Richards was making. But for the sake of his argument he 
exhibited, in his Practical Criticism, a contrivance which he 
called a "double or dummy" -"with nonsense syllables" -"a 
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purified dummy." The dummy showed several things, per-
haps a good deal more than Richards had in mind. For it 
certainly was not a pure dummy. How could it be? It was 
a linguistic dummy. And so this dummy did have a meter-
perhaps even a kind of rhythm. If it did not have a meter, 
how could it be adduced as showing that movement, or 
meter, apart from sense did not have poetic value? You 
can't illustrate the poetic nullity of a certain quality taken 
pure by annihilating that quality. You do it by purging or 
purifying, isolating, the quality. And if you can do that, 
you prove that the quality can be isolated-at least from 
certain other qualities, in this case, the main lines of the 
linguistic meaning. In order to get even this dummy of a 
meter, Richards had to leave in a good many linguistic 
features. 
J. Drootan-Sussting Benn 
Mill-down Leduren N. 
Telamba-taras oderwainto weiring 
A wersey zet bidreen 
Ownd istellester sween .... 
"If any reader," says Richards, "has any difficulty in scanning 
these verses, reference to Milton, On the Morning of Christ's 
Nativity, xv, will prove of assistance."6 There are, indeed, 
several uncertainties in Richards' composition which cor-
respond to greater certainties in Milton's full linguistic 
archetype. Still the Milton is not necessary. Let us list some 
of the things we know about this dummy. The "nonsense 
syllables" are divided into groups (words). As English 
readers we find little difficulty pronouncing them. Some of 
the groups are English words ("Mill," "down,"); others are 
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English syllables, even morphemes ("ing," "ey," "een," "er"). 
The capital initials, the monosyllables, the hyphens, the 
rhymes, give us very strong indications, absolutely sure 
indications, where some of the stresses fall. And there are 
some syllables, notably some final syllables, which are surely 
unstressed. If we don't inquire too closely how much any 
given stressed syllable is stressed more than another (and 
who is to say that we should make that inquiry?), we will 
indicate the scansion of Richards' dummy somewhat as 
follows: 
, / I / J. Drootan-Sussting Benn 
, , 'I ? , 
Mill-down u~duren N. 
1 ? , / /, I. • Telamba-taras oderwamto wemng 
1 ? I I 
A wersey zet bidreen 
/ ? ? / 
Ownd istellester sween .... 
The main uncertainties will be with the groups "Leduren," 
"Telamba," "Awersey," "istellester," where there will be a 
choice or guess in placing the stress. But the choice in no 
one of the four cases is crucial to the meter. You can choose 
either way and not destroy the iambics. And Richards' 
readers who have read this dummy and admired the 
ingenuity of the argument have certainly all along been 
giving the dummy the benefit of some implicit scansion. 
The dummy does two things for the present argument. 
It illustrates or strongly suggests the principle that meter 
may inhere at certain rudimentary levels of linguistic 
organization, and, more specifically, that the kind of English 
meter of which we are speaking, so far as it depends on 
syllabic stress, depends not on any kind of absolute or very 
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strong stress, but merely on a relative degree of stress-on a 
certain moreness of stress in certain positions. Of this latter 
we want to say something further before we finish. It is not 
a principle which is challenged by the linguists-though the 
exact sense in which they wish to apply it seems doubtful. 
Let us now make some general prosodic observations. 
And first, that to have verses or lines, you have to have 
certain broader structural features, notably the endings. 
Milton's line is not only a visual or typographical fact on the 
page, but a fact of the language. If you try to cut up his 
pentameters into tetrameters, for example, you find yourself 
ending in the middle of words or on weak words like "on" 
or "the." Much English prose is iambic or nearly iambic, 
but it is only very irregular verse, because if you try to cut 
it regularly, you get the same awkward and weak result. 
Lines of verse are syntactic entities, though not necessarily 
similar or parallel entities. Depending on the degree of 
parallel, you get different kinds of tension between the fact 
of the lines and the fact of the overall syntax or movement. 
Given the line then or the typographical semblance of a 
line (the possibility of a line) on the page, let us ask the 
question how we know we have a meter and know what 
meter it is. The line may indeed be only a syntactic entity 
and not metrical in any more precise way-as perhaps it is 
throughout Robert Bridges' Testament of Beauty7 and in 
much so-called "free verse." With Mr. Whitehall we can 
call this a kind of "rhythm," nonsyllabic, isosyntactic, so long 
as the syntactic entities, the phrases or clauses, are "in 
strictly parallel sequence," as in Hebrew verse and in some 
"free verse." But this is in fact a very narrow restriction. 
It rules out all mere cutting of ordinary prose into its 
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phrases or clauses (as in much free verse, and perhaps in 
Bridges or in parts of Bridges). For again, like Pike's 
isochronism, phrases and clauses are inevitable, and if they 
by themselves make a "rhythm" (or a meter), it is impos-
sible not to write in this "rhythm" or meter. To get a meter, 
some other kind of equality has to be added to the succession 
of syntactic entities. (Even strictly parallel syntactic entities 
will be improved metrically by the addition of some more 
precise kind of equality.) The meter in the sense that it is 
internal to a given line or that it is something that runs 
through the series of lines is some kind of more minute 
recurrence-some exact or approximate number of syllables, 
with probably some reenforcement of certain syllables, some 
repeated weighting, what Mr. Whitehall calls a "config-
urational feature." Here if we take a wide enough look 
at the world's languages and literatures (at Chinese and 
classical Greek, as well as the Western vernaculars of our 
immediate experience), we can talk about pitch and quan-
tity, as well as accent or stress. But for our discussion of 
English meters, stress is the thing. (Rhyme, assonance, 
alliteration too are auxiliary "configurational" and metric 
features-though Mr. Whitehall seems to count them out.) 
The important principle of stress or accent in English 
verse is, however, a rather ambiguous thing, for there are in 
fact two main kinds of stress meter in English: the very old 
(and recently revived) meter of strong stress with inde-
terminate or relatively indeterminate number of syllables 
between the stresses, and the other meter, of the great 
English art tradition (Chaucer to Tennyson), which is a 
syllable-stress meter, that is, a meter of counted syllables 
and of both major and minor stresses . 
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There are certainly some lines of syllable-stress meter 
which taken alone could be read also as strong-stress meter 
(four beats instead of five). To use one of Mr. Frye's 
examples: 
/ / / / 
To be, or not to be, that is the question: 
Wh~ther 'tis n~bler in the mind to s~ffer 
/ / / / 
The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune . . . 
But the precise number of syllables in syllable-stress meter 
is always somewhat against the strong-stress interpretation. 
One stress out of five in a pentameter line will inevitably 
be the weakest; still, because of the numbering of the 
syllables, and the alternation of the stresses, this fifth too 
calls out for some recognition. 
/ / I I. I. To be, or not to be, that 1s the questwn. 
/ / / / / 
With loss of Eden, till one greater man ... 
And then we have the matter of the whole passage, the 
whole act and scene, the whole book, the whole long poem 
to consider. And Mr. Frye admits that the strong stresses 
vary in number from eight (the maximum apparently 
possible within the conditions of the pentameter-a virtuoso 
feat achieved by Milton) and the scarcely satisfactory three 
(eked out in musical terms, for a line of Keats by Mr. Frye's 
assumption of a preliminary "rest"). But the "pentameter" 
in a long poem by Shakespeare, Milton, Pope, Wordsworth, 
or Keats is not subject to such fluctuations. The pentameter 
is always there. It is the meter of the poem. The strong-
stress lines of four, of three, of eight, and so on, come and 
go, playing along with the steady pentameter-and it is a 
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good thing they do come and go, for if every line of Hamlet 
or Paradise Lost had the four strong beats which Mr. Frye 
finds in the opening four or five lines, Mr. Frye would begin 
to detect something marvelously monotonous; he wouldn't 
be so happy about his "inherent" and "common" four-stress 
rhythm. One principle of monotony is enough; it is the meter 
of the poem. In "pentameter" verse it is the iambic pentam-
eter. 
A few lines of Chaucer, Shakespeare, Spenser, Pope, 
Wordsworth, Tennyson, read consecutively, can hardly fail 
to establish the meter. What makes it possible for the lighter 
stresses to count in syllable-stress meter is the fact that it is 
a syllable meter. Following French and classical models, 
but in an English way, the poets count their syllables 
precisely or almost precisely, ten to a pentameter line, and 
this measuring out makes it possible to employ the minor 
accents along with the major ones in an alternating motion, 
up and down. The precise measurement tilts and juggles 
the little accents into place, establishes their occurrence 
as a regular part of all that is going on. 
Likewise, the clutter of weaker syllables in a strong-stress 
meter is against an accurate syllable-stress reading, most 
often prevents it entirely. A few lines of Piers Plowman or 
of Everyman ought to suffice to show what is what. 
In a somer seson, whan soft was the sonne, 
I shope me in shroudes, as I a shepe were, 
In habits like an heremite, unholy of workes, 
Went wyde in this world, wondres to here. 
Lorde, I wyll in the worlde go renne over all, 
And cruelly out-serche bothe grete and small. 
Every man wyll I beset that lyveth beestly 
Out of Goddes Iawes, and dredeth not foly . 
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This other kind of meter is older in English poetry and may 
be more natural to the English tongue, though again it may 
not be. Here only the major stresses of the major words 
count in the scanning. The gabble of weaker syllables, now 
more, now fewer, between the major stresses obscures all 
the minor stresses and relieves them of any structural duty. 
(Sometimes the major stresses are pointed up by alliteration; 
they are likely to fall into groups of two on each side of a 
caesura.) Thus we have Beowulf, Piers Plowman, Every-
man, Spenser's February Eclogue, Coleridge's Christabel, the 
poetry of G. M. Hopkins (who talks about "sprung rhythm" 
and "outrides"), the poetry of T. S. Eliot, and many another 
in our day. 8 
Let us now return and dwell more precisely for a 
moment on the principle of relative stress. This is a slight 
but very certain thing in English; it is the indispensable 
and quite adequate principle for recognizing and scanning 
verses composed precisely of a given number of English 
syllables-or more exactly, for seeing if they will scan (for 
not all sequences of equal numbers of syllables show a 
measured alternation of accents). This is the main point of 
our whole essay: simply to reassert the fact of English 
syllable-stress meter, to vindicate the principle of relative 
stress as the one principle of stress which in conjunction 
with syllable counting makes this kind of meter. Mr. Chat-
man has already quoted the landmark statement about 
relative stress made by Otto Jespersen in his "Notes on 
Metre," 1900 ( Linguistica [Copenhagen, 1933], pp. 272-7 4), 
and we need not repeat this. In speaking of this principle 
let us explain firmly, however, that we do not find it neces-
sary to follow either Jespersen or Trager-Smith in believing 
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in any fixed or countable number of degrees of English 
stress. We wish in the main to avoid the cumbersome 
grammar of the new linguists. For all we know, there may 
be, not four, but five degrees of English stress, or eight.9 
How can one be sure? What one can nearly always be sure 
of is that a given syllable in a sequence is more or less 
stressed than the preceding or the following. Or, suppose 
that there are, as Jespersen and Trager-Smith seem to agree, 
just four degrees of English stress. The discriminations are 
not needed for discerning the meter-but only the degrees 
of more and less. How much more is always irrelevant. 
The main thing to observe about the principles of relative 
stress and counted syllables is that by means of these you 
can explain the necessary things about English syllable-
stress verse. For one thing, quite starkly, you can tell an 
iambic line from one that is not iambic. 
Preserved in Milton's or Shakespeare's name. 
When a student misquotes this Popean line in a paper, it 
is not our perfect memory of the poem but our sense of the 
meter (and our belief in meter) which tells us he has left 
out a word. The four-beat theory of the pentameter could 
not make this discovery. 
To take another kind of example: let us suppose that Pope 
had written: 
A little advice is a dangerous thing. 
Persons who say that the line is one of Pope's four-beat 
lines will be hard put to explain why it isn't a good line; it 
still has its four strong beats. Yet nobody can actually say 
that the revised line is a good Popean line and goes well 
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with the other lines of the Essay on Criticism. And all we 
have changed is the position of one relative accent, which 
makes it impossible that the syllable "is" should receive a 
stronger accent than the preceding syllable, and hence 
impossible that there should be five iambs in the line. 
I I 1 I 
A little advice is a dangerous thing. 
That one shift of accent throws us immediately into the 
anapestic gallop, and we have a line that belongs in Anstey's 
Bath Guide. 
Another kind of example: 
Ah, Sunflower, weary of time. 
Hardly the Goldsmith or Anstey anapestic gallop. Yet un-
mistakably an anapestic line. The strong syllables "Ah," 
and "flow-," coming where they do, create a heavy drag. 
Nevertheless, "sun" is even stronger, at least stronger than 
"flow-," a fact which is crucial. A reader can take the two 
opening syllables as he likes, as iamb, trochee, or spondee 
(if there is such a thing), and still not defeat the subsequent 
anapests. The very weak syllables "er" and "y" in two key 
iambic stress positions make it unthinkable that the line 
should be read as iambic. 
Again: the beginning of the line is a characteristic place, 
in both iambic and anapestic lines, for the full inversion. 
Ruin hath taught me thus to ruminate. 
Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer ... 
Softly, in the dusk, a woman is singing to me; 
Taking me back down the vista of years, till I see . 
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But: 
Hail to thee, blithe spirit! 
This is something different. The unquestionably iambic 
movement following the very strong first syllable10 might, 
if we were desperate, be accounted for by saying that the 
word "Hail" breaks into two syllables, "Hay-ul," with a 
resultant needed extra weak syllable and the familiar open-
ing pattern of iambic inversion. But a much more energetic 
and irrefutable assertion of the iamb appears in the progres-/ w 
sive rise or stress increase of the three syllables "thee, blithe 
sp{~it." (Note well: the slack of a given foot can be stronger 
than the stress of the preceding foot.) For a trochaic Jeading 
of this line, you would have to have "th:e, blithe," a 
rhetorical impossibility, making a nonsensically hopping 
line. 
The notion of an accentual spondee (or "level" foot) in 
English would seem to be illusory, for the reason that it is 
impossible to pronounce any two successive syllables in 
English without some rise or fall of stress-and some rise or 
fall of stress is all that is needed for a metrical ictus. This 
fact produces in English iambic meter two kinds of am-
biguous situations or metrical choices, that of two weak 
syllables coming together, and that of two strong syllables 
coming together. In each of these situations, the iambic 
principle is saved merely by the fact that certain unhappy 
choices are impossible. 
Rocks, caves, lakes, fens, bogs, dens, and shades of death. 
Certainly it is impossible to pronounce the first two, the 
first three, the first six syllables of this line with a perfectly 
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even stress. On the other hand, no determinate pattern of 
stresses seems dictated. No doubt several are possible and 
are actually employed or experienced by various readers of 
this Miltonic passage. To us the most plausible seems as 
follows: 
II I / II / 1/ 
Rocks, caves, lakes, fens, bogs, dens ... 
The more regularly iambic reading, 
I II I II 
Rocks, caves, lakes, fens ... 
seems forced. The only reading which will clearly defeat 
the iambic movement is absurd: 
II / 1/ I 
Rocks, caves, lakes, fens ... 
Two weak syllables together present perhaps the more 
difficult problem. But all cases will not be equally difficult. 
In profuse strains of unpremeditated art. 
Here certainly the crucial fact is that "strains" is more 
stressed than "-fuse." Only observe that much-come out on 
the fourth syllable with an ictus, and the first two syllables 
can be stressed an)' way anybody wants. There are only two 
possible ways: "ln pro-" or "In pr6'-". The second way, 
invoking a kind of Miltonic indult for the disyllable begin-
ning with "pro-," makes the line more regularly iambic, but 
it is not necessary. 
Upon the supreme theme of Art and Song ... 
This is the same thing, only pushed ahead to the second 
and third feet of the line. The situation of the four syllables 
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here, two weak and two strong, has been described as a 
kind of compensation, a "hovering" of the accent, or as a 
"double or ionic foot" (Ransom, Kenyon Review, XVIII, 
471). And doubtless some such notion does something to 
help our rationalizations. But we may observe also that 
only the coming together of the two strong accents makes 
possible the coming together of the two weak. "The" and 
"su-" are so weak only because "-preme" is so strong; and 
because "-preme" is so strong, "theme" has to be yet stronger. 
(Imagine a group of persons arguing about themes. One 
says theme X is good. Another says theme Y is good. An-
other says, "Yes, but the supnfme th~me is Zeta." Just the 
reverse of the stress required in the Yeats line.) In a system 
where the only absolute value, the ictus, consists only in a 
relationship, we needles~ly pursue a too close inquiry into the 
precise strength of the stronger point in the relationship. A 
somewhat more difficult, double, example of the two-weak, 
two-strong pattern is provided by Marvell. 
To a green thought in a green shade. 
One may begin by observing that whatever we do with the 
two pairs of weak syllables, it remains absolutely certain 
that "thought" is stronger than "green," and that "shade" is 
stronger than "green." (The relative strength of the two 
"greens" produces of course the peculiarity of the logico-
rhythmic character of the line-the interaction of its sense 
with its meter. But here we speak precisely of the meter.) 
"To a," because of its introductory position, presents no 
difficulty. "In a" is more curious just because of its medial 
position. Probably a rather marked caesura, in spite of the 
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continuing syntax and the shortness of the line, is created 
by the head to back juxtaposition of the two ictuses 
"thought" and "in." This again is part of the peculiar 
gravity of the line. The most plausible reading seems to us: 
/ // /U ( U 1//. To a green thought m a green shade. 
If anybody wants to read: 
I I/ I II To a green thought in a green shade, 
arguing for two anapests compensated for by two single-
syllable strong feet, there is probably no triumphant way to 
refute the reading. Still the lack of pause between "green" 
and the nouns which follow it is against the single-syllable 
foot. The single-syllable foot occurs in lines that sound 
like this: "Weave, weave, the sunlight in your hair." 
Some of the most perplexing problems confronting the 
theorist of English meter-no matter to what school he 
belongs-are those arising in connection with the "dipody" 
or double-jump single foot ( x :f. x !t). This foot was much 
used by narrative poets of the late Victorian and Edwardian 
eras and also, because of its accentual difficulties and 
ambiguities, has been a favorite ground for exercise in 
several kinds of temporal scansion. Regular or nearly regular 
instances of the dipody are perhaps easy enough. 
II I II I II I II I would I were in Shoreham at the setting of the sun. 
A recent handbook remarks very sanely: "Although the 
meter is duple insofar as there is an alternation between 
unaccented and accented syllables, there is also an alterna-
tion in the degree of stress on the accented syllables 
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the result is that the two-syllable feet tend to group them-
selves into larger units" (Laurence Perrine, Sound and Sense 
[New York, 1956], p. 160). "You will probably find yourself 
reading it as a four-beat line." It is a kind of strong-accent 
meter, with number of syllables and minor stresses tightened 
up into a secondary pattern. An easy enough substitute for 
the dipody will be of course the anapest ( x x f). The iamb 
also ( x f) is available, and also the single strong-stress 
syllable, either at the start of the line, or just after a medial 
pause. 
II I, II I II I II 
Brooding o er the gloom, spins the brown eve-jar. 
Thus dipodic meters can occur where no single line has 
more than two dipodies, and many lines have only one, and 
in these latter the reader may well have a choice just where 
to place the dipody. Meters of this sort are very slippery, 
elusive. One's first feeling on reading them may be that a 
strong lilt or swing is present, though it is hard to say 
just how it ought to be defined. A recurrent feature may be 
that the line seems to start on a strong stress, with falling 
meter, but then, with the aid of the agile dipody, swings up 
midway into a rising meter to the finish. The number of 
syllables in the line will vary greatly, and the principle of 
relative stress operates with a vengeance-the weaker syl-
lable of the dipody showing all sorts of relations to the 
stresses of the other feet. It is a tricky, virtuoso meter, very 
apt in nursery rhymes and in the rakish, barrack-room, mad-
hatter, pirate-galleon narratives of the era to which we have 
alluded above. Meredith's pleasant little monstrosity "Love 
in the Valley" is a striking instance of the difficulties. It 
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seems safe to say that no great English poems have been 
accomplished in any variant of this meter. The theory of 
meter which we are defending is, we believe, better fitted to 
explain-and reveal the ambiguities of-the dipodic meter 
than any other theory. But the illustration and arguing of 
the point are perhaps beyond present requirements. 
v 
IT IS ONE of the hazards of an argument such as this that 
it is often on the verge of slipping from questions about 
something that seems to be merely and safely a matter of 
"fact" to questions about value. It is quite possible that 
some prosodists of the linguistic and musical schools would 
grant that meter, as we have described it, is a fact, but in 
the same breath would put it aside as of little consequence, 
at least when compared to the strong-stress pattern or some 
principle of equal timing. This was, for instance, the spirit 
of D. W. Prall's attack on the traditional metric in his 
Aesthetic Analysis (New York, 1936, esp. pp. 117, 130). 
Such a metric was trivial, "artificial," misleading. Our own 
difference from some recent writers may partly be reduced 
to a difference in emphasis, which reflects a different estimate 
of significance. We maintain not only that meter, in our 
sense, does occur, but that it is an important feature of verse. 
To make out a broad-scale case for this claim might 
require much space and effort. Fortunately, we can do 
perhaps all that is necessary at the moment if we work upon 
an assumption that is now quite widely entertained, or in-
deed is a commonplace with students of poetry today: that 
there are tensions between various poetic elements, among 
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them meter and various aspects of sense, and that these 
tensions are valuable. 
One of the good features of Mr. Chatman's Kenyon essay 
is his constant appeal to an idea of "tension" between the 
full spoken poem and some kind of metrical pattern. "I 
believe that the beauty of verse often inheres in the tensions 
developed between the absolute, abstract metrical pattern 
and the oral actualization of sequences of English sounds" 
( p. 436). A student in a seminar presided over by one of 
the present writers was stumped, however, in scanning a line 
at the blackboard and refused to put the next stress mark 
anywhere at all. "I don't see how to show the interaction 
between the meter and the sense." As if by scanning he 
could show the interaction. As if anybody expected him to. 
As if the meter itself could be the interaction between itself 
and something else. This interest in tension, or interaction, 
is excellent. But how can there be a tension without two 
things to be in tension? 
, / / / / 
Wondring upon this word, quaking for drede. 
(Clerk's Tale, 1. 358) 
Here is a very special relation of phrase to meter. The 
double inversion, at the start of the line and again after the 
caesura, gives the two participial verbs a special quiver. 
But this depends on the fact that there is a meter; the 
inversions otherwise would not be inversions. 
You can write a grammar of the meter. And if you cannot, 
there is no meter. But you cannot write a grammar of the 
meter's interaction with the sense, any more than you can 
write a grammar of the arrangement of metaphors. The 
interactions and the metaphors are the free and individual 
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and unpredictable (though not irrational) parts of the 
poetry. You can perceive them, and study them, and talk 
about them, but not write rules for them. The meter, like 
the grammar and the vocabulary, is subject to rules. It is 
just as important to observe what meter a poem is written 
in (especially if it is written in one of the precise meters of 
the syllable-stress tradition) as it is to observe what language 
the poem is written in. Before you recognize the meter, you 
have only a vague apprehension of the much-prized tensions. 
Perhaps it needs to be said that there is a difference 
between deviations from a meter (or "exceptions," as Mr. 
Ransom calls them) and the constant strain or tension of a 
meter (as an abstract norm or expectancy) against the 
concrete or full reality of the poetic utterance. The devia-
tions are a part of the tension, but only an occasional part. 
The deviations occur only here and there-though some of 
them, the inverted first foot, the dropping of the first slack 
syllable, the extra slack syllable internal to the line (elided, 
or not elided in the anapest) -occur so often as to assume 
the character of an accepted complication of the norm. 
But the tension in the wider sense is always there. Here 
one might discourse on the "promotion" and "suppression" 
of syllables to which both the linguists and Arnold Stein 
refer. These are useful terms. There is no line so regular 
(so evenly alternating weak and strong) that it does not 
show some tension. It is practically impossible to write an 
English line that will not in some way buck against the 
meter. Insofar as the line does approximate the condition of 
complete submission, it is most likely a tame line, a weak 
line. 
And thus: "scanning" a line is not a dramatic, or poetic, 
. 140. 
The Concept of Meter 
reading of a line. Scanning a line is reading it in a special, 
more or less forced, way, to bring out the meter and any 
definite deviations or substitutions. Scanning will not bring 
out the other parts of the tension; it will tend to iron them 
out. On the other hand, a good dramatic, or poetic, reading 
will tend to bring out the tensions-but note well that in 
order to do this it must be careful not to override com-
pletely and kill the meter. When that is done, the tensions 
vanish. (Another reason why the meter must be observed 
is, of course, that if a line is truly metrical, a reading which 
actually destroys the meter can only be an incorrect reading 
-by dictionary and rhetorical standards.) A good dramatic 
reading is a much more delicate, difficult, and rewarding 
performance than a mere scanning. Yet the scanning has its 
justification, its use. We would argue that a good dramatic 
reading is possible only by a person who can also perform a 
scansion. 
"The trouble with conventional metrics," complains Mr. 
Chatman, "is that because it cannot distinguish between 
levels of stress and intonation, it often cannot distinguish 
meaningful from trivial performances" ( p. 436). The answer 
is that metric is not required to do this, though it is needed 
for it. Mr. Chatman or another reader will have to make his 
own reading as meaningful as possible, but he will be in a 
better position to do this if he recognizes the meter. We 
are speaking all along, if not about a sufficient, yet about a 
necessary, rule for poetic reading. 
If we may insert a brief pedagogic excursus: School-
teachers nowadays, beginning in grade school and going 
right up into graduate school, probably try much too hard 
to prevent their students from a "mechanical" or thumped-
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out scansion, telling them rather to observe the variations, 
the tensions-telling them in effect to promote all tensions 
as much as possible. But the fact is that the tensions and 
the variations will pretty much take care of themselves if 
the student lives long enough and provided he is equipped 
with just one principle (of no precise application) that the 
variations and tensions are there and ought somehow to be 
recognized. The variations and tensions tend to assert them-
selves. The meter, because it is artificial, precisely measured, 
frail if meticulous, tends to be overridden and, if not actually 
destroyed (as it cannot be in any correct reading), at least 
obscured. This you can see if you ask college freshmen to 
scan a passage of Milton or to write fifteen lines in imitation. 
The probability is that the student of average gifts, if he has 
never at any stage of his schoolroom education been required 
or allowed to whang out the meter, is not aware that it is 
there and hence has very little notion of what the teacher 
means by the tensions. 
For the word "tension," let us substitute at this point, in a 
concluding suggestion, the word "interplay"-meaning the 
interplay of syllable-stress meter with various other features 
of linguistic organization, but especially with those which 
are likely to set up other quasi-metric or rhythmic patterns. 
One of the disadvantages of the old strong-stress meter is 
doubtless its limited capacity for interplay. The stress 
pattern of the meter is so nearly the same as the stress 
pattern of the syntax and logic that there is nothing much 
for the meter to interplay with. The same must be true for 
all meters depending on patterns of repeated or parallel 
syntax-such as the meter of the Hebrew Psalms and the 
free verse of Walt Whitman. Where such meters gain in 
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freedom and direct speech-feeling, they lose in opportunity 
for precise interplay. Conversely, where syllable-stress me-
ters lose in freedom and naturalness of speech-feeling, they 
gain in the possibility of precise interplay. Perhaps this 
suggests a reason why the greatest English poetry (Chaucer, 
Shakespeare, Milton, Pope, Wordsworth) has after all been 
written in the more artful syllable-stress meter-not in the 
older, simpler, more. directly natural strong-stress meter. 
It is no doubt possible to think of many kinds of interplay, 
with many resulting kinds of total poetic feel. Maybe some 
of the languor and soft drag of Tennyson's verse, for in-
stance, comes sometimes from the interplay between the 
rising iambic motion of the line and the falling trochaic 
character of a series of important words. 
It little profits that an idle king ... 
To follow knowledge, like a sinking star ... 
Again, and very frequently in English verse of the tradition, 
the special rhythmic effects arise from the fact that the stress 
pattern of the iambics either more or less coincides with 
or more or less fails to coincide with the pattern of the 
stronger logical stresses, thus producing a movement either 
slow or fast, heavy or light. 
,. / // / 
That, like a wounded snake, drags its slow length along ... 
,. / / 
Flies o'er th'unbending corn, and skims along the main. 
The same kind of thing combines further with the number 
and length of the words involved in a line to produce 
contours of tension so special as perhaps better not trans-
lated into any other kind of meaning but simply regarded 
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as shapes of energy. The 10,565 lines of Milton's Paradise 
Lost, all but two or three of them iambic pentameter lines, 
abound in illustrations of Milton's virtuosity. To show two 
extremes in one respect, recall a line we have already 
quoted and set beside it another. 
Rocks, caves, lakes, fens, bogs, dens, and shades of death ... 
Immutable, immortal, infinite ... 
Eight strong stresses in one line; three in the other. But five 
metric stresses in either. And if that were not so, there 
would be nothing at all remarkable about the difference 
between eight and three. 
It is, finally, possible, as we have already observed, that 
a given line in a given poet may invite scanning in either 
the older strong-stress way or in the Chaucer-Tennyson 
syllable-stress way-four beats by the old, five beats by the 
new. If a poem written on the whole in syllable-counting 
pentameters happens to show here and there lines which 
have one somewhat lighter stress and hence four stronger 
stresses, this is not very remarkable. For in the nature of 
things, as we have already observed, five stresses will always 
include one weakest. We have already sufficiently illus-
trated this phenomenon. But if a poem written on the whole 
in a meter of four strong stresses, with indeterminate number 
of syllables, at some point tightens up, counts syllables, and 
tilts minor accents into an iambic pentameter, this is some-
thing else. A wise and shifty modern poet, always in search 
of rhythmical invention, writes a stanza containing in the 
middle such a line as: 
Her hair over her arms and her arms full of flowers, 
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and at the end: 
Sometimes these cogitations still amaze 
The troubled midnight and the noon's repose. 
This is playing in and out of the metrical inheritance. Part 
V of The Waste Land begins: 
After the torchlight red on sweaty faces 
After the frosty silence in the gardens 
After the agony in stony places ... 
Coming after four parts of a poem written largely in strong-
stress meter, these lines, with their marked swinging parallel 
of construction, will most likely be read at a fast walk as 
strong-stress meter, four stresses to the first, three each to 
the second and the third. But each is also a perfectly 
accurate pentameter line, each complicated in the same two 
traditional ways, the inverted beginning and the hypermetric 
ending. ("Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer ... ") 
It is probably not until about the time of Mr. Eliot and 
his friends that the free and subtle moving in and out and 
coalescing of strong-stress and syllable-stress meters in the 
same poem, the same stanza, begins to appear with any 
frequency. This is something remarkable in the history of 
metrics. But the understanding of it depends precisely 
upon the recognition of the few homely and sound, tradi-
tional and objective, principles of prosody upon which we 
have been insisting throughout this essay. Without recogni-
tion of the two distinct principles of strong-stress and of 
syllable-stress meter, it seems doubtful if anything at all 
precise or technical can be said about Mr. Eliot's peculiar 
rhythms and tensions. 
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THE AUGUSTAN MODE IN 
ENGLISH POETRY 
ONE OF THE MOST serviceable routines of "scientific" 
literary criticism is the proem which points to the deficien-
cies of earlier workers in the field. Yet this is a form which, 
often enough inept, would be especially so in the present 
instance. More than a little criticism of English neoclassical 
poetry, and in my opinion some excellent criticism, has been 
written in our own century and by critics who are still alive. 
From the work of the last ten years I select two essays 
which appear to me to converge very cogently in an argu-
ment which I now make my own. These two essays are 
"The Mask of Pope," by Professor Austin Warren, and that 
on Pope's verbal style entitled "Wit and Poetry and Pope," 
by Professor Maynard Mack. 
Professor Warren's thesis is that English neoclassical 
poets wrote their best poetry under the sanction of the 
"play principle." They professed a strong allegiance to a 
standard of nature and reason, and to lofty ideals, the heroic 
and the sublime. They had a vision of an "ultimate and 
inclusive order" and inside that, sitting pretty, the smaller 
order of a modern civilization. 1 But guided by this vision 
they managed an Annus Mirabilis or a Carmen Saeculare, 
or erected the crystal palace of An Essay on Man, or con-
ferred an elaborate new decorum upon the Virgilian and 
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Homeric narratives. It was only on vacation from the vision 
and the ideal-with a ticket of satiric and burlesque license 
-that they engaged in the serious fun which an expressionist 
theory would call being true to themselves-an Absalom and 
Achitophel, a Cadenus and Vanessa, a Shepherd's Week, a 
Rape of the Lock, an Arbuthnot, or a Dunciad. As another 
modern critic has expressed it, "only an age of reason would 
put so much beauty into burlesque or would feel it needed 
the protection."2 Perhaps the earliest writer to make the 
point was Samuel Johnson, with his remark that Gay's 
pastorals, though intended for burlesque, had the "effect of 
reality and truth." Swift's defection from the ideal, after his 
juvenile Pindarics, took the form of a relentlessly disgusted 
antisublime. Gay's mockery was chronic and frivolous. 
Prior's attempts to be serious are hardly important. Only 
Dryden and Pope, the greatest of the neoclassical poets, 
show important alternations between the modes, and if the 
effort of Pope's Essay on Man was nearly simultaneous with 
some of his most mature laughter, and if his Horatian poems 
are shaded between straight sober morality and satiric fun, 
this does not so much refute our theory as compel the 
admission that the challenge met by the neoclassical and in 
particular the Augustan poet was a complex one and the 
adequate response by no means an easy burlesque nihilism. 
There is an accent of the genetic about this account which 
I think differs a little from what one might look for in a 
description of neoclassical poems constructed with a strictly 
critical purpose. Nevertheless, the insight seems to me 
accurate, and one that we ought to accept with gratitude. 
Working in another quarter, on the very surface of the 
poetry itself, in the rhetorical and ambiguous colors where 
. 150. 
The Augustan Mode 
the poet's conscious plans can perhaps be read with least 
certitude and least profit, Professor Mack reaches a con-
clusion that strikes me as the accurate counterpart of Pro-
fessor Warren's. Augustan poetry, observes Professor Mack, 
was once called prose and more recently, in a more com-
plimentary spirit, has been called "poetry of statement." 
In some sense it obviously is a kind of "poetry of statement." 
It sounds more like statement than much other poetry we 
can think of-the poetry of metaphysical violence, for in-
stance, or that of romantic passion. Augustan poetry seems 
to sound like or to wish to sound like a statement about 
literary criticism, about ethics, or about cosmology, or per-
haps like just a good clear statement of a story or a good 
clear description of a foolish or wicked character. As another 
recent critic has put it, the thing that normally "comes 
first" in the poetry of Pope and his friends is the "thought."3 
Or, it is the poetry of "coherence,"4 or "intellectual" poetry. 
Or it solves "the aesthetic problem of reasoning in poetry."5 
A recent anonymous writer in the London Times Literary 
Supplement has revived with approval the notion enter-
tained by Carlyle that Pope's use of language was a "cold-
blooded use of language."6 But Mr. Mack's thesis, demon-
strated beyond cavil in a series of finely distinguished and 
graded examples, is that if Pope was a poet of "reason" or 
"statement," he had a very peculiar way of showing this. 
It is true that he had a verbal style which was to some 
extent limited and determined by the apparent aim of seem-
ing reasonable and clear, by the neat couplets ending the 
thoughts of neat length, the exactly divided parallels and 
oppositions. Nevertheless-and this may seem extraordinary 
-it was also a style which in virtue of the same rules and 
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limits had special invitations and encouragements to be 
unprosaic, even unreasonable. Only a passion for exact 
alignment, for precision work with words-so the argument 
runs-made possible the Augustan repertory of pregnant 
junctures, metaphoric insinuations, covert symbols, hinted 
puns, sly rhymes, cheating jingles and riddles. The tight 
frame of logic and meter kept words in their places, but in 
so doing forced them to exert all the more their interactive 
energies. The Augustan couplet at its best earned the dis-
pleasure of a severe critic, Mr. Dennis, in the same way-by 
wit and puns-that poetry in general earned the displeasure 
of a serious philosopher, Mr. Locke. This couplet poetry 
might look like a surrender to prevailing norms of clarity, 
distinctness, sweet reasonableness, science, and the order 
of nature. It was actually a polite evasion of all that. One 
might have thought it curious, on the face of the matter, 
that the great age of classical order should be at ease only 
in the Gothic and mystical shackles of rhyme. 
II 
THERE HAVE BEEN other ways of approaching the thesis 
which I am urging. The way of morbid psychology, for 
instance. English neoclassicism is the "expression through 
frivolity of concealed anxieties."7 Or the sociological, which 
is perhaps in this instance more rewarding. Thirty years 
ago Professor Griffith remarked that the Augustan man of 
letters wished at any cost to appear as a wit and hence had 
to abhor pedantry, which meant any show of learning. Still 
he had to have knowledge and had to use it in his poetry. 
And this was one reason for the vogue of poems in the mode 
. 152. 
The Augustan Mode 
we call the Progress Piece, especially the burlesque kind, 
like Dunciad III. These poems permitted the poet to drama-
tize a tract of knowledge, to get it in "surreptitiously, as it 
were, and without prejudice."8 The sociological color of this 
argument has come out more strongly in recent explorations 
of the "war" waged by middleclass sensible men-"men of 
sense"-Blackmore, for instance, and the elder Wesley-
against aristocratic "men of wit," the "debauched crew" 
who followed Dryden.9 Wit in this view became a "sin" 
("no venial crime") 10 against normal sobriety-if not against 
normal dullness-and the more it was a point of pride among 
the Tory literati, the more it was resented by their antago-
nists. Wit glanced irreverently at the heights; the wit of 
Swift even presumed to be "reconciled" with "divinity." 
One of Mr. Empson's less difficult analyses of the structure 
of "complex words" deals with the word "wit" as it appears 
for the well-known forty-sixth time in Pope's Essay on Criti-
cism. We have three "wits," the poet, the critic, and the 
smart society man or elegant salon conversationalist. Rate 
one or another of these three "wits" plus or minus (honored 
or degraded) as he is compared one way or another with 
one of the others. But the main implication is that a poet 
ought to be not a pedant but a polished gentleman. 
This is a different sort of sociological poetics from the 
upperclass celebration of security which is sometimes im-
puted to Augustan poets and their patrons. 11 That connected 
presumably, on the philosophic side, with the cosmic com-
placency to which we have already alluded, with a "spacious 
baroque optimism"12-to use an older phrase, with "The 
Peace of the Augustans." Nature, in such loftier reaches, 
seemed to refuse the garment of "wit," presumably looking 
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upon it as disadvantageous. Near the end of the Essay on 
Man Pope himself makes what seems to me a lamentable 
recantation of a classical doctrine received in childhood. 
I tum' d the tuneful art 
From sounds to things, from fancy to the heart; 
From Wit's false mirror held up Nature's light. 
IV. 391-93 
The pity is that he was more or less telling the truth. If, for 
example, the unearned optimism of the "ruling passion" 
which runs through Epistle II of the Essay on Man falls a 
bit short of being Pope's most impressive poetry, as I at 
least am inclined to think it does, one way to suggest the 
character of the shortcoming is to say that the lines would 
have trouble passing the salon test. 
See some strange comfort ev'ry state attend, 
And Pride bestow' d on all, a common friend. 
II. 271-72 
This may be somewhat tedious, somewhat too comforting. A 
more tart expression, one that took proper advantage of 
human vanity and was safe from being found a partisan 
with it, would no doubt have been inappropriate in the 
context. Yet in a different context Pope had once before 
shown the witty side of the same platitude. 
Whatever Nature has in worth denied, 
She gives in large recruits of needful Pride. 
Essay on Criticism, ll. 205-206 
Lord Chesterfield's advice to his son about cultivating poetic 
diction and his advice about cultivating the precise, unpre-
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tentious speech of a gentleman are equally in earnest, but 
these utterances do not occur in the same letterY They 
represent a split in the Augustan ideal of eloquence-between 
a social side and a purely literary side-an opposition which 
the greatest of the Augustan poets was able to harmonize 
no more completely than the greatest of the salon con-
versationalists. 
III 
ONE GREAT DIFFERENCE between Augustan serious poetry 
and Augustan poetry for fun lies in how the poet has dealt 
with reality. The classical tradition of the mirror joined with 
the new rationalism and scientific standards of observation 
made Augustan professions of describing the reality very 
high. The classic metaphysical view that the most real is 
what is most basic and permanent-what is in a sense "ideal" 
-determined to a large extent the kind of reality that was 
aimed at in the loftier poems. The religious and literary 
standard of the "sublime" fitted in readily here too. The 
recognition of deviation and deformity-of evil, ugliness, and 
suffering-was hitched into such idealism by an argument 
about parts going into the whole, private into public (vices 
into larger virtues). "Whatever is, is right." That was one 
kind of reality-cosmic and total. The opposite sort of reality 
-commonplace and fragmentary-the unexplained, supposed 
real of literal everyday life, was something that Augustan 
poets did not much try to handle. Swift scores a moderate 
triumph because he has the wit to see that even the drollness 
of burlesque will sustain a "Description of the Morning" or 
a "Description of a City Shower" for only a limited number 
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of lines. The subject is too drab and too innocent to be 
susceptible of much perversion. It is not clever of Gay to 
ramble on for three longish parts of a poem that gives mainly 
good advice on how to walk the streets of London without 
getting splattered. I believe his Trivia is a poem highly 
prized by historians of the city. 
It is true that a classical theory of the comic stood ready 
to support a certain kind of realism. The Aristotelian char-
acters of lower life became characters of ordinary life in the 
Roman formulas: speculum consuetudinis, imitatio vitae. The 
objects of comedy were supposed to be the recognizable 
characters of everyday experience (the more difficult to 
portray as the portrait was more subject to verification). In 
the specially Roman genre of satire also, the theory was 
realistic. The language of satire, a thing emphasized by 
Horace, was to be plain and unambitious, sermo pedestris. 
This clause gave much leeway for breaking poetic rules and 
having fun in a parvenu and not strictly titled genre. Horace 
summed up the situation in a passage of highly suspicious 
modesty. 
I will strike my own name from the list of those I call poets. It 
is not enough to turn verses-especially if the thoughts are prosy 
(sermoni propiora), as mine are. A poet has to have some real 
talent and inspiration, a big mind, and great powers of expression. 
That explains why some critics have been very much inclined to 
question whether comic drama is real poetry or not. It doesn't 
have enough strength and brilliance-either in its message or in 
its style. It is ordinary prose conversation put into meter .... 
Rearrange the words so as to break up the meter, and the char-
acter in the play is speaking the same as he would in real life. 
Satire I, iv, 39 ff . 
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It would remain for Joseph Warton to make an earnest 
application of this argument against the poetry of Pope, and 
for Percival Stockdale to undertake a demonstrative refuta-
tion.14 Nothing, however, forbids our supposing that the 
Augustan poet himself on occasion found in this classic view 
some assistance for his rationalizations. 
And this unpolished, rugged verse, I chose, 
As fittest for discourse, and nearest prose. 
Dryden, Religio Laici, II. 453-54 
Yet classical comic realism had never dealt out straight, 
ordinary reality-any more than any other successful realism 
ever has. To explain what it did do is not easy. The universal 
meaning attributed to poetry in Aristotle's Poetics is one 
thing if related to the tragic hero and pushed in the direction 
of Aristotle's Metaphysics, but it is another thing if related 
to the comic deviational "character" which is defined in the 
Poetics and sketched in Aristotle's Ethics. The thirty Char-
acters of Aristotle's pupil Theophrastus are all eccentrics-
cranks, degenerates, misfits. They are a gallery of diseases, a 
nosology. Where then is the classic universal in any sense 
which one may relate to the metaphysical exemplar? It may 
be said that classical comedy teaches us ideals of human 
behavior by the method of contrasted deformities. And to 
this it may be added that Aristotle's Ethics, with its com-
pliment to the ready-witted, ironic gentleman conversation-
alist and its alignment of him with the refined innuendo of 
"New" Comedy, shows that the rule in the Poetics that comic 
characters must be inferior was far from the whole truth. 
The classical comic, and after it the Restoration Molieresque 
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comic, included along with the inferior butt the superior 
witty critic of the butt. This indeed was necessary-to escape 
the dullness of subnormality and to cast a lustre of the ideal 
(wit and intellect are always ideal) over the comic sup-
posedly everyday real. 
IV 
MY VIEW IS that the English Au gus tans were, at their best 
and at their most characteristic, laughing poets of a height-
ened unreality. The world which the Augustan wit found 
most amusing and into which he had his deepest visions 
was an inverted, chaotic reality, the unreality of the "un-
creating word," -the "true No-meaning" which "puzzles 
more than Wit." The peculiar feat of the Augustan poet 
was the art of teasing unreality with the redeeming force 
of wit-of casting upon a welter of unreal materials a light 
of order and a perspective vision. 
That is the truth despite all the intimations to the con-
trary which Augustan poets themselves may have uttered, 
all the rules which later scholars may have identified, to the 
effect that Augustanism is the direct incorporation of ideal 
reality, of reason and light-"one clear, unchanged, and 
universal light." That passage on Nature in Pope's Essay, 
like the rules for every poetic emergency urbanely recited 
by Horace, is perhaps best taken as a part of the author's 
mask. Augustan poets (along with the critic Dennis) could 
talk about the rules, they could in various ways introduce 
the rules as material into their poetical Arts of Poetry; but 
Augustan poets could not formally demonstrate the rules 
without being chilly. The Essay on Criticism furnishes posi-
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tive examples only of how to accommodate the sound to 
the sense. The best these poets could do for the rules-and 
it was uncommonly good-was to give burlesque examples 
of how the rules are violated. This explains why the liveliest 
Augustan prose criticism (it is not found in the Longinian 
terms of a Preface to Homer or of notes to Homer) sounds 
so much like the actual performance of Augustan poetry. 
Thus, there was a rule derived from Aristotle and Horace 
that a literary character portrayal should be consistent and 
plausible-it should observe its "decorum." 
... si forte reponis Achillem, 
impiger, iracundus, inexorabilis, acer. 
Ad Pisones, 11. 120-21 
But this rule is not very exciting. It does not invite extra-
illustration. Or at least the Augustans were not really so 
much interested in illustrating it as a Scaliger or a Vida 
might have been. The only way to make such a rule 
interesting is to subvert it. Chapter V of Pope's Scriblerian 
Peri Bathous prescribes how a modern poet of the "profund" 
might do this. 
In the very Manners he will affect the Marvelous; he will draw 
Achilles with the Patience of Job; a Prince talking like a Jack-
pudding; a Maid of Honour selling Bargains; 15 a Footman speak-
ing like a Philosopher; and a fine Gentleman like a Scholar. 
With the important difference in consciousness that made 
wit, this kind of garbled character was what the Augustan 
poet himself would execute in his poems. 
Rufa, whose eye quick-glancing o'er the Park, 
Attracts each light gay meteor of a Spark, 
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Agrees as ill with Rufa studying Locke, 
As Sappho's diamonds with her dirty smock. ... 
Now deep in Taylor and the Book of Martyrs, 
Now drinking citron with his Grace and Chartres. 
Now Conscience chills her, and now Passion burns: 
And Atheism and Religion take their turns. 
Moral Essay II, 21-24, 63-66 
Now high, now low, now Master up, now Miss, 
And he himself one vile Antithesis. 
Epistle to Arbuthnot, 11. 324-25 
The principle of unreality comes out in Pope's Peri 
Bathous even more starkly when he talks about outdoor 
nature. And here let me cite a curious parallel to a modern 
philosopher's view of the whole meaning of our modern 
Western art. In his Dehumanization of Art Ortega y Gasset 
remarks: 
It would be interesting to find out whether in the new artistic 
inspiration, where they fulfill a substantive and not merely a 
decorative function, images have not acquired a curious deroga-
tory quality and, instead of ennobling and enhancing, belittle 
and disparage poor reality. I remember reading a book of 
modern poetry in which a Hash of lightning was compared to a 
carpenter's rule and the leafless trees of winter to brooms 
sweeping the sky. The weapon of poetry turns against natural 
things and wounds or murders them.16 
Beside that place the following passage of Peri Bathous. 
He [the poet of the profund] ought therefore to render himself 
master of this happy and anti-natural way of thinking to such a 
degree, as to be able, on the appearance of any object to furnish 
his imagination with ideas infinitely below it. And his eyes should 
be like unto the wrong end of a perspective glass, by which all 
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the objects of nature are lessened. For Example; when a true 
genius looks upon the Sky, he immediately catches the idea of 
a piece of blue lutestring or a child's mantle .... If he looks 
upon a Tempest, he shall have an image of a tumbled bed. 
Chapter V 
Ortega y Gasset begins his essay by professing a neutral 
descriptive purpose. Yet his description is so sympathetic 
as to sound much like an apology. Say what you will, he 
argues in effect, these are the modern values in art. See 
what you can make of them. Pope, on the other hand, is 
putting a finger on deviations from the norm of classical 
sanity. "Nobody can write that way without being ridicu-
lous." The similarity of the two critiques, however, is strik-
ing, as is the general correspondence of Peri Bathous to the 
lavish subversions which characterize Pope's own poetry. 
In cold December fragrant chaplets blow, 
And heavy harvests nod beneath the snow. 
Dunciad I, 77-78 
The forests dance, the rivers upward rise, 
Whales sport in woods, and dolphins in the skies. 
Dunciad III, 245-46'* 
In all this there appears, I believe, more than a slight 
affinity between Augustan burlesque and the kind of un-
reality which during the period of Ortega's survey flourished 
in various forms of "expression" and "surrealism." The 
parallel between Peri Bathous and the conceptions of Ortega 
reaches its most exquisite in Ortega's introduction of the 
"Cp. Horace, Ad Pisones, l. 29: "Delphinum silvis adpingit, fluctibus 
aprum" (the negative rule) with Horace, Odes, I, ii, 9-12: "Piscium et 
summa genus haesit ulmo I Nota quae sedes fuerat columbis, I Et super-
jecto pavidae natarunt I Aequore dammae." 
. 161. 
Hateful Contraries 
term "infrarealism." The English translation of the sentence 
by which this term is defined could scarcely sound more like 
a borrowing from Pope's ironic treatise. "Instead of soaring 
to poetical heights, art may dive beneath the level marked 
by the natural perspective." 
v 
THE SUBLIME vmw of the world had, as we have seen, a 
way of facing and comprehending evil by assimilating it-
the part into the grander whole, the definite ugly detail into 
the large mystery. This hypertheodicean tendency showed 
a fairly close sympathy for the less precise versification of 
the Miltonic influence, for the "philosophic" vocabulary, the 
newly pervasive benevolence, the apple-bearing landscape 
without original sin. And all these things had a com-
fortable relation with the softening, the tenderly emotive 
trend of the age, the sentimentalizing of comedy, the sub-
siding of tragedy (after the inflation of heroics) either into 
poetic justice or into a counterpart which we may call poetic 
injustice-the thing that Dennis disliked in Addison's Cato. 
Distinct from all these things and in many instances opposed 
to them, stood the aristocratic vice of wit-a different way 
of coming to account with evil. 
If one looks about among the Augustans for a theory 
of laughter, one may come across some version of self-
enhancement, the Hobbesian "sudden glory" (as in Addison's 
Spectato1' no. 47) or the more refined Shaftesburyan con-
nection of laughter with freedom and hence with intellectual 
debate. 17 There was also the well-known satirist's apology: 
that men are willing to be thought scoundrels, but afraid of 
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being thought fools, that satire is a public corrective of vice, 
that it "heals with morals what it hurts with wit." (Some 
allowance on our part for satirical disingenuousness would 
seem in order when the emphasis falls upon "healing.") In 
general these theories of laughter are antithetical not only 
to the psychologisms known to us of a later day but to the 
somber forms of transcendentalism and intuitionism where 
laughter itself and the comic literary genre have been seen 
as participating in the inferiority of the laughable object, 
in its mechanization, absent-mindedness, or conceptualized 
rigidity. The classical tradition of laughter, aside from the 
Platonic nervousness about comic contagion, in general 
honored and relished the act of laughter, though disparag-
ing its object."' Augustan wit, in particular, was both very 
lively-serious (or lively-gloomy) 18 and very well aware of 
its own powers-even though, as we have seen, it was on 
holiday from poetic rules. Not in Swift, however, nor in 
Pope, nor in any of their friends, I believe, does one find so 
direct a statement about the relation of laughter to "serious" 
literature as this of Fielding's in the Covent Garden Journal: 
It is from a very common but a very false Opinion, that we con-
stantly mix the Idea of Levity with those of Wit and Humour. 
The gravest of Men have often possessed these qualities in a very 
eminent Degree, and have exerted them on the most solemn 
Subjects with very eminent Success. These are to be found in 
many Places in the most serious Works of Plato and Aristotle, of 
Cicero and Seneca. Not only Swift, but South hath used them on 
" The misapprehension of Aristotle that appears in Ben Jonson's free 
translation of a Platonic passage in Heinsius' commentary on Horace ("As 
Aristotle saies rightly, the moving of laughter is a fault in Comedie"-Timber, 
no. 1.31, ed. Maurice Castelain [Paris, 1906], p. 133) represents, I believe, 
not so much a really agelastic attitude on the part of Jonson as a protest 
against certain forms of farce and slapstick. 
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the highest and most important of all subjects. In the sermons of 
the Latter, there is perhaps more Wit than in the Comedies of 
Congreve. . . . No. 18, March 3, 1752 
Fielding's conception of a serious "wit" and "humour" 
may be understood from his own prose of the Covent Garden 
Journal as well as from his comic prose histories. He is the 
last of the triumphantly comic Augustans. (Dr. Johnson 
was very deeply touched by the strain of solemnity and 
feeling that overcame the Augustan laughter.) And Field-
ing's conception is above all exemplified in the mode of 
poetry-that established by Dryden and perfected by Pope 
-which it has been the aim of this paper to define. Augustan 
poetry at its best-let me recapitulate my argument-was the 
last stand of a classic mode of laughter against forces that 
were working for a sublime inflation of ideas and a luxury 
of sorry feeling. It did its work under a kind of disguise, 
by a kind of licensed escape or leave of absence from serious 
rules which it could not wholly afford to repudiate. It was 
a way of declining a prevalent and respectable disorder of 
the age-the now notorious "dissociation of sensibility"-
while appearing to participate. Augustan poetry was a 
retirement from areas of "nature" that were beginning to 
look sterile, a spirited rearguard action in the retreat of 
Renaissance humanism before the march of science. It may 
have been the poetry of a "Silver Age," but when Shelley's 
friend Peacock later gave it that name, he did so without 
understanding either the challenge with which the poets 
were confronted or the character of their response . 
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JAMES BOSWELL~ 
IT wouLD BE difficult to argue which is the more 
striking thing-Boswell the man, living a certain eager and 
violent kind of life; or Boswell the author, writing a certain 
deeply engaged kind of journal. The Journal could not have 
been written without the life. The life will not actually be 
diminished or removed from focus if we consider it as the 
conscious enactment of a story for a journal, the more or 
less deliberate and daring involvement in an experience 
that came quite near, in alternating phases, to both the 
comic and the tragic of the literary categories. ("My avidity 
to put as much as possible into a day makes me fill it till it is 
like to burst." "It has occurred to me that a man should not 
live more than he can record .... I have so long accustomed 
myself to write a diary that when I omit it the day seems to 
be lost.") 
Both Johnson and Boswell set great store by the very fact. 
"The value of every story," said Johnson (and Boswell 
recorded it), "depends on its being true. A story is a picture 
of either an individual or of human nature in general: if it 
be false, it is a picture of nothing." Boswell had been 
brilliantly successful, at the time of his first London Journal, 
in employing the dramatic perspective that came with some 
deliberate lag in "posting" his entries. Nevertheless, it was 
"Copyright 1959 by Yale University . 
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always a matter of moment to him that his Journals should 
have the kind of accuracy which came from his writing 
down some kind of record when the events were very 
"recent" in his mind. He would dispute the point with 
warmth and conviction against anybody who from mere 
memory, "at a distance of several years," ventured to ques-
tion a statement he had published. "No man's memory can 
preserve facts or sayings with such fidelity as may be done 
by writing them down when they are recent." Sometimes a 
sketch of only a few words would later serve as a clue which 
he would confidently, and, we have reason to believe, 
accurately, expand into a detailed scene. At other times, 
when he was in fact writing up his Journal "from memory," 
after a lapse of even so short a space as three or four weeks, 
he might suffer from a feeling that what he wrote was "very 
imperfect." Let the literary critic be ready to concede that 
for diaries and journals the conviction of the individual 
historic verity does count heavily. Given a certain degree 
of fictive, of symbolic, of universal interest in a writing, if 
then the fact be known also to be present, a great enhance-
ment does occur. A measure even of dead weight in the 
design, of mere fact, will be tolerated and will work in its 
own way to fortify the imaginative substance. 
II 
ON AN AucusT AFTERNOON in Edinburgh, six judges of the 
High Court of Justiciary sit looking down upon a miserable 
man, a peasant butcher and drover of cattle who has been 
tried the day before on a charge of sheep-stealing. The jury 
of Edinburgh businessmen brings in a unanimous verdict of 
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guilty. The counsel for the defence, James Boswell, steps 
forward and makes a plea to the judges that in view of 
certain circumstances which he believes are present, he be 
allowed a few days to muster an argument for mitigation 
of sentence. One of the judges is Boswell's father; another 
is a friend and encourager, but no less senior and sarcastic 
critic on occasion, the hanging judge and literary theorist 
Lord Kames. A third is the parvenu Ayrshire neighbor of the 
Boswells, Thomas Miller, Lord Justice-Clerk and Acting 
President of the Court, a man whose already publicly 
expressed attitude toward the defendant (and perhaps 
toward his counsel) may be taken as lethal in this situation. 
Each of these judges, starting with Alexander Boswell and 
ending with Thomas Miller, delivers his opinion. They 
mention the younger Boswell as well as his client. 'Tm for 
indulging [the] young man." "Your counsel ... has exerted 
all his talents and abilities .... " "Nothing remains to me 
now but to pronounce . . ." We have the very words of all 
six judges, or most of their words. Of the substantial sense 
and the key phrases, there can be no doubt-because Bos-
well, deeply intent, sympathetic, persevering counsel that 
he is, sole advocate of the woefully lost cause, at the same 
time does not in the least lose his awareness of himself as an 
experiencing, recording personality. On the margins of a 
printed petition in an inheritance cause a week old he 
scribbles the words-even the largely pompous and needless 
speech of Lord Coalston making the point that in industry 
and learning he himself is not unworthy to be sitting on that 
bench. Would this scene, as we partly edit and reconstruct 
it for Boswell, adding to his words some of the official docu-
ments-the verdict, the dreadful sentence (" ... by the hands 
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of the common executioner upon a gibbet . . . pronounced 
for doom")-pass muster in a novel by Sir Walter Scott or 
R. L. Stevenson? How much would a free creative story-
teller wish to alter the materials? In the face of what we 
have, the question becomes irrelevant. A certain powerful 
element of the universal, of symbolic interest-present be-
yond question-is here merged with the known and equally 
unquestionable historic fact. Something sombre and pathetic 
was enacted, by certain agents, of whom we know enough 
to conceive them in a deeply substantive way, as real 
persons-by Boswell, by his father, by the Justice-Clerk, by 
the doomed man. Add, too, our reflection on the remarkable 
chance, the wild improbability of our actually having this 
record. This true drama refuses to be measured completely 
by the norms of the fictional. 
Having said that, however, we return to the categories-
because these are all we can pretend to expound or criticize. 
There is a certain kind of thing which Boswell is not very 
good at talking about. This is the external physical object 
or scene, especially if it is in some way curious and has to be 
described or explained. Place Boswell before a rude country 
gate, an old tower, a prehistoric arrangement of big stones, 
a cave, a landscape in the Hebrides, a machine for leveling 
a very steep hill, and he perhaps labors greatly, but not with 
much effect. He was well enough aware of this. "I am a 
very imperfect topographer." "I find I can do nothing in 
the way of description of any visible object whatever. 
Whether it is owing to my not seeing with accuracy, or to 
my not having the use of words fitted to such sort of 
description, I cannot say." Well then, if Boswell is unable 
to describe physical objects, how is it that certain scenes in 
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his Journals stand out so vividly in our memory? "I walked 
down the high street of Edinburgh, which has a grand 
appearance in the silence and dusky light of three in the 
morning, and felt myself like an officer in a campaign." 
"I waited a little and then heard the great man. . . . The 
sound of his feet upon the timber steps was weighty .... 
He had on an old purple cloth suit, and a large whitish wig." 
"I was ... conducted by a person in the Ambassador's livery 
to a seat just before the organ and fronting the altar. The 
solemnity of high mass, the music, the wax lights, and the 
odor of the frankincense made a delightful impression upon 
me. I was divinely happy." " ... to the Temple Gate. Mr. 
Johnson could not stop his merriment .... 'Ha, ha, ha,' 
making all Fleet Street resound at the silent midnight hour. 
I went with him to his door, when he embraced me and 
blessed me." The principle of inner human relevance which 
works in these city scenes can hardly be disguised, even 
when they are cut down to such glimpses; it scarcely needs 
direct laboring. Still they are external scenes too, and this 
defines and gives edge to the inner relevance. Perhaps we 
may borrow some special illumination for the enquiry if 
we permit ourselves to turn aside and pursue Boswell for a 
moment of the year 1773 into the less characteristic outdoor 
and scenic paths of his Hebrides Tour-the environment 
which elicits from him those misgivings as to his -descriptive 
power which we have quoted. 
Most often there is not, in fact, any description at all-at 
least not anything that Sir Walter or Flaubert would have 
considered a description. The chief medium is the names 
of the characters, their grouping, and their words-always 
their words. There will be also, in some instances, something 
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like a stage direction, in the most ordinary specific terms, 
concerning how things looked. This element may seem 
severely restricted, almost perfunctory. It too, however, can 
be quite important. Consider: "a large boat with eight oars," 
"a fine autumn Sunday morning" on the sea between Raasay 
and Skye, a party of seven passengers which includes the 
Raasay chief and a minister of the Gospel; and Samuel 
Johnson "with manly eloquence" delivers "a short discourse 
worth any sermon," on facing death, on punishment or 
annihilation, on a "trust in the mercy of God, through the 
merits of Jesus Christ." Immediately after, we come into the 
harbor of Portree and alongside a vessel "lying in it to carry 
off the emigrants" to America. A hinted seascape, a mini-
mum of properties, a reminder of local history compose a 
contrasting frame of earthly circumstance which accents 
and marvelously deepens this lay sermon on the waves, gives 
to the snapshot gesture the definition of a drama. Not 
"paint," but the idea is Boswell's descriptive technique. Few 
readers, one may hazard, will fail to imagine this scene 
vividly-and it will scarcely matter that their images will 
differ as widely as their experience of seascapes, of boats, of 
sennons. 
III 
HuMAN HEIKGS in the act of speech are always Boswell's 
focus, his medium, his idiom. This fact is ambivalent: on 
one side spontaneous and autobiographical, on the other, 
traditional and literary. On the one hand, Boswell himself 
is an active, an eager, a perpetual, a chronic conversationalist 
-never happy unless in company, scarcely even alive unless 
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in company. He cannot remember what happened on a 
certain single day, he will say in writing up a back stretch 
of Journal. "I am pretty certain that I passed it in the plain 
course of business without being in company." On the other 
hand, the literary tradition from which both Boswell and 
his great mentor Samuel Johnson stem is that of the 
"apophthegm," the anecdote, the collection of Ana. "I love 
anecdotes," says Johnson. "I fancy mankind may come in 
time to write all aphoristically, except in narrative; grow 
weary of preparation and connexion and illustration and all 
those arts by which a big book is made." And Boswell 
thought "that there should be half a dozen of Menages in 
every age to preserve the remarkable sayings which are 
often lost." 
At certain times, especially when he was in the company 
of the London great ones, Boswell was content to play a 
very modest, though he believed an important, conver-
sational role. "I have an admirable talent of leading the 
conversation; I do not mean ... by playing the first fiddle, 
but ... as one does in examining a witness." We notice, 
however, and perhaps with some dismay, that the con-
versational anecdote is very closely connected in Boswell's 
mind with the bon mot, the witticism, the ingenious simile, 
and especially the pun-the kind of thing which he records 
so extensively in his Boswelliana. And this again is very 
close to a more active and agressive side of Boswell himself 
as a conversationalist, heard most loudly at the Edinburgh 
supper and drinking parties among his Scottish advocate and 
writer friends. "I said I would rather see Sir George and the 
goose, than St. George and the dragon; and the garters of 
onion I called the collars of the order .... I was in admirable 
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spirits from having spoken as I did." "Lord Alemoor 
asked me if I ever studied beforehand the good things which 
I said in company. I told him I did not. I was really 
excellent company." And all this again is very close to those 
deliberate and ingenious similes which Boswell so often 
interrupts his Journal to develop-the mind of the essayist 
("The H ypochondriack") at work excogitating materials. 
"Nothing worth recording was either said or done. But I 
shall here put down a simile which I made at Alnwick. ... 
Facts ... particular causes ... are to principles, like sticks 
to peas in a garden .... This is a good idea, and upon some 
occasion ... I may expand it." 
We discover furthermore that Boswell has the opinion-or 
at least professes this opinion in a prominent place, at the 
end of the H ebrides-that the only conversation worth put-
ting down for posterity to read is the brilliant sayings of the 
great and celebrated. "Few, very few, need be afraid that 
their sayings will be recorded." This formula works well 
enough, for the most part, so long as we are in the company 
of Johnson or some of the other members of the Club. The 
conversations of the Johnsonian circle, and especially of 
course Johnson's own thrusts, often give us the bon mot (the 
trenchant figure, not the pun) in its full size and might. 
Even in these conversations, however, the quality is often 
not brilliance, but something more homely-perhaps even 
the opposite of brilliance, as in the ambitious bungles, the 
habitual etourderie of Goldsmith. Think too of the more 
staple scenes of human intercourse, innumerable and varied 
-the tender, the sorrowful, the wrangling, the anguished-
which fill the Journals and are their unremitting kind of 
merit. Boswell was oppressed in the presence of really dull 
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persons. A certain energy and honesty of converse seems 
to have been his requirement in a companion. But it is 
hardly true that he always talked with brilliant persons or 
waited for brilliance before beginning to remember and 
record. He hardly could have. 
Magazine writers of Boswell's day now and then em-
ployed, half in earnest, a kind of "Poetical Scale" or tabular 
score-board for comparing the merits of English poets. 
Under the head of some such term as "invention," we may 
imagine one of them, if required to compare Boswell's 
prose with the work of the poets, giving him only about five 
points (out of the possible twenty). He invents nothing, at 
least not in the literary sense; his invention comes just in the 
way he lives. Under some head like "arrangement" this 
critic, if he looked carefully, might have given Boswell 
perhaps eighteen or nineteen points ("The twentieth was 
never yet attained to"). The way he puts his persons and 
places together-arranges his scenes-we have noticed in the 
Hebrides, might well seem to be his greatest skill. And then 
the head of "diction"? Here the critic might have been 
nonplussed. In a certain sense it would have appeared to 
him that Boswell was not using diction at all-just words of 
no special kind or distinction, except perhaps for a moment 
now and then of essay style, when he tries to be like his hero 
Johnson. In the main, and in the best passages (when he is 
writing directly from the observed and felt life), he seems 
to think that the ordinary, the correct, name for every object 
and action suits his purpose better than any other. His 
narrative enjoys a kind of effortless immediacy of contact 
with his subject matter. No periphrase, no poetry, no tints 
in the medium, no bubbles. All is "plate glass," or looking 
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through contact lenses. A compliment which Boswell elicited 
when he showed Johnson parts of the Hebrides Journal 
referred specifically to his avoiding Scotticisms, but it may 
be stretched a little to suggest Boswell's chief and most 
constant stylistic gift, his native and perhaps hardly con-
scious talent for saying things straight. "I said I wished he 
would translate it. 'How?' said he. BOSWELL. 'Into good 
English.' JOHNSON. 'Sir, it is very good English.'" 
But that critic of the "poetical scale" who had set out to 
place Boswell according to the neoclassic categories might 
very conceivably not have pursued his discussion of the 
diction in this way. After noting that the words were plain 
and undistinguished, he would almost certainly have added 
that they were often "low." (Diction, 3!) There was hardly 
any object so low that Boswell would not name it by its 
correct name ("four combs, a pair of scissors, and a stick 
of pomatum," "a pot of lenitive electuary"). This was part 
of that fidelity which he cultivated. (It was an aspect of 
the actual difficulty, the anfractuosity, of life as seen, 
perhaps deceptively, through the simple and plain style.) 
It was not as if Boswell had theories about literature that 
were in advance of the prevailing taste and theory of his 
day. So far as he followed theory, he followed one branch, 
the biographical or the anecdotal, rather than the full-dress 
poetic. But in his practice he followed the biographical 
all the way, to its full consequences, without any of the 
buffering of implicit poetic decorum, of elegance, which 
appears, say, in the biographical writing of Mason's Gray or 
even in Johnson's Lives of the Poets. Boswell's autobiog-
raphy, after being pillaged by Boswell himself of certain 
special parts for the Life of Johnson, dropped out of sight 
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in its boxes and bundles. It comes to notice again in the 
middle of the twentieth century and sounds astonishingly 
like a segment of the fictional prose of this era. 
IV 
WE HAVE Samuel Johnson's advice to Boswell on how to 
keep a journal, delivered in the very swim of events during 
one of Boswell's London "jaunts." "The great thing is the 
state of your own mind; and you ought to write down 
everything that you can .... Write immediately while the 
impression is fresh." (Aristotle to Menander on how to get 
a laugh, to the tadpole on how to become a frog.) This 
advice can scarcely have seemed novel to Boswell, yet one 
part of it was impressive enough for him to repeat it in his 
Journal more than a year later. "Mr. Johnson said that the 
great thing was to register the state of my own mind." 
Years earlier, Boswell, in a moment of indolence and mis-
giving about his Journal, had argued with himself, "Does it 
not contain a faithful register of my variations of mind?" 
If we wish to understand why some of Boswell's narrations, 
even some of the most seemingly routine or perfunctory 
sketches of the shape of a given day, have their own interest 
and carry us on easily to the next day and the next, it is 
because Boswell is always talking about how his days and 
nights felt to him. It is always a cardinal point with him to 
be searching for happiness, to keep testing himself to see if 
he is finding it, to take his own emotional temperature, to 
look forward to his opportunities, and backward to estimate 
his successes and his failures. He tries hard to state ex-
plicitly; he is busy also arranging details to suggest. ("Words 
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cannot describe our feelings. The finer parts are lost, as the 
down upon the plum." "The state of my mind must be 
gathered from the little circumstances inserted in my Jour-
nal.") The great days of London life when he hugs himself 
for joy, certain skillfully managed Edinburgh days of just 
enough work, just enough sociability, just the right kind and 
amount of food and the warming wine carefully "sucked," 
and on the contrary the days of madness and rampaging, 
of gross boldness, of violence and intemperance in convivial 
life, in drinking, in making love, and the subsequent days of 
oppressive melancholy and desolation-these stand forth con-
spicuously enough in the record. At the same time he is 
attentive to the days of quieter tone, the intermediate values. 
"I rose from the table quite cool, and several of us drank tea 
with the ladies. This was an inoffensive day." "We three 
drank a bottle of claret each, which just cheered me." 
v 
THE STORY of Boswell is the story of man's disobedience 
and its fruit, as that fruit grew ripe in the experience of a 
man who lived both marvelously in accord, and marvelously 
at variance, with the life of his contemporaries. Sing, 
terrestrial muse .... The literary mind of the age would have 
had the story, if not heavenly poetic, at any rate reasonably 
smooth and elegant or majestically grand. As a precocious 
Eton schoolboy in the year 1787 wrote in his Addisonian 
essay: the poet Chaucer "lived in a period little favourable 
to simplicity, and several meannesses occur throughout his 
work. . . . The state of equipoise between horror and 
laughter which the mind must here experience may be 
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ranked among its most unpleasing sensations." Boswell him-
self records for us his friend Dempster's report on the 
historian Orme, who occupied himself reading "Euripides 
in Greek because his mind had to have something hard to 
chew." But "over one door [he had] a drawing of a boy 
painting. Over the opposite door, a boy playing on a flute. 
'There,' said he, 'is my opinion of poetry; beautiful images 
and fine sounds.'" There was a part of Boswell's mind 
which was largely in rapport with this kind of taste and 
interest. "When fancy from its bud scarce peeped, and 
life's sweet matins rung," he wrote in a youthful poem, and 
he defended the lines in his I ournal: ". . . I think them two 
beautiful allusions." "Auchinleck," he wrote later to a friend 
who was planning to enrich a progress poem with an allusion 
to the family and estate, "is a most unpoetical name. But 
it may be mentioned at the foot of a page." His favorite 
image for what delights him in verbal composition is the 
edible sweet-the "delicious" pineapple, "the dessert of rich 
flavor." Among his most frequent terms of praise for the 
conversation of Samuel Johnson are "majestic," "musical," 
"melodious." 
Such expressions, however, do not bring us very close to 
the real imaginative principle in Boswell. Surely the most 
extraordinary thing about his management of human con-
versation and feeling in his life and in his I ournals is his 
capacity (defying good taste) to entertain the jostling 
opposites-in alternation, in conjunction: good and evil, 
prudence and rashness, and all their attendant range of 
pleasure and pain, delight and woe. There is a special kind 
of reflective or aesthetic feeling-an accent of realization-
which arises just out of the clash of the primary or im-
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mediate life feelings. One of these accents, a major one, is 
the laughable. Boswell was hitting to one side of the truth 
about this when in a Hypochondriack essay he recom-
mended for the comic stage a certain "character com-
pounded of two qualities, each of which may be the founda-
tion of ridicule." The principle is actually somewhat wider, 
surely wide enough, for instance, to embrace Boswell himself 
standing before the bar of the House of Lords, Boswell 
recording of himself: "'My Lords,' said I, 'I speak with 
warmth for this schoolmaster who is accused of too much 
severity. I speak from gratitude, for I am sensible that if 
I had not been very severely beat by my master, I should 
not have been able to make even the weak defence which I 
now make. . . .' Lord Mansfield smiled." Boswell for the 
defence: comic mode. 
A second major accent of realization is, with Boswell, not 
quite the classic counterpart or tragic opposite of the laugh-
able, but rather a near neighbor living in certain interest-
ingly uneasy relationships. Any kind of feeling at all, any 
internal commotion, may be enjoyable and may be deliber-
ately sought and deliberately nursed in memory. He reads in 
a newspaper about the death of an earl whom he had long 
considered a great man of the world. "There is a pleasure in 
being to a certain degree agitated by events." And thus his 
repeated interviews with condemned men, his executions, 
and his funerals. ("I can never resist seeing executions. . . . 
One of weak nerves is overpowered by such spectacles.'') 
And thus his own curiously flickering and detached, both 
complacent and assured, self-awareness on such occasions. 
His unselfish and anguished engagement in behalf of a 
doomed client merges with a quite satisfactory consciousness 
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of his own role as eloquent defender and a prolonged exploi-
tation of his opportunity as observer. "I was in a kind of agi-
tation, which is not without something agreeable, in an odd 
way of feeling .... I enjoyed the applause." "I said, 'I 
suppose, John, you know that the executioner is down in the 
hall.' . . . Two o'clock struck. I said, with solemn tone, 
'There's two o'clock.' " Boswell for the defence: quasi-tragic 
mode. 
Such are his experiences in partisanship and sympathy. 
But an even more central theme of the journals is the daily 
endurance of his own most personal and immediate version 
of the human tragi-comedy. One of the most constant things 
that Boswell knows is the vibration between indulgence 
and remorse-or their near simultaneity and union. "Drink-
ing never fails to make me ill-bred .... I recollect having 
felt much warmth of heart, fertility of fancy, and joyous 
complacency mingled in a sort of delirium .... my wife was 
waiting all the time, drowsy and anxious." Sometimes the 
awareness is more tired and casual. In those nonce reflec-
tions, incidental and effortless observations, after a day or 
after a supper, of which the journals are so full, often there 
appears a kind of puzzled estimate of dissatisfaction, its 
causes, its feeble remedies. "After every enjoyment comes 
weariness and disgust." "Our grave reflections on the vanity 
of life are part of the farce-like the grave ridiculous in 
comedy-for, after making them, we take a jovial bottle as 
if we never had thought." 
Suppose that we ourselves, a modern reader of Boswell, 
had been living about the year 1755 and had been mature 
enough and shrewd enough, or clairvoyant enough (a kind 
of Rousseau or Voltaire with a vision of the future) to have 
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been asked by some young Scot what kind of man he should 
strive to become in order to write a daily record of his life 
that would have a strong claim on the attention of a wide 
audience a hundred and fifty years later. To be honest, we 
should have had to give a combination of advice and diagno-
sis which would have ended with a preachment, something 
like this: "Let it be understood, then, that your eager 
pursuit of the varieties of human experience will necessarily 
entail much imprudence, much moral turpitude ( 'fornica-
tion ... lasciviousness ... emulations ... strife ... drunken-
ness, revellings, and such like'), much consequent debilita-
tion and remorse. You will know moments of joyous realiza-
tion, others of only feverish excitement, and many others of 
intense anguish, of black despair and oppression. The latter 
will become more frequent and settled as you grow older. 
Your life will not be long, and its closing years will not be 
happy. 
"In short, the advice (even though we are philosophes 
and urge no theological scruples) is far from an exhortation 
that you do attempt to lead the kind of life that will be 
desirable, in some measure necessary, if you are to be the 
writer of a certain kind of engrossing journal. Other genera-
tions of readers, many years later, will gain by your enter-
prise. You yourself will pay a heavy price; so will your 
wife and your children." 
Or, let us resume our actual vantage of the present 
moment and look back as seriously as we can. We ask the 
question, inevitably, how is this frank, this prideful, at 
moments even exultant record, not offensive? What is the 
quality or degree of Boswell's awareness of evil? ("Yet I am 
a very sensible, good sort of man." "I have one of the most 
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singular minds ever was formed.") Does he really under-
stand what he is? Does he enjoy the kind of perspective 
needed to shape such experiences as he endures into a 
record that commands our serious regard? We have to 
acknowledge first of all that this record proceeds throughout 
upon a kind of perception which is demonstrated in the 
expression. It is not a record or a confession by accident. 
When Boswell joins with the very jury at a tavern in a 
species of celebration on the coffin of a client, there is, it is 
true, no embarrassment, just a certain odd elation. Still it 
is Boswell himself who has acknowledged and joined these 
impressions for us. Another sensibility might well have 
screened, might well have bowdlerized and simplified-bid-
ding for a higher degree of propriety, of the supposed tragic 
or sublime, of purity of "diction." The endless naivete of 
Boswell, his profoundly childlike mentality, comes in here 
as a force in the self-dramatization. If only the writer have 
the accuracy, the courage, to portray his childlikeness! 
Childlikeness directly displayed is not like what leaks out 
unhappily around the edges of the dishonest attempt at 
self-concealment. Boswell is the man who does not blench 
at revealing that in a fit of domestic rage he threw an 
egg or a banknote in the fire, that in a moment of hilarity 
he lowed like a cow in the Drury Lane playhouse, that 
another time in London, mistaken for Wilkes, he was willing 
to pretend to be Wilkes, that in the provinces, at York, he 
talks to a man about Boswell's Corsica without letting on 
that he is Boswell. A pun or wild sally enveloped in Bos-
well's complacent report of it is a more interesting thing than 
the bare joke, presented on its own as a gem, in Boswelliana. 
Boswell almost never, perhaps never for any extended 
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stretch, writes in complete ignorance or moral obtuseness. 
Even the exuberant whoring passages are likely to have 
their edging of apology, of rueful humor, their introspective 
accent, their partly foreseen and dreaded aftermath of 
remorse. ("In the midst of divine service I was laying plans 
for having women. . . . I imagine that my want of belief is 
the occasion of this.") The awareness of evil perhaps seldom 
or never reaches degrees of great reflective intensity. Still 
Boswell has a sense of evil-a feeling of it, the kind of 
painful impression which Johnson, after a day of fatiguing 
hospitality at Aberdeen, acknowledged in the words: "Sen-
sation is sensation." 
The analogy between Boswell and the sentimental hero 
of his day, the rake with the heart of gold in the picaresque 
or comic epic novel, is too striking to be resisted. Doubtless 
Boswell himself felt the resemblance, and he must have felt 
some special distress in the realization that his own true 
story could not end like the fiction of Tom ]ones. ("Such a 
cloud of hypochondria .... I wish it may not press upon me 
in my old age.") The sentimental novels were a species of 
hagiography. They presented the rake as the hero of the 
new morality of the good heart. Boswell himself exemplifies 
that morality, but no author ever took less pains to glorify 
his hero than Boswell in his autobiography, less pains to 
make his readers like that hero. 
Boswell and his ] ournal sometimes today do encounter the 
criticism that it is difficult to like Boswell. The question is 
hardly more relevant than a question whether we can like 
Hamlet or Heathcliff. Boswell writes a true story-beyond 
question-and this, as we have observed, is one undoubted 
source of its peculiar power. (In real life no doubt he did 
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care very much whether he was liked. He tried hard to be 
liked.) At the same time, in the detachment of his writing, 
in the subtle ranges and conflicts of feeling which he 
manages, in his firmness of detail and purity of verbal style 
-in his general artistry as a journalist-Boswell projects 
himself as a figure of unique fictive significance. If we know 
what we are about as we read and respond to this extra-
ordinary saga of self-portrayal, we shall hardly stop to 
wonder whether we do like Boswell, whether we ought to 
like him. (The very possibility of puzzlement is a clue to 
the situation.) In part no doubt we will like him. Who 
can fail to like the lover of Margaret Montgomerie, the 
patient correspondent of the neurotic Temple, the friend in 
need of Paoli, the devotee and biographer of Johnson, the 
desperate opponent of the Justice-Clerk, the counsel for the 
defence of the abandoned John Reid? At the same time 
there will doubtless be many respects in which we find it 
very difficult to like him. Why should we not admit this? 
What kind of purity, of whitewash, do we look for in the 
protagonists of our most impressive stories? The correct 
response to Boswell is to value the man through the artist, 
the artist in the man. 
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THE COCKTAIL PARTY (1950) 
... be prepared for the coming of the Stranger, 
Be prepared for him who knows how to ask questions. 
IT IS CLEAR by now that The Cocktail Party 1 is an 
unusual success-at least in America. Eliot has performed the 
considerable feat of getting the Broadway audience to listen 
to a comedy of manners in which the manners are criticized. 
Making due allowance for the difference between criticism 
and sentiment, poetry and prose of a sort, Eliot and Cibber, 
we may say that The Cocktail Party shows the same relation 
to the work of Noel Coward as in 1696 Love's Last Shift 
showed to the work of Etherege or Wycherley or to the 
immediately subsequent Relapse of Vanbrugh. Eliot's play 
has had generous applause from the popular press but is so 
far anomalous among contemporary smart comedies as to 
have aroused at the same time, in some more fastidious 
organs, distinct expressions of unhappiness-the strident dis-
approval of the Partisan Review, the tolerant dismay of the 
New Yorker and reluctant reservations of the Nation, the 
courteous anguish of the New York Times. 2 Mr. Brooks 
Atkinson, who might be allowed to represent this select 
chorus of voices, after the fair-minded preliminaries speaks 
with the accent of the professional who knows his drama 
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and knows what it is not-missing the "fiery imagery" of 
Robinson Jeffers and satisfied that Eliot's "verse in this play 
derives from a sanctimonious attitude toward life rather 
than from the superior spiritual vitality of a poet." 
The play has certain faults, the most startling of which 
seems to me <o occur at the pinnacle, in Act III, where one 
part of the double outcome, that of martyrdom, aiming at 
something the opposite of tame, shoots both too far above 
the comic and too far wide of it, into the sensationally 
gruesome. The fate of Celia as reported by the nuntius 
Alex, returning from the antipodes to horrify and edify his 
cocktail circle with the news, insists far too explicitly on the 
meaning of her name-a girl indeed "enskied and sainted." 
"We found that the natives .... Had erected a sort of shrine 
for Celia Where they brought offerings of fruit and flowers." 
And I can see no excuse for the manner of her death (even 
though, as I understand, Eliot has considerably softened this 
since his rehearsal draft). "It would seem that she must have 
been crucified Very near an ant-hill." The failure of tact is 
only underscored by an elaborate introductory patter about 
monkeys, heathens, and Christian natives. It is no doubt 
proper to elicit and to answer the complaint of the Philistine: 
"Just for a handful of plague-stricken natives Who would 
have died anyway." But something more muted, nearly 
accidental, unheroic, was surely required. It could have been 
disagreeable enough. A later passage in the same scene 
seems closer: 
hunger, damp, exposure, 
Bowel trouble, and the fear of lions. 
I think of the grim fantasy of immurement in the Amazonian 
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jungle which ends Waugh's Handful of Dust, or a death in 
Conrad's Heart of Darkness:" . .. some man-I was told the 
chief's son- ... made a tentative jab with a spear at the 
white man-and of course it went quite easy between the 
shoulder-blades." The most successful part of Act III is the 
other half of the double outcome, the reward of mediocre 
acceptance. The homely, patched-up felicity of the Cham-
berlaynes, glimpsed at the moderately more than average 
moment as they prepare for the second party, is beyond 
cavil convincing and just dramatic enough to be interesting. 
The problem of Act III was expository, how to level off. 
The climaxes of decision had been reached in Act II in 
Harcourt-Reilly's consulting room. 
But the general objection raised by the naturalistic left 
is that the play is emotionally thin and cold, substantively 
skeletal and brittle, and the most special and well defined 
form which this objection has taken runs to the effect that 
the alternatives discovered in the priest-psychiatrist's con-
fessional-either sanctity or resignation-exclude the joyful 
"fullness of natural life," or at least that this exclusion is 
implicit in the fact that so "boring and empty" a couple as 
the Chamberlaynes are allowed to represent "the ultimate 
possibilities of human love." Here I believe one has to go 
to the trouble of pointing out the donnees upon which, after 
all, the alternatives of the action are based, of distinguishing 
between literal statement and intensive symbolic dimensions, 
of defending Eliot for having been true to the materials 
with which he is working. -The play makes no implications 
whatever, so far as I can see, about the limits of natural love 
(though it may intimate that these will be the fuller for 
being opened by something supernatural) . 
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Two people who know that they do not understand each other, 
Breeding children whom they do not understand 
And who will never understand them. 
No doubt the psychiatrist is talking of something which in 
its crude concreteness he believes to be fairly common, and 
no doubt we are asked to recognize something more elusive, 
a kind of loneliness which is ultimate and universal-though 
naturalists may be shy of mentioning it. But none of this 
is to make Edward and Lavinia paragons. "It is a good life," 
says the psychiatrist. The play opens with a modern mess, 
a set of people, an atmosphere, and a diseased situation 
which has grown, not surprisingly, out of this atmosphere. 
The psychiatrist too is a typical figure. The reunion of 
Edward and Lavinia under his auspices is not the marriage 
of Romeo and Juliet by Friar Laurence. We have to go out 
of our way to miss or disallow in Eliot's play a kind of 
allusion or general reference to what is traditionally done in 
the comedy of manners, a comedy, that is, dealing with the 
corrupt mores of the fashionable set. And at this level, the 
intrigue is managed perfectly. The last shift of Edward and 
Lavinia, even if it works a little better than they deserve, is 
yet but a shift and produces the kind of happiness which is 
the most that may be expected from the initial situation. 
(The choice of sanctity made by Celia, the translation of 
her limitless desire, is also plausible enough and has been 
determined in part through the same situation. If on the 
one hand she has "really had a vision," on the other her 
affair with Edward has been an unlucky effort to realize it. 
"I found ... that we had merely made use of each other." 
It is not her choice, only the sensationalism of the outcome, 
at which, as I have argued, one may boggle.) The comedy 
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of the Chamberlaynes must be taken in the extensive dimen-
sion, as what the play is talking about, immediately and 
literally. If we wish to find universal meanings, about the 
fullness of life, they are there too, plainly enough, but they 
relate only incidentally to the maximum possibilities of 
married love. The cocktail world, with its peculiar problems 
relating to marriage or to dedication, is one of numerous 
worlds, among which love and marriage themselves are but 
others, the career of the Great Gatsby another. The cosmos 
is a microcosm. We may be altogether out of it and yet 
meditate the difference between expansive self-realization 
and the humility of acceptance. 
When you find, Mr. Chamberlayne, 
The best of a bad job is all any of us makes of it-
Except of course, the saints .... 
you will forget this phrase, 
And in forgetting it will alter the condition. 
At this point I leave consideration of difficulties to say 
something in general praise of the language and rhythms of 
the play. "Heightened" and "perfected conversation," an-
other reviewer has called it, "a new birth of eloquence in the 
theatre."3 
The word neither diffident nor ostentatious, ... 
The common word exact without vulgarity, 
The formal word precise but not pedantic. 
Nobody has described this any better than Eliot himself. It 
is straight-shooting language, scrupulously right, making 
possible the little joke tied in at the end of the phrase as if 
without effort: 
. 188. 
Eliot's Comedy 
Finding your life becoming cosier and cosier, 
Without the consistent critic, the patient misunderstander. 
Or the sinister incompleteness: 
Mr. Peter Quilpe 
Was a frequent guest. 
Or the flattened gnomic summation (far echo of "Prufrock," 
"Gerontion," or The Waste Land): 
Each way means loneliness-and communion. 
Both ways avoid the final desolation 
Of solitude in the phantasmal world 
Of imagination, shuffiing memories and desires. 
Shall we say that Eliot, in his determination to put poetic 
drama honestly within reach of an audience, has uttered a 
thinner and plainer version of the themes and images of his 
major and more densely implicated poems? To say so need 
not, I believe, be a disparagement. A play is something 
which an audience is to follow from sentence to sentence 
and understand in the main-though certain auras of sig-
nificance may be missed. Even these auras will be thinner 
than the suffused coloration of "Gerontion" or a meditation 
in Four Quartets. In a comedy of manners they will be 
scarcely so smoky or lurid as in the choruses of Family 
Reunion. There are poetic virtues of chasteness, restraint, 
terseness, precision. These are the presiding virtues of 
Eliot's comedy. 
Concerning the verse, Eliot has explained that in the less 
intense parts "the purpose . . . should be to operate upon 
the auditor unconsciously so that he shall think and feel in 
the rhythms imposed by the poet, without being aware 
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of what these rhythms are doing." But this may be under-
statement. I find the meter, or at least the rhythm, a very 
marked thing throughout. At times, as in the first exchange 
between Edward and Harcourt-Reilly, it seems to have 
got the better of the actors, inducing a kind of antiphonal 
barking or rasping. The most remarkable thing about Eliot's 
meters has always been their heavy reliance on the logic, 
the word repeated and modulated (the traductio, the "turn"), 
the phrase paralleled and contrasted, the analogies of over-
flow from line to line-against these the prosody in the sense 
of syllables or stresses often seeming at a sunken level. Some 
of the most rhythmically original passages of The Waste 
Land might be described in this way-"After the torch-
light red on sweaty faces After the frosty silence in the 
gardens .... " Sweeney Agonistes showed the method at its 
sharpest and jazziest clip. "I don't care. You don't care! 
... Well some men don't and some men do Some men don't 
and you know who." And so in The Cocktail Party: 
It's such a nice party, I hate to leave it. 
It's such a nice party, I'd like to repeat it. 
I don't know. 
You don't know! And what's his name? 
Brassy, chattery rhythms like these from Julia, or, in contrast, 
more intricate motions of strategy. 
If another woman, 
She might decide to be forgiving 
And gain an advantage. If there's no other woman 
And no other man, then the reason may be deeper 
And you've ground for hope that she won't come back at all. 
If another man, then you'd want to remarry .... 
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EDWARD 
But I want my wife back. 
The lacing and variation of parallels develops the psychi-
atrist's insidious intent, hypnotically-to the point where 
Edward's bark is elicited. I suppose a very distinct set of 
rhythms might be analyzed for each of the important 
characters. One other, for instance, surely characteristic of 
Celia, might be termed the "And if this" climax of sweet, 
austere discountenance, toward Edward or toward herself. 
And if this is reality, it is very like a dream. 
And if that is the sort of person you are-
Well, you had better have her. 
And if that is all meaningless, I want to be cured 
Of a craving for something I cannot find .... 
Or the expression may appear split. 
Because, if there isn't, then there's something wrong, ... 
With the world itself-and that's much more frightening. 
This in a manner epitomizes the rhythm of Celia's experience 
and utterance. 
But to resume our more tentative inquiry into the larger 
features of the play: Certain likely sources of irritation may 
be ranked under the opposite heads of too great and too little 
verisimilitude. But these may have an inverse importance 
for the reader of the text and the audience at the play. The 
opening cocktail chatter-a story about tigers and there were 
no tigers, Lady Klootz at a wedding but "I wasn't at her 
wedding" -strikes me as rather painful realism, a society 
version of what Dryden would have called "mechanic 
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humour," or what today might be charged with the fallacy 
of "imitative form," the imitation of inanity becoming itself 
inane. On the stage, however, it works very well. The pas-
sage has an important exordia! function as the effort of four 
guests led by a talkative old harridan to keep things going 
through a mysteriously awkward emptiness-on one flank the 
savage red expression of the host without his wife and on the 
other the deadpan of the Unidentified Guest. It is a very fine 
dramatic conception. But later in the same scene, when the 
chatterers have departed and Edward turns to face the 
residual stranger, values are reversed. Along with a mildly 
amusing triple pattern of mixing gin and water, we have 
the first fine speeches of Harcourt-Reilly, the poetic interest 
of which can scarcely be in doubt but which as dramatically 
realized may strain our suspension of disbelief somewhat 
beyond the voluntary. "Now for a few questions. How long 
married?" It is difficult not to be sidetracked in the reflection 
that a professional psychiatrist (or a mysterious stranger) 
would not go at it like this in a man's drawing room, and 
that if he did he would most likely be kicked out. Later 
again in the same scene, when through the return of Peter 
seeking advice in his baffiement about Celia, Edward himself 
is drawn into the role of confessor, we may think he has 
picked up a great deal from his brief encounter with the 
psychiatrist. "As the fever cooled You would have found 
that she was another woman. . . ." There is a sort of 
ventriloquism here which the unfriendly will attribute to 
Eliot himself. 
Several other uncertainties, and these of a kind more 
structural for the whole play, ought to be mentioned. How 
could so superior a girl as Celia ever fall for a mutt like 
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Edward? Or, if we like, an alternative question (the two 
may not be simultaneously permissible) : What is there about 
Celia that prepares us for the prophecy "She will go far"? 
Again, would Edward and Lavinia accept the blunt advice 
given by Harcourt-Reilly in the consulting room, or wouldn't 
they be precipitated into the nervous breakdowns on the 
verge of which they are already teetering? And, most 
obviously: How can two such fatuous cocktail characters as 
Julia and Alex be translated between the first and second 
acts into Guardian Angels?4 I believe these questions do 
represent a real weakness in the play, a certain thinness of 
flesh and blood, though to some extent the reason for them 
is the same as that always behind improbabilities of the 
poetic drama-the demands of drama and poetry. How 
could Othello be so brutally gullible? Grant a certain 
implausibility, a veto on the questioning faculty, and see 
what happens. Nevertheless, the last of these questions, that 
relating to Julia and Alex, is one which I am particularly 
interested to look at, for it relates in a special way to the 
play's most internal, characteristic, and ticklish arrange-
ments, the interaction of the plain meaning, the comedy and 
psychology of manners, with the more or less hidden and 
hinted meanings of morals and theology. Literal, moral, and 
anagogical, a medievalist might say, are the three levels of 
the play. It may be a nice critical task to say how well they 
are erected upon one another and how well consolidated. 
But one of the troubles for the critics may have been that 
the name of Eliot has made them look for something esoteric 
in places where the literal mechanics of the plot are mainly 
to be noted. At any rate there are places where it seems 
necessary to insist on the latter. Julia and Alex, for instance, 
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turn out to be Guardians not just because this is needed for 
the symbolic progression, but also for the very solid reason 
that it is a main part of the intrigue. They are Guardians 
from the start, from the first strained moments of the cock-
tail party, where they are present because Edward has been 
unable to head them off (presumably, that is, because their 
telephones would not answer). They have brought with 
them two of the principals to Edward's uncomfortable 
quadrangle, Celia and Peter Quilpe-and, of course, they 
are connivers in the presence of the unidentified psychiatrist. 
A concerted plan (or perhaps at some points only a com-
plication) is in progress and continues steadily that evening 
in their several visits to the flat on the excuse of searching 
for umbrella or spectacles or of feeding Edward, and the 
next day as they use the fiction of telegrams to marshall 
Peter and Celia to the flat at the moment of Lavinia's return. 
This continues through Act II in the carefully timed arrivals 
of Edward, Lavinia, and Celia at the psychiatrist's office 
and the auxiliary hovering activities of Julia and Alex. The 
preliminary conference between Alex and Harcourt-Reilly 
is in the best tradition of comic plot-the informative, unctu-
ous, self-gratulatory exchange between the master plotter 
and his confederate (Lady Sneerwell and Snake). 
One might of course put the question about Julia and Alex 
in this way: If they were not really silly, how could they act 
so silly, and for that matter, are they not acting a part which 
all their friends accept as normal? Julia alludes to this 
duplicity in the first scene, with an avowal rather like Prince 
Hal's while rioting with Falstaff. 
I know you think I'm a silly old woman 
But I'm really very serious . 
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This will hardly do by any grim standard of plausibility. 
But Julia and Alex no doubt deserve some indulgence as 
descendants in the honorable line of good-hearted irregulars 
-Falstaff, for instance, Tony Lumpkin, Charles Surface, Mrs. 
Erlynne, and the Devil's Disciple. 
But it will be appropriate to insist somewhat further on 
the difficulty of drawing a clean contour for the plot of this 
play, apart from the symbolism, or of separating the comic 
and psychiatric from the penumbra of the supernatural-the 
Jungian from the actually religious. Edward's drab invention 
of a sick aunt in Essex (a topic about which, incidentally, 
he is ribbed too often and too late) might be taken as a lame 
prefiguration, coming from the prosy side, of more pregnant 
uncertainties. Perhaps it is part of Eliot's triumph that he 
has been able to disguise or soften the lines of his plot to 
the degree that the comedy may be looked on seriously. Or 
perhaps this goes too far. One might like to inquire, for 
instance, more precisely into the relation of Alex and Julia 
to Harcourt-Reilly. What kind of establishment does he 
run?-with cars at the patient's door at nine, and his hotel 
(called sanatorium by the nai've) and his real sanatorium, a 
house of religious retreat or what? I suspect that Mr. Yvor 
Winters will have a field day here in the discovery of 
"pseudo-references." Toward the end of Act II, Julia and 
Harcourt-Reilly speak of Celia in terms which slip over, 
though by ever so little, from the spiritual to the neo-Platonic 
or mysterious. "You and I don't know the process by which 
the human is Transhumanized. . . . Will she be frightened 
by the first appearance of projected spirits?" This is a little 
in the manner of the glosses to The Ancient Mariner, from 
Iamblichus, De Mysteriis. Harcourt-Reilly on first meeting 
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Celia saw behind her chair the image of a Celia "whose face 
showed the astonishment Of the first five minutes after a 
violent death." Here Shelley has been invoked to some 
effect: The magus Zoroaster . ... Met his own tmage walking 
in the garden. ("If this strains your credulity, Mrs. Chamber-
layne, I ask you only to entertain the suggestion That a 
sudden intuition, in certain minds, May tend to express 
itself at once in a picture.") Perhaps the most successful of 
these passages, refraining from the mysterious but standing 
on choral and ritual tiptoe, is that which closes Act II in 
the consulting room, the two Guardians and the psychiatrist 
drinking their "libation" and reciting the formulas for 
hearth, roof, and bed, and for the journey. This sequence 
is neatly returned to comedy by the recollection of Peter 
Quilpe, "one for whom the words cannot be spoken." 
"Others," says Alex, "perhaps, will speak them. You know, 
I have connections-even in California." 
There are several allusions to Harcourt-Reilly as the 
"Devil." "I was rather afraid of him," says Celia. "He has 
some sort of power." "If it's a machine," says Lavinia, 
"someone else is running it. But who? Somebody is always 
interfering. . . . I don't feel free." One may sense here a 
kind of presidency familiar in a wide range of admired 
fables, a fairy-tale capacity and absoluteness like that of 
Due Theseus, or Duke Vincentio, or Sherlock Holmes, or 
The Man Who Was Thursday. This is something which 
many stories cannot get along without, and which we ought 
to move cautiously in trying to discredit. Harcourt-Reilly is 
the more interesting too for the hints that after all it is not 
he who is ultimate in his machine, but the silly and dreadful 
(or at moments charming) old person Julia. Julia "is always 
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right," says someone in Act I. But it is a surprising juncture 
in Act II when Harcourt-Reilly, fatigued from his double 
triumph, asks Julia for reassurance, and she says: "Henry, 
you simply do not understand innocence." 
... when I say to one like her, 
'Work out your salvation with diligence,' I do not understand 
What I myself am saying. 
JULIA 
You must accept your limitations. 
What I take to be the most elaborate figuration of this partly 
occult motif occurs in Act I on Julia's return in search of her 
spectacles, when the Unidentified Guest wheels suddenly 
from the mantel and with monocle fixed in his eye sings 
tipsily the song of One Eyed Reilly. 
As I was drinkin' gin and water, 
And me bein' the One Eyed Reilly, 
Who came in but the landlord's daughter 
And she took my heart entirely. 
At this stage of the game they are not admitting their 
acquaintance, and the apparent significance of the business 
is that the stranger is having a little fun and disguising his 
serious purpose from a fatuous and inquisitive old woman. 
But his cue for the one-eyed foolery is her preceding line 
about the lost spectacles (in her purse, incidentally, all the 
while): "''d know them, because one lens is missing." 
Teiresias, I shall venture, has suffered a split, into the male 
half and the female, each blind in one eye, but seeing mighty 
well in concert. (We may read this if we like as a joke, a 
flourish, an Eliot signature.) The same order of symbolism, 
. 197. 
Hateful Contraries 
though less intricate and amusing, appears in the indigestible 
supper cooked up by Alex-in this scene mainly a nuisance, 
and apparently an imbecile. It appears later in the cinematic 
world of "images" where Peter Quilpe has found the metier 
which he understands. 
The Cocktail Party is a play which for complete realiza-
tion requires a friendliness toward certain semiallegorical 
ways of statement. And it will be better not to look to it for 
the kind of real-seeming fullness which we may have been 
taught to equate with poetic drama-because poetic drama 
has most often been tragedy. Comedy we know has always 
been privileged to present the flat or even the cliche char-
acter. And one other kind of drama has too-the morality. 
(Much will depend on whether, like ~Jr. Brooks Atkinson, 
we affix the term "morality" as a conclusive stigma, or, more 
circumspectly, employ it as the name of an interesting if 
remote tradition of our drama.) Eliot's play is perhaps the 
best morality play in English since Everyman, and the only 
comical-morality. The late Victorian problem comedy, one 
may add in passing, is a kind of middle plane hinted by 
analogy, and in one or two passages having the tables 
smartly turned upon it. 
CELIA 
Well, my bringing up was pretty conventional-
! had always been taught to disbelieve in sin. 
The conversation between Harcourt-Reilly and his clients 
in Act II, especially that with Edward, may be said to 
establish a comic mode of its own, the high psychiatric. 
". . . letting you talk as long as you please, And taking note 
of what you do not say." And this too may be a turning of 
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the tables, in that Harcourt-Reilly's advice to his patients, 
though not perhaps orthodox psychiatry, may yet be very 
good advice. 
Eliot has before this, in his Murder in the Cathedral, suc-
cessfully employed the conventions of the morality, aligned 
with tragedy and the chorus. In his Family Reunion he has 
joined tragic choral poetry and a contemporary setting 
("Argos and England"), and in pursuit of an issue very 
similar to that of The Cocktail Party. The choice of Celia 
is essentially the same as that of the martyr Becket in Murder 
in the Cathedral and the same as that of Harry Lord Mon-
chensey, the expiator of ancestral guilt, in Family Reunion. 
A quotation from the hectic closing scene of the latter play 
may make this sufficiently clear. 
I have not yet had the precise direction. 
Where does one go from a world of insanity? 
Somewhere on the other side of despair. 
To the worship in the desert, the thirst and deprivation, 
A stony sanctuary and a primitive altar .... 
A care over the lives of humble people, 
The lesson of ignorance, of incurable diseases .... 
I must follow the bright angels. 
The difference between The Cocktail Party and both the 
earlier plays lies in the treatment of the alternative worldly 
choice. In Murder in the Cathedral this is a temptation the 
rejection of which costs intense spiritual effort but is clearly 
indicated. In Family Reunion it is curtly assigned to the 
dolt. "John shall be the master. ... What would destroy 
me will be life for John." But in The Cocktail Party Eliot 
has had the wholesome inspiration of exploring the moral 
and comic possibilities of the humbler choice. Had he kept 
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the complementary choice of sanctity somehow closer to the 
same key, he would have written on the whole a better play. 
But in any case The Cocktail Party is both a more con-
temporary and a more cohesive play than either of the 
others, rising in its most assured moments moderately and 
decorously from the comedy of manners to the levels of 
morality and theology. 
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FROM PLOT TO SYMBOL 
No CRITIC of Eliot, so far as I am aware, has yet 
ventured any comment upon the many passages in Tenny-
son's Maud which sound like antecedents to the poetry of 
Eliot and especially to Prufrock. The resemblances are 
partly disguised by the rollicking meters and the melo-
dramatic plot in which Tennyson's themes and images are 
carried. Yet the main features of Tennyson's lyric mono-
drama, its themes of hesitation, removal, and frustration, its 
brooding melancholy, and its technique of pathological solil-
oquy, constitute a generally sustaining frame of reference, 
and if one begins to read with an alerted ear, the reward 
may be astonishing. 
The images in Maud which I find most suggestive of Eliot 
fall into three main groups: ( 1) certain garden images of 
innocence and ecstasy occurring apropos of the protagonist's 
halcyon moments as a hopeful and then accepted lover; ( 2) 
certain confused images of a death in life, of a dream 
world, and of yet another realm of death, running through 
the immediately succeeding darker phase of the action; ( 3) 
miscellaneous images of weariness, suspicion, and fear oc-
curring at various points. 
A voice by the cedar tree, 
In the meadow under the Hall! 
(I, V, 1) 
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Birds in the high Hall-garden 
When twilight was falling, 
Maud, Maud, Maud, Maud, 
They were crying and calling 
(I, xii, 1) 
The birds, the voice, the tree, and the meadow, the vague 
and economically suggestive use of the prepositions by, in, 
under, convey an intimation of mysterious ecstasy much like 
that which may be heard in several passages of Eliot's poetry 
-in The Hollow Men, in Marina, in Burnt Norton. 
There, is a tree swinging 
And voices are 
In the wind's singing ... 
And the bird called, in response to 
The unheard music hidden in the shrubbery. 
Both in Maud and in Ash Wednesday, in Burnt Norton, and 
in The Family Reunion/ as well as in other poems of Eliot, 
these garden images are centered in that of the rose.2 In 
Maud the "rose-garden" theme is insistently reiterated during 
the happier phase of the action, up to the moment when 
Maud steals out from the dance to the lovers' ill-fated 
meeting. 
For I know her own rose-garden, 
And I mean to linger in it 
Till the dancing will be over. (I, xx, 4) 
Down the passage which we did not take 
Towards the door we never opened 
Into the rose-garden. 
In the next phase of Tennyson's story, the protagonist, 
separated from Maud by his own violent deed in the duel 
. 202. 
Prufrock and Maud 
with her brother and then by her death (sombre events 
which have been presaged in the theme of ancestral feud 
and in his own morbid broodings), endu:J;es the torment of a 
half-dreaming hallucinatory state and then a madness of 
death in life. 
In a wakeful doze I sorrow 
For the hand, the lips, the eyes .... (II, iv, 5) 
She comes from another stiller world of the dead. 
(II, v, 7) 
To have look' d, tho' but in a dream, upon eyes so fair. 
(III, vi, 1) 
Eyes I shall not see unless 
At the door of death' s other kingdom 
Eyes I dare not meet in dreams 
In death's dream kingdom 
These do not appear: 
Lips that would kiss. 3 
The protagonist in Maud wakes, to a sullen roll of "thunder," 
as "a tumult shakes the city." In the "shuddering dawn," he 
beholds by the curtains of his bed, the cold, white "phantom" 
of his love, 
Without knowledge, without pity .... (II, iv, 7) 
After such knowledge, what forgiveness? 
Get thee ,hence, nor come again, 
Mix not memory with doubt. (II, iv, 8) 
... mixing Memory and desire. 
With these images and themes-the frustrated and mad-
dened lover, the ghastly city, the living death and dreamlike 
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commerce with a spectral figure-we arrive at the areas of 
meaning where Maud most closely anticipates Prufrock. 
Early in his monologue the protagonist of Maud shows the 
symptoms of fatigue, uncertainty, worry about his future, 
and dream-living which are so conspicuous in Prufrock. 
Ah, what shall I be at fifty 
Should Nature keep me alive, 
If I find the world so bitter 
When I am but twenty-five? (I, vi, 5) 
Did I hear it half in a doze 
Long since, I know not where? 
Did I dream it an hour ago, 
When asleep in this arm-chair? (I, vii, 1) 
I grow old ... I grow old ... 
I shall wear the bottoms of my trousers rolled. 
Till human voices wake us, and we drown. 
Even at the peak of the protagonist's success and joy, the 
notion of a death in life appears. 
I have climb'd nearer out of lonely Hell. 
(I, xviii, 8) 
giammai di questa fonda 
Non torno vivo alcun. 
In the phases of the action which follow, during the 
protagonist's exile and madness, images of the infernal are 
blended with those of the ghastly city-a Baudelairean four-
millante cite pleine de reves-in a way that anticipates both 
Prufrock and Part I of The Waste Land. The protagonist 
lies "Dead, long dead ... 4 Only a yard beneath the street," 
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With never an end to the stream of passing feet 
Ever about me the dead men go 
For it is but a world of the dead. (II, v, 1, 3) 
And just before this, before madness sets in: 
( 0 0 0 decor sembable a l' ame de r acteur, 
Un brouillard sale et jaune ... ) 
... the yellow vapours choke 
The great city sounding wide; 
The day comes, a dull red ball 
Wrapt in drifts of lurid smoke 
Of the misty river-tide. (II, iv, 9) 
The yellow fog that rubs its back upon the window panes 
... the yellow smoke that glides along the street ... 
Under the brown fog of a winter dawn, 
A crowd flowed over London Bridge, so many, 
I had not thought death had undone so many. 
As Tennyson's protagonist moves through his nightmare (in 
the phase just before his madness) he is afflicted with 
emotions more violent than those of Prufrock, but involving 
nevertheless much the same accents of dislike, misgiving, 
and suspicion. 
Should I fear to greet my friend 
Or to say, 'Forgive the wrong'? (II, iv, 12) 
And I loathe the square and streets, 
And the faces that one meets ... (II, iv, 13) 
Should I . .. 
Have the strength to force the moment to its crisis? 
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"Do I dare?" and, "Do I dare?" 
There will be time, there will be time 
To prepare a face to meet the faces that you meet. 
The couplet which we have last quoted from Maud (prob-
ably the most precise resemblance to Prufrock) is part of the 
germinal lyric (II, iv) which Tennyson published first in 
1837 in The Tribute. In 1853 (two years before the nearly 
coincidental publication of Maud and of the first of the 
Fleurs du Mal) Arthur Hugh Clough, anonymously review-
ing several volumes of verse, among them the Glasgow 
"mechanic" Alexander Smith's spasmodic Life Drama and 
Arnold's Strayed Reveler and Empedocles, quoted Tenny-
son's lines (without attribution) in a passage so richly 
prophetic of the Eliotic decor that it may perhaps be quoted 
here with relevance. 
There is a charm ... in finding ... continual images drawn from 
the busy seats of industry; it seems to satisfy a want that we have 
long been conscious of, when we see the black streams that welter 
out of factories, the dreary lengths of urban and suburban 
dustiness, 
the squares and streets 
And the faces that one meets, 
irradiated with a gleam of divine purity ... the true and lawful 
haunts of the poetic powers . . . [are] if anywhere, in the blank 
and desolate streets, and upon the solitary bridges of the midnight 
city, where Guilt is and wild Temptation, and the dire Compul-
sion of what has once been done- ... there walks the discrowned 
Apollo, with unstrung lyre. 5 
If one cares to bolster the parallel between Tennyson and 
Eliot by an appeal to external records of intention, the 
materials lie ready enough to hand, both on the side of 
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Tennyson and on that of Eliot. One would point out, I 
suppose, that Maud carries the subtitle A Monodrama, and 
that Tennyson himself observed that the poem is "a little 
Hamlet." And that he further observed that "the peculiarity 
of this poem is that different phases of passion in one person 
take the place of different characters." (Let us go then, you 
and I ... ) One would point out, with even more assurance, 
that Eliot has given several restrained testimonials of hom-
age to Tennyson, and even of admiration for parts of Maud. 
In an essay of 1942 he has written: 
A third long poem which was very much admired is 'Maud': 
a poem, I think, of forced and unreal violence, but containing 
two or three great lyrical passages which will last as long as 
the language. 6 
In his longer essay on Tennyson, a version of which he used 
as Introduction to his edition of Tennyson in 1936, Eliot 
had actually named the two or three lyrics in Maud which 
he so much admires. Two of these are lyrics of ecstatic 
lover's yearning: "0 let the solid ground Not fail beneath 
my feet Before my life has found ... " (I, xi, 1), and "Go 
not, happy day ... Till the maiden yields" (I, xvii). A third 
is that garden song which we have already quoted: "Birds in 
the high Hall-garden When twilight was falling ... " 
Let us say, however, that the discussion should not dwell 
on such betrayals,"' or on whatever inferences about Eliot's 
" I myself should be quite unwilling, for instance, to make Tennyson the 
final interpreter of his own poem. The account which appears in the 
Memoir and the annotations seems to me off center in at least three respects, 
the emphasis on "the holy power of Love," that on the "blighting influence" 
of a commercial age, and the idea that the poem demonstrates any final 
redemption through "unselfishness." The main force in the poem is the 
protagonist's riot of unhealthy emotion. The jingo theme which is planted 
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sources of inspiration might be wrung from them. It will 
better serve both critical and historical purposes if we 
inquire whether there are any ways in which these parallels 
between Tennyson and Eliot (as they are observable in the 
poems themselves) can actually instruct our reading of the 
later poet. Is it possible or profitable to think of Tennyson's 
Maud as a part of the complicated perspective of allusion to 
which we have already learned to look, the gallery of echoing 
panels against which we have already learned to throw our 
voices, in the reading of a poem by Eliot? It appears to me 
that a case may be made at least with respect to Prufrock. 
We have all along recognized Hamlet, Lazarus, John the 
Baptist, and Marvell's eager lover as Prufrockian analogues. 
A few years ago Professor Pope added the tortured figure of 
Raskolnikov with his impotence, indecision, and solitude, 
his faltering and revulsion as he climbs the stairs of the 
police office toward the confession of his murder. "He felt as 
though the fateful moment was still far off, as though he 
had plenty of time left for consideration."7 (Time to turn 
back and descend the stairs ... ) Perhaps the example that 
comes closest to providing a model for the present argument 
is Prufrock's tired allusion to Marvell's pursuit of the "Coy 
Mistress." "Let us roll all our strength and all Our sweetness 
up into one ball." 
Would it have been worth while . . . 
To have squeezed the universe into a ball . 
in several early parts of the poem and provides the resolution is quite 
gratuitous. Tennyson's partial misreading of his own poem corresponds to 
the imbalance which appears in the emotions of the poem itself. His 
original title Maud or the Madness was a better reading . 
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If it is relevant here that we think about Marvell, perhaps 
too, when we read Prufrock' s reflections upon the yellow 
fog, the streets, and "the faces that you meet," there may be 
a gleam of relevance in our remembering the sufferings of 
Tennyson's protagonist along "the squares and streets," 
through the same yellow fog and amid "the faces that one 
meets." The contrast between Prufrock and Marvell is one 
between slumbrous indecision and highly purposive action. 
The contrast between Prufrock and Maud is one between 
that same indecision (a state of delicate introspection) and 
an action which erupts momentarily and disastrously out of 
a background of clouded and stormy brooding. Tennyson's 
Maud and to some extent the very similar Locksley Hall are 
poems of melancholy introversion. The heroes, like so many 
of Browning's soliloquizers and like Arnold's Empedocles, # 
are self-dramatizers. Yet the melancholy of the hero in 
Maud is so flamboyantly expressive as to seem almost en-
tirely innocent of self-appraisal. It is clearly without any 
saving grace of irony. It is what the school of scribblers 
with whom Tennyson was temporarily in rapport deliber-
ately aimed at being-"spasmodic." Marvell gives us the 
erotica-metaphysical antecedent to the Prufrockian love 
song; Tennyson, the "spasmodic." The cultural moment 
represented in Prufrock is one of decline-of strenuous emo-
tion (we may venture to call it "spasm") fatigued, relaxed, 
retrospective. 
"A set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall 
be the formula of that particular emotion," writes Eliot in 
" "The dialogue of the mind with itself has commenced; modern problems 
have presented themselves; we hear already the doubts, we witness the dis-
couragement, of Hamlet and of Faust" (Arnold, Preface to Poems, 1853) . 
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his essay on Hamlet. But in that essay he makes it far from 
clear in fact whether the "objective correlative" of which he 
is speaking has to be a set of events, like murder or incest, 
which are motives for emotion, or whether that correlative 
may not be just a set of images and "musical" intimations, 
the verbal expression of an emotion for which the motive 
may be very obscure. A compromise between these alterna-
tives is what appears in Tennyson's "little Hamlet," a poem 
part plot and part sheer expression of emotion. The second, 
or symbolic, alternative, carried to a subtle excess, is what 
appears in Eliot's poem about a man who is "not Prince 
Hamlet-nor was meant to be." If we make allowance for 
Eliot's now customary (though I think often unfortunate) 
translation of such distinctions into terms of the poet's own 
person, we may see our point about Maud made in the 
negative part of Eliot's critique of that poem. 
I think that the effect of feeble violence, which the poem as a 
whole produces, is the result of a fundamental error of form. A 
poet can express his feelings as fully through a dramatic, as 
through a lyrical form; but Maud is neither one thing nor the 
other ... In Maud, Tennyson neither identifies himself with the 
lover, nor identifies the lover with himself: consequently, the 
real feelings of Tennyson, profound and tumultuous as they are, 
never arrive at expression.8 
To continue the discussion in Eliot's terms, we should have 
to say that in Prufrock the poet has so well identified himself 
with the dramatic figure as to confer on the emotions ex-
pressed the benefit of superior ironic intelligence. This 
makes Prufrock clearly a better instance than Maud of that 
"intellectual narcissism," or "advance of self-consciousness," 
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which Eliot has more recently celebrated in a Progress of 
Poesy from Poe to V alt~ry. 9 
But to attempt a conclusion on a ground apart from such 
speculations: if we are to say that "symbolism" is anything 
which is present in Mallarme and Eliot but is not present, 
or at least not in just the same way, in Tennyson or Shake-
speare, we shall have to say that "symbolism" is a use of 
symbols in a largely "qualitative"10 way, that is, with a logic 
which is independent of the story or set of motives on which, 
until late in the nineteenth century, the logic of symbols 
had ordinarily been very much dependent. The older mode 
of poetry exhibited a literal meaning (the story of Maud 
and her lover) and, coloring or interpreting this, a texture 
of metaphorically invoked symbols or of actual but symbolic 
properties (the "black bat night" and the rose-garden) . 
But the newer mode (perhaps fulfilling a profound tendency 
of the older) exhibits a telescoping of the "vehicle" and 
"tenor" of the metaphoric structure, a fusion of story and 
symbol, so that all of the poem is one symbolic texture, much 
more comprehensive but also much less determinate than 
any structure built on an explicit story.U ("Nommer un 
objet, c' est supprimer les trois quarts de la jouissance ... ") 
In Prufrock it is nearly possible, tantalizingly plausible, to 
suppose a basic story of a little man approaching a tea party 
at which there is a woman to whom he might, except for his 
morbid hesitancy, propose marriage, or to whom he stands, 
rather, in such a casual relation that his very thoughts of 
proposal are almost hallucinatory. But the story frays out 
disconcertingly at the edges into its larger symbolic intima-
tions-of indecision, of sterility, of a manifold and indefin-
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able spiritual malaise. Are these the theme, and is Prufrock 
the symbol? Or is it the other way? The very vagueness of 
the feelings, of the "Idea," with which the hypochondriac 
and schizophrenic soliloquist is afflicted, the reflexiveness, 
the deep internality, the untranslatable "musicality" of the 
whole experience, are of course a counterpart of the formal 
or structural uncertainties. Both in what it says and in how 
it says this (both as expression and as craft) Prufrock is a 
poem which typifies the symbolist and postsymbolist era in 
poetry. As a monodrama of frustration and melancholy 
Maud is one of the many precursors of Prufrock and is a 
minor analogue. At the same time, in its more strongly 
motivated and overtly asserted yet violently exaggerated 
sentiments, Maud offers a typically Victorian contrast both 
to the denser yet less certain symbolic structure and to the 
introspectively shifty meaning of Prufrock . 
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WHAT TO SAY ABOUT A POEM 
WHAT To SAY about a poem. How to say something 
special about a poem, different from what is said by the 
ordinary reader, different quite likely from what would be 
said by the poet himself. Our professional preoccupation as 
teachers, scholars, critics, sometimes conceals from us the 
fact that our kind of interest in poems is after all a very spe-
cial thing-a vocational or shop interest, somewhat strained 
perhaps at moments, even somewhat uncouth. Poems, a 
cultivated person might suppose, are made to be read and 
enjoyed. If I read a poem and enjoy it, why should I then 
proceed to dwell on it as an object about which something 
deliberate and elaborate has to be said-unless in a sur-
reptitious effort to borrow or emulate some of the self-
expression enjoyed by the poet? What a critic or a teacher 
does with a poem is not, certainly, the main thing the poem 
is intended for or fit for. The poem is not the special 
property of these professionals. What they do with it in any 
deeper sense, what their purpose and methods are, we had 
better not try to say too quickly. It is the problem of this 
essay. 
II 
MANY CENTURIES of literary theory have equipped us with 
a large array of now more or less standard topics, handles 
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or labels, for the analysis of poems. We are disciplined to 
speak of the theme (the most abstractive and assertive kind 
of meaning which the poem has), and we wish to distinguish 
this from its realization or more concrete definition in 
various expressive features conceived as denser, more real, 
than theme, and yet translucent with meaning. We speak of 
diction, imagery, metaphor, symbol (above all symbol); we 
sometimes resurrect such older terms as personification, al-
legory, fable. And in our most ambitious, or in our vaguer 
and more portentous, moments, we sum up such terms and 
magnify them into the name of myth. At the same time, we 
speak of the movement of the poem in time, its rhythm, and 
more precisely its meter, its lines, stanzas, rhymes, allitera-
tion and assonance, its echoes, turns, agnominations, and 
puns, and also the more directly imitative qualities of its 
sound, the onomatopoeia, representative meter, and sound 
symbolism, the orchestration, and all that. Sound tangles 
with meaning. A whole poem has a pattern, both of meaning 
and of sound, interacting. It is an act of speech and hence a 
dramatization of a meaning; it is set in a landscape or a 
decor, an atmosphere, a world, a place full of flora and 
fauna, constellations, furniture, accoutrements, all "sym-
bolic" of course. It is spoken by some person, fictitious, or 
fictive, if we rightly conceive him, a persona, a mask, a 
mouthpiece, and hence it has a point of view and a variety 
of emotive endowments, an attitude toward its materials, 
and toward the speaker himself, a self-consciousness, and a 
tone of voice towards you and me the readers or audience. 
And often we too, if we rightly conceive ourselves, are a 
part of the fiction of the poem. Or at least we read only 
over the shoulder of some person or group that is the 
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immediate and fictive audience. The poem is furthermore 
(especially if we are historical critics) a poem of a certain 
type or genre (tragic, comic, epic, elegiac, satiric, or the 
like), and this conception implies certain rules, a tradition, 
a decorum, convention, or expectancy. The genre and its 
aspects are in truth a part of the language of the sophisti-
cated poet, a backdrop for his gestures, a sounding board 
against which he plays off his effects. Often enough, or 
perhaps always, the exquisite poem presents a sort of finely 
blended or dramatically structured opposition of attitudes 
and of the meanings which lie behind them-their objective 
correlatives. Hence the poem has tension (stress and dis-
tress), it lives in conflict; its materials are warped, its diction 
strained, dislocated. Catachresis is only normal. That is to 
say, the poem is metaphoric. The metaphoric quality of the 
meaning turns out to be the inevitable counterpart of the 
mixed feelings. Sometimes this situation is so far developed 
as to merit the name of paradoxical, ambiguous, ironic. The 
poem is subtle, elusive, tough, witty. Always it is an indirect 
stratagem of its finest or deepest meaning. 
I have been running over some of the main terms of our 
inherited grammar of criticism and attempting just a hint at 
some of their relationships-the pattern, if not of the poem, 
at least of criticism itself. I hope it is evident that I am in 
no sense unfriendly to this grammar of criticism or to any 
one of the terms of which it is composed. I am all in favor 
of a grammar of criticism and of our making it as sober, 
tight, accurate, and technically useful as may be possible. 
The grammar, for instance, must be especially firm in the 
areas of syntax and prosody, where the poet himself has, at 
various times in various languages and poetic traditions, 
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been compelled to be, or has allowed himself to be, most 
tight and technical. It is important, for instance, to know 
that Paradise Lost is written in iambic pentameter, and if we 
let ourselves be pushed around at the whim of random 
musical or linguistic theory into finding three, four, or seven 
or eight metrical beats in a Miltonic line of blank verse, we 
are making sad nonsense of literary history and of what this 
particular poet did and said. An analogous difficulty would 
be the enterprise of talking about the poet John Donne 
without the use of any such terms at all as paradox, meta-
physical wit, irony. 
On the other hand, grammar is grammar. And I will 
confess to a decided opinion that the kind of technical and 
quasi-technical matters which I have been naming ought to 
be discussed mainly at the level of generalization-they 
ought to be taken mainly as the preliminaries, the tuning-up 
exercises, the calisthenics of criticism. An essay on the 
theme of metaphor, of symbol, of lyrical dramatics, of irony, 
of meter, of rhyme or pun, is one sort of thing-it is likely to 
be extremely interesting and useful. But an interpretation 
or appreciation of a specific poem by the means mainly of 
an appeal to categories expressed by such terms is another 
sort of thing-this is likely in my opinion to be somewhat 
less interesting. 
The purpose of any poem cannot be simply to be a work 
of art, to be artificial, or to embody devices of art. A critic 
or appreciator of a poem ought scarcely to be conceived as 
a person who has a commitment to go into the poem and 
bring out trophies under any of the grammatical heads, or to 
locate and award credits for such technicalities-for symbols, 
for ironies, for meter. These and similar terms will likely 
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enough be useful in the course of the critic's going into and 
coming out of a given poem. But that is a different thing. 
To draw a crude analogy: It would be an awkward pro-
cedure to introduce one human being to another (one of our 
friends to another) with allusions to commonplaces of his 
anatomy, or labels of his race, creed, or type of neurosis. 
The analogy, as I have said, is crude. Poems are not persons. 
Still there may be a resemblance here sufficient to give us 
ground for reflection. 
I am supposing that the specific thing we are discussing 
is what to say about a given poem-rather than how to make 
a survey of poetry in general in order to write a grammar of 
poetry. Not the most precisely definable and graded features 
of poems in general, the accepted grammar, but something 
in a sense even more generic, the basic activity of our own 
minds by which we examine a given individual poem-this is 
what I now wish to talk for a while about. This activity of 
our own in examining a poem, let me add immediately and 
firmly, does suppose that an object, with definable features, 
is there, independent of us, for us to examine. 
III 
LET us, for one thing, remember, and observe in passing, 
that as teachers, for instance, we are likely to put ourselves 
in a Socratic relation to our pupils-setting them exercises, 
asking them questions. So that our own first question, what 
to say about a poem, is likely enough to assume the shape: 
what to ask about a poem. This I think is a very special, 
intrinsic and difficult aspect of our professional problem. 
If we assume that we do know, roughly, the correct things 
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to say about a poem, how can these be transposed into good 
questions? Sometimes the very attempt will reveal the 
emptiness of what we thought we had to say. This question 
about questions is obviously a matter of art and tact, our 
own personality and that of our pupils, and I believe that 
nobody ought to presume to write any manuals about it. 
But let me stay long enough to suggest that a good question 
about a poem should have at least two qualities-it should 
stand in a middle ground between two kinds of fault. That 
is, in the first place, it should have in mind an answer that 
is better than arbitrary or prescriptive. It should not mean 
in effect merely: "Guess what I am thinking about. Or, tell 
me what I ought to be thinking about." "How does the 
imagery, or the meter, in this poem accomplish its purpose?" 
We may look on such a question, if we like, as setting an 
exercise, a way of eliciting or demanding an overnight 
paper. It is scarcely a part of a Socratic discussion. But 
then in the second place, the question ought not to be so 
good that it betrays or implies its own answer or the terms 
of its answer. "Is the imagery of the dead trees in this poem 
well suited to express the idea of mortality?" The answer 
that is being angled for ought to be more than simply yes or 
no-unless perhaps as a mere preliminary to some further 
and more real question. Sometimes, oddly enough, the two 
faults of question-making turn out to be the same thing-or 
at least some of our more careless questions will invite being 
taken in either of two ways, both empty. Rather accurate 
parodies of the world of discourse we teachers are capable 
of creating appear sometimes in the jokes, gags, or riddles 
(learned I suppose mostly over breakfast radio) which 
become the favorites of our youngest pupils. "What is large 
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and red and eats rocks?" A certain fatl}er tried to be the 
ingenious pupil and answered, "A large poem by William 
Blake." But that of course was wrong. The answer was: 
"A large red rock-eater." A good question should have a 
definite answer-different from the question and yet entailed 
by it. Some questions the teacher will ask mainly for the 
sake of giving himself the occasion for reciting the answer. 
(I do not say that is always bad.) A good question about a 
poem will be less like the example I have already given 
than like this other from the same source-though not 
exactly like this either. "What is the difference between a 
lead pipe and an infatuated Dutchman?" The father, 
though a teacher of poetry, gave up. The answer of course 
is that one is a hollow cylinder, the other is a silly Hollander. 
IV 
AT THE ouTSET what can we be sure of? Mainly that a poem 
says or means something, or ought to mean something (or 
ought to if we as teachers have any business with it-perhaps 
that is the safe minimum). The meaning of the poem may 
be quite obscure and difficult (rough, opaque and resistant 
to first glance), or it may be smooth and easy, perhaps 
deceptively smooth and easy, a nice surface and seemingly 
transparent. For either kind of poem, the simplest, but not 
the least important, kind of observation we can make, the 
simplest question we can ask, is the kind which relates to the 
dictionary. What does a certain word or phrase mean? We 
are lucky enough, I am assuming, to have a poem which 
contains some archaic, technical, or esoteric expression, 
which the class, without previous research, will not under-
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stand. If we are even luckier, the word has another, a 
modern, an easy and plausible meaning, which conceals the 
more difficult meaning. (Ambiguity, double or simultaneous 
meaning, our grammar instructs us, is a normal situation in 
poems.) In any case, we can put our question in two stages: 
"Are there any difficulties or questions with this stanza?" 
"Well, in that case, Miss Proudfit, what does the word braw 
mean?" "What does kirkward mean?" "When six braw gentle-
men kirkward shall carry ye." We are lucky, I say, not 
simply that we have a chance to teach the class something-
to earn our salary in a clear and measurable way. But of 
course because we hereby succeed in turning the attention 
of the class to the poem, to the surface, and then through 
the surface. They may begin to suspect the whole of this 
surface. They may ask a few questions of their own. This 
is success. A person who has been a teacher for a number of 
years masters the problem of knowing his lesson only to 
experience the more difficult problem of trying to remember 
what it is like not to know it. 
v 
THE ANSWERS to the kind of questions we have just noticed 
lie in a clean, dictionary region of meaning. This kind of 
meaning is definitely, definably, and provably there-some of 
our pupils just did not happen to be aware of it. Let us call 
this explicit meaning. I believe it is important to give this 
kind of meaning a name and to keep it fixed. The act of 
expounding this meaning also needs a name. Let us call it 
explanation-explanation of the explicit. 
Obviously, our talking about the poem will not go far at 
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this level-not much farther than our translation of Caesar 
or Virgil in a Latin reading class. 
And so we proceed, or most often we do, to another level 
of commentary on the poem-not necessarily second in order 
for every teacher or for every poem, but at least early and 
fundamental, or in part so. This level of commentary may 
usefully be called description of a poem-not explanation, 
just description. There is no way of describing the weather 
report, except to repeat what it says-describing the weather. 
A poem, on the other hand, not only says something, but is 
something. "A poem," we know, "should not mean but be." 
And so the poem itself especially invites description. 
The meter of a poem, for instance, is of a certain kind, 
with certain kinds of variations and certain relations to the 
syntax; one kind of word rhymes with another kind (Aristotle 
with bottle, in Byron; Adam with madam, in Yeats); some 
conspicuous repetition or refrain in a poem shows partial 
variations ("On the Ecchoing Green .... On the darkening 
Green." "Could frame thy fearful symmetry .... Dare frame 
thy fearful symmetry") . Some unusual word is repeated 
several times in a short poem, or a word appears in some 
curious position. Some image (or "symbol") or cluster of 
images recurs in a tragedy or is played against some other 
image or cluster. Shakespeare's Hamlet, for instance, may 
be described as a dramatic poem which concerns the murder 
of a father and a son's burden of exacting revenge. At the 
same time it is a work which exhibits a remarkable number 
and variety of images relating to the expressive arts and to 
the criticism of the arts-music, poetry, the theater. "That's 
an ill phrase, a vile phrase; 'beautified' is a vile phrase." 
"Speak the speech, I pray you ... trippingly on the tongue." 
. 223. 
Hateful Contraries 
"Govern these ventages with your finger and thumb . . . it 
will discourse most eloquent music." 
Description in the most direct sense moves inside the 
poem, accenting the parts and showing their relations. It 
may also, however, look outside the poem. Internal and 
external are complementary. The external includes all the 
kinds of history in which the poem has its setting. A 
specially important kind of history, for example, is the 
literary tradition itself. The small neat squared-off quatrains 
of Andrew Marvell's Horatian Ode upon Oliver Cromwell 
go in a very exact way with the title and with the main 
statement of the poem. Both in ostensible theme and in 
prosody the poem is a kind of echo of Horatian alcaics in 
honor of Caesar Augustus. The blank verse of Milton's 
Paradise Lost and the couplets of Dryden's translation of the 
Aeneid are both attempts to find an equivalent for, or a 
vehicle of reference to, the hexameters of Greek and Latin 
epic poetry. A poem in William Blake's Songs of Innocence 
is written in simple quatrains, four rising feet or three to a 
line, with perhaps alternate rhymes. These are something 
like the stanzas of a folk ballad, but they are more like 
something else. A more immediate antecedent both of 
Blake's metric and of his vocabulary of childlike piety, 
virtues and vices, hopes and fears, is the popular religious 
poetry of the eighteenth century, the hymns sung at the 
evangelical chapels, written for children by authors like 
Isaac Watts or Christopher Smart. 
VI 
WE CAN INSIST, then, on description of poems, both internal 
and external, as a moment of critical discourse which has its 
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own identity and may be usefully recognized and defined. 
Let us hasten to add, however, that in making the effort to 
define this moment we are mainly concerned with setting 
up a platform for the accurate construction of something 
further. 
The truth is that description of a poetic structure is never 
simply a report on appearances (as it might be, for instance, 
if the object were a painted wooden box). Description of a 
poetic structure is inevitably also an engagement with 
meanings which inhere in that structure. It is a necessary 
first part of the engagement with certain kinds of meaning. 
(Certain kinds-in the long run we shall want to lay some 
emphasis on that qualification. But for the moment the 
point is that there is meaning.) In the critic's discourse 
"pure description" will always have a hard time taking the 
"place of sense." 
Perhaps we shall feel guilty of stretching the meaning of 
the word meaning slightly, but unless we are willing to 
leave many kinds of intimation out of our account of poetry, 
we shall have to say, for example, that Byron meant that 
criticism had fallen on evil days-and that it didn't matter 
very much. "Longinus o'er a bottle, Or, Every Poet his own 
Aristotle." We shall have to say, surely we shall wish to 
say, that Milton in the opening of his Paradise Lost means, 
"This is the language and style of epic, the greatest kind 
of poetry; and this is the one theme that surpasses those of 
the greatest epics of antiquity." ("This" -in a sense-"is an 
epic to end all epics." As it did.) Alexander Pope in his 
Epistle to Augustus means, "This is a poem to the King of 
England which sounds curiously like the Epistle of Horace 
to the Emperor Augustus. Let ·anybody who cares or dares 
notice how curious it sounds." Shakespeare means that the 
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action of Hamlet takes place on a stage, in a world, where 
relations between appearance and reality are manifold and 
some of them oddly warped. 
Through description of poems, then, we move back to 
meaning-though scarcely to the same kind of meaning as 
that with which we were engaged in our initial and simple 
explanation of words. Through description, we arrive at a 
kind of meaning which ought to have its own special name. 
We can safely and usefully, I think, give it the simple name 
of the implicit. What we are doing with it had better too be 
given a special name. Perhaps explication is the best, though 
the harsher word explicitation may seem invited. The realms 
of the explicit and the implicit do not, of course, constitute 
sealed-off separate compartments. Still there will be some 
meanings which we can say are clearly explicit, and some 
which are clearly but implicit. 
I believe that we ought to work to keep ourselves keenly 
aware of two things concerning the nature of implicit 
meaning. One of these is the strongly directive and selective 
power of such meaning-the power of the pattern, of the 
main formally controlling purpose in the well-written poem 
(in terms of Gestalt psychology, the principle of "closure"). 
It is this which is the altogether sufficient and compelling 
reason in many of our decisions about details of meaning 
which we proceed, during our discussion of the poem, to 
make quite explicit-though the dictionary cannot instruct 
us. In the third stanza of Marvell's Garden: "No white or 
red was ever seen/ So am'rous as this lovely green." How 
do we know that the words white and red refer to the 
complexions of the British ladies?-and not, for instance, to 
white and red roses? The word am'rous gives a clue. The 
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whole implicit pattern of meaning in the poem proves it. In 
these lines of this poem the words can mean nothing else. 
In Marvell's Ode on Cromwell: " ... now the Irish are 
asham'd to see themselves in one Year tam'd .... They can 
affirm his Praises best, And have, though overcome, confest 
How good he is, how just, And fit for highest Trust." How 
do we show that these words do not express simply a 
complacent English report, for the year 1650, on the ruthless 
efficiency of Cromwell in Ireland? Only by appealing to the 
delicately managed intimations of the whole poem. The 
cruder reading, which might be unavoidable in some other 
context, will here reveal (in the interest of a supposedly 
stolid historical accuracy) a strange critical indifference to 
the extraordinary finesse of Marvell's poetic achievement. 
"Proud Maisie is in the wood, Walking so early .... 'Tell me, 
thou bonny bird, When shall I marry me?'-'When six braw 
gentlemen Kirkward shall carry ye.'" How do we know, 
how do we prove to our freshman class, that the word proud 
does not mean in the first place-does not necessarily mean 
at all-conceited, unlikable, nasty, unlovable, that Maisie 
does not suffer a fate more or less well deserved (withered 
and grown old as a spinster-an example of poetic justice)? 
Only, I think, by appealing to the whole contour and intent 
of this tiny but exquisitely complete poem. 
"Who makes the bridal bed, 
Birdie, say truly?"-
"The gray-headed sexton 
That delves the grave duly. 
"The glow-worm o'er grave and stone 
Shall light thee steady. 
The owl from the steeple sing, 
'Welcome, proud lady.'" 
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The second thing concerning implicit meaning which I 
think we ought to stress is exactly its character as implicit 
-and this in reaction against certain confused modes of talk 
which sometimes prevail. It was a hard fight for criticism, 
at one time not so long past, to gain recognition of the 
formal and implicit at all as a kind of meaning. But that 
fight being in part won, perhaps a careless habit developed 
of talking about all sorts and levels of meaning as if they 
all were meaning in the same direct and simple way. And 
this has brought anguished bursts of protest from more 
sober and literal scholars. The critic seems all too gracefully 
and readily to move beyond mere explanation (Being a 
sophisticated man, he feels perhaps the need to do relatively 
little of this). He soars or plunges into descriptions of the 
colors and structures of the poem, with immense involve-
ments of meaning, manifold explicitations-yet all perhaps 
in one level tone of confident and precise insistence, which 
scarcely advertises or even admits what is actually going on. 
The trouble with this kind of criticism is that it knows too 
much. Students, who of course know too little, will some-
times render back and magnify this kind of weakness in 
weird parodies, innocent sabotage. "I am overtired / Of the 
great harvest I myself desired," proclaims the man who 
lives on the farm with the orchard, the cellar bin, the drink-
ing trough, and the woodchuck, in Robert Frost's After 
Apple-Picking. "This man," says the student in his homework 
paper, "is tired of life. He wants to go to sleep and die." 
This we mark with a red pencil. Then we set to work, 
somehow, in class, to retrieve the "symbolism." This mono-
drama of a tired applepicker, with the feel of the ladder 
rungs in his instep, bears nearly the same relation to the end 
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of a country fair, the end of a victorious football season, of 
a long vacation, or of a full lifetime, as a doughnut bears to a 
Christmas wreath, a ferris wheel, or the rings of Saturn. 
Nearly the same relation, let us say. A poem is a kind of 
shape, a cunning and precise shape of words and human 
experience, which has something of the indeterminacy of a 
simpler physical shape, round or square, but which at the 
same time invites and justifies a very wide replication or 
reflection of itself in the field of our awareness. 
Till the little ones, weary, 
No more can be merry; 
The sun does descend, 
And our sports have an end. 
Round the laps of their mothers 
Many sisters and brothers, 
Like birds in their nest, 
Are ready for rest, 
And sport no more seen 
On the darkening Green. 
What experience has any member of the class ever had, or 
what experiences can he think of or imagine, that are 
parallel to or concentric to that of the apple-picker? of the 
Ecchoing Green?-yet the words of the poem do not mean 
these other experiences in the same way that they mean the 
apples, the ladder, the man, the sport and the green. The 
kind of student interpretation which I have mentioned may 
be described as the fallacy of the literal feedback. Proud 
Maisie translated into conceited Maisie may be viewed as a 
miniature instance of the same. And this will illustrate the 
close relation between the two errors of implicit reading 
which I have just been trying to describe. The uncontrolled 
reading is very often the over-explicit reading . 
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VII 
ExPLANATION, then-of the explicit and clearly ascertain-
able but perhaps obscure or disguised meanings of words; 
description-of the poem's structure and parts, its shape and 
colors, and its historical relations; explication-the turning of 
such description as far as possible into meaning. These I 
believe are the teacher-critic's staple commitments-which 
we may sum up, if we wish, in some such generic term as 
elucidation or interpretation. 
It is difficult to illustrate these matters evenly from any 
single short poem. Let me, nevertheless, make the effort. 
Not to show the originality of my own critical judgment, 
but to keep within the area of what is readily available and 
plausible, I choose the four quatrains of William Blake's 
London in his Songs of Experience. 1 
I wander thro' each charter' d street 
Near where the charter'd Thames does flow, 
And mark in every face I meet 
Marks of weakness, marks of woe. 
In every cry of every Man, 
In every infant's cry of fear, 
In every voice, in every ban, 
The mind-forg'd manacles I hear. 
How the Chimney-sweeper's cry 
Every black'ning Church Appalls; 
And the hapless Soldier's sigh 
Runs in blood down Palace walls. 
But most thro' midnight streets I hear 
How the youthful Harlot's curse 
Blasts the new born Infant's tear, 
And blights with plagues the Marriage hearse . 
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Let me remark briefly that Blake engraved and printed and 
illuminated this poem as part of a pictorially designed page. 
But I believe that this poem (if perhaps not all of Blake's 
similarly illustrated poems) can be fully understood without 
any picture. 
A further special remark is required by the fact that an 
early draft of this poem, which is available in Blake's note-
book, the celebrated Rossetti manuscript, gives us several 
variant readings, even variants of key words in the poem. 
Such avenues of access to the poet's process of composition, 
a favorite kind of resort for the biographical detective, may 
also I believe be legitimately enough invoked by a teacher 
as an aid to exposition. Surely the variant reading, the 
fumbled and rejected inspiration, makes a convenient enough 
focus on the actual reading. We suppose that the poet did 
improve his composition, and usually he did. So if word A 
is worse, why is word B better, or best? Comparison opens 
inquiry, promotes realization. Sometimes the discovery of 
such an unravelled thread, in our learned edition of the poet, 
will save a classroom discussion which was otherwise mov-
ing toward vacuity. Nevertheless I choose here not to 
invoke the interesting variants to Blake's poem, because I 
believe the existence and the exhibition of such genetic 
vestiges is not intrinsic to the confrontation of our minds 
with the poem. Not that to invoke the variants would be 
unfair-it is simply unnecessary. If we really need inferior 
variants, we can make up some of our own. And perhaps 
we ought to. 
Perhaps there is no single word in this poem which calls 
for the simple dictionary work which I have defined as the 
level of mere explanation. But the word charter' d, used 
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twice in the first two lines, is nearly such a word. At any 
rate, its emphatic and reiterated assertion, its somewhat 
curious ring in its context, as well as its position at the start 
of the poem, make it a likely word to begin with. How is a 
street chartered? How is the Thames chartered? A charter 
is a written document, delivered by a governmental au-
thority, and granting privileges, recognizing rights, or creat-
ing corporate entities, boroughs, universities, trading com-
panies, utilities. It is privilege, immunity, publicly con-
ceded right. The Great Charter (Magna Charta) is a glorious 
instance of the concept in the history of men who speak 
English. I have been following, where it led me, the article 
under the word Charter in the Oxford English Dictionary on 
Historical Principles. But surely the great Dictionary is 
mistaken when under meaning 3.2 figurative. "Privileged, 
licensed," it quotes Shakespeare's Henry the Fifth, "When 
he speakes, The Ayre, a Charter'd Libertine, is still," and 
shortly after that, Blake, Songs of Experience, "Near where 
the charter'd Thames does flow." Surely the eminent Vic-
torian person who compiled that entry was little given to the 
modem critical sin of looking for ironies in poetry. The 
force of that reiterated word in the first two lines of Blake's 
poem must have something to do with a tendency of the 
word, in the right context (and Blake's poem is that con-
text), to mean nearly the opposite of those meanings of 
advantage listed in the Dictionary. For chartered privilege 
is a legalistic thing, which sounds less good when we call it 
vested interest, and which entails an inevitable obverse, 
that is, restriction or restraint. How indeed could the street 
or the river be chartered in any of the liberating senses 
listed in the Dictionary? It is the traffic on them or the right 
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to build houses along them that is chartered in the sense of 
being conceded-to somebody. And this inevitably means 
that for somebody else-probably for you and me-the privi-
lege is the restriction. Thus the strange twisted aptness, the 
happy catachresis, of the wanderer's calling so mobile and 
natural a force as the river chartered at all. The fact is that 
this meaning of the word chartered is not listed in the Oxford 
Dictionary. 
We began with the Dictionary, but we have had to go 
beyond it, to correct it in a specific point, and even to 
reverse its general drift. Examples of dictionary explanation 
of words in poems almost always turn out to be not quite 
pure. 
To turn away from the attempt at such explanation, then 
-what opportunities do we find for simply describing this 
poem-and first, with regard to its immediate historical 
contexts? Perhaps some note on the chimney sweeper will 
be needed for our twentieth-century American pupils. We 
can look a little to one side and see Blake's angry poem The 
Chimney Sweeper in the Songs of Experience: "A little black 
thing among the snow, Crying 'weep!' 'weep!' in notes of 
woe!" We can look back and see the companion Chimney 
Sweeper, tenderly comical, poignant, in the Songs of In-
nocence. " ... I said 'Hush, Tom! never mind it, for when 
your head's bare You know that the soot cannot spoil your 
white hair.'" An Act of Parliament of 1788 had attempted 
to prohibit the employment of chimney sweeps until they 
were eight years old. In winter they began work at 7 a.m., 
in summer at 5. Their heads were shaved to reduce the risk 
of their hair catching fire from pockets of smouldering soot. 
An essay on the eighteenth-century London practice of 
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chimney-sweeping would of course be an explication, in 
extenso, of the third stanza of this poem. We could add 
notes too for this stanza on the wars and armies of the 
period, on the condition of the London churches (the 
blackening of Portland limestone outside-suppositions about 
the failure of the ministry inside, priestly symbols of oppres-
sion in other lyrics by Blake), or for the fourth stanza we 
could investigate harlots in eighteenth-century London. But 
I believe it is part of the power of this particular poem that 
it scarcely requires any very elaborate descriptive explica-
tions of this sort. "We can do pretty well with the poem," 
says one commentator, "in contexts of our own manufacture 
or out of our own experience."2 
Another external point of reference, a part of Blake's 
immediate literary and religious tradition, has already been 
named-that is, when we alluded to the simple metrics and 
the innocent language of the eighteenth-century evangelical 
hymns. Blake's Songs of Innocence and of Experience, says 
one critic, are "almost a parody" of such popular earlier 
collections as the Divine Songs Attempted in Easy Language 
for the Use of Children by the nonconformist minister and 
logician Isaac Watts.a Blake knew that collection well. And 
thus, a certain Song entitled Praise for Mercies Spiritual and 
Temporal. 
Whene'er I take my walks abroad, 
How many poor I see; 
What shall I render to my God 
For all his gifts to me. 
How many children in the street, 
Half naked I behold! 
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While I am cloth' d from head to feet, 
And cover' d from the cold. 
The echoes of such socially innocent hymnology in the 
minds and ears of Blake and his generation make, as I have 
suggested, a part of the meaning of his vocabulary and 
rhythm, part of a historic London sounding board, against 
which we too can enjoy a more resonant reading of the 
bitterness and irony of the wanderer in the chartered streets. 
But to turn back to the words of our poem and to inquire 
whether any internal features of it deserve descriptive 
notice: For one thing, I should want a class to notice how 
the simple hymn-like stanzas of this poem are fortified or 
specialized in a remarkable way by a kind of phonemic tune, 
or prominent and stark, almost harsh, succession of similar 
emphatic syllables. This tune is announced in the opening 
verb wander, then immediately picked up and reiterated, 
doubly and triply:-chartered street, chartered Thames, "And 
mark in every face ... Marks of Weakness, marks of woe." 
The word mark indeed, the inner mental act, the outer 
graven sign, is the very motif of this marking repetition. It 
was more than a semantic or dictionary triumph when Blake 
revising his poem hit on the word chartered-rejecting the 
other quite different-sounding word which we need not 
mention, which appears in the Rossetti manuscript. 
The student of the poem will easily pick out the modula-
tions of the theme through the rest of the poem: the rhyme 
words man and ban, the emphatic syllable of manacles, the 
black'ning Church, the hapless sigh, the Palace Walls ... 
Harlot, Blasts, and Marriage. But what is the meaning of 
this phonetic pattern? A certain meaning, not in the sense 
necessarily of what Blake fully intended or would have 
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confessed or defined if we had asked him, but in the sense 
of something which is actually conveyed if we will let it be 
conveyed, has been pretty much implied in the very descrip-
tion of the pattern. According to our temperaments and our 
experiences, and as our imagination is more auditory, eidetic, 
or kinesthetic, we will realize the force of this phonetic 
marking in images of insistently wandering, tramping feet, 
in a savage motion of the arms and head, in a bitter chanting, 
a dark repetition of indictments. Any one of these images, 
as I attempt to verbalize it, is perhaps excessive; no one 
is specifically necessary. But all of these and others are 
relevant. 
We have said that the word chartered when applied to 
the street and even more when applied to the river is an 
anomaly. A close inspection of this poem will reveal a good 
many curiosities in its diction. Notice, for example, the word 
cry, which occurs three times in the course of stanzas two 
and three. Why do men cry in the streets of London? In 
addition to various random cries of confusion, hurry, and 
violence (which we are surely entitled to include in the 
meaning of the word) , there is the more special and more 
continuous London street cry, the "proclamation," as the 
Dictionary has it, of wares or of services. If we had plenty 
of time for history we could read Addison's Spectator on 
"Street Cries." A more immediately critical interest is served 
when we notice that the steadily clamorous background of 
the London scene of charter and barter merges by a kind 
of metaphoric glide, in the next two lines, into a medley of 
other vocal sounds, "cries," in another sense, of fear, "voices," 
"bans" -that is to say, legal or official yells, proclamations, 
summonses, prohibitions, curses. Are the kinds of cries 
. 236. 
What to Say about a Poem 
really separate, or are all much the same? In the next line 
the infant cry of fear merges literally with the cry of service 
-"sweep, sweep," or "weep, weep," as we learn the pronun-
ciation from Blake's two Chimney Sweeper songs. The whole 
poem proceeds not only by pregnant repetitions but by a 
series of extraordinary conjunctions and compressions, by a 
pervasive emergence of metaphoric intimation from the 
literal details of the Hogarthian scene. Consider, for in-
stance, how to appall is to dismay or terrify, and etymo-
logically perhaps to make pale. Doubtless the syntax says 
here in the first place that the unconsciously accusing cry 
of the infant sweep strikes dismay, even a kind of pallor, 
into these irrelevant, mouldering, and darkening fabrics. At 
the same time the syntax does not forbid a hint of the 
complementary sense that the walls throw back the infant 
cry in ineffectual and appall~d echoes. The strange assault 
of pitiful sounds upon the very color of the walls, which is 
managed in these first two lines by verbal intimation, erupts 
in the next two beyond verbalism into the bold, surreal-
istically asserted vision of the sigh which attaches itself as 
blood to palace walls. 
But most thro' midnight streets I hear 
How the youthful Harlot's curse 
Blasts the new born Infant's tear, 
And blights with plagues the Marriage hearse. 
The devotee of Blake may, by consulting the Rossetti 
manuscript, discover that the poet took extraordinary pains 
with this last stanza of the poem (which was an after-
thought) : he wrote it and rewrote it, deleting words and 
squeezing alternatives onto his already used-up page. Clearly 
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he intended that a lot of meaning should inhere in this 
densely contrived stanza-the climax, the most appalling 
instance, of the assault of the city sounds upon the citadels, 
the institutions, the persons of the chartered privilege. The 
new role of the infant in this stanza, lying between the 
harlot and the major target of her curse, and the impatient 
energy, the crowding of sense, from the harlot and her curse, 
through the blight, the plague, to the ghastly paradox of 
that final union of words-the marriage hearse-perhaps we 
had better leave this to a paper by our students, rather than 
attempt to exhaust the meaning in class. 
I have perhaps already said too much about this one short 
poem. Yet I have certainly not said all that might be said. 
Relentless criticism of a poem, the technique of the lemon-
squeezer, is not to my mind an ideal pedagogic procedure. 
It is not even a possibility. A descriptive explication of a 
poem is both more and less than a multiple and exhaustive 
precis. Our aim I think should be to say certain selected, 
intelligible things about a poem, enough to establish the 
main lines of its technical achievement, of its symbolic 
shape. When we have done that much, we understand the 
poem-even if there are grace notes and overtones which 
have escaped our conscious notice. 
VIII 
LET ME BAC:K OFF then from the poem by William Blake and 
return once more, briefly, to my main argument. Explana-
tion, description, and explication: we can recognize three 
phases of our interpretation of the poem, though they prove 
to be more closely entangled and merged with one another 
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than we might have realized at the beginning. But are 
they all? Is there not another activity which has been going 
on in our minds, almost inevitably, all this while? The 
activity of appreciation. All this time, while reading the 
poem so carefully, have we not also been liking it or disliking 
it? Admiring it or despising it? Presumably we have. And 
presumably we ought now to ask ourselves this further 
question: Is there any connection between the things we 
have managed so far to say about the poem and the kind of 
response we experience toward it? Our liking it or our dis-
liking it? Are we inclined to try to explain why we like the 
poem? Do we know how to do this? More precisely: Would 
a statement of our liking for the poem, an act of praise or 
appreciation, be something different from (even though 
perhaps dependent upon) the things we have already been 
saying? Or has the appreciation already been sufficiently 
implied or entailed by what we have been saying? 
At the first level, that of simple dictionary explanation, 
very little, we will probably say, has been implied. And 
very little, we will most likely say, in many of our motions 
at the second level, the simply descriptive. It is not a merit 
in a poem, or surely not much of a merit, that it should 
contain any given vocabulary, say of striking or unusual 
words, or even that it should have metaphors, or that it 
should have meter or any certain kind of meter, or rhymes, 
as any of these entities may be purely conceived. 
But that-as we have been seeing-is to put these matters 
of simple explanation and simple description more simply 
and more abstractly than they are really susceptible of being 
put. We pass imperceptibly and quickly beyond these mat-
ters. We are inevitably and soon caught up in the demands 
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of explication-the realization of the vastly more rich and 
interesting implicit kinds of meaning. We are engaged with 
features of a poem which-given always other features too 
of the whole context-do tend to assert themselves as reasons 
for our pleasure in the poem and our admiration for it. We 
begin to talk about patterns of meaning; we encounter 
structures or forms which are radiant or resonant with mean-
ing. Patterns and structures involve coherence (unity, co-
herence, and emphasis), and coherence is an aspect of truth 
and significance. I do not think that our evaluative intima-
tions will often, if ever, advance to the firmness and com-
pleteness of a demonstration. Perhaps it is hardly conceiv-
able that they should. But our discourse upon the poem 
will almost inevitably be charged with implications of its 
value. It will be more difficult to keep out these intimations 
than to let them in. Critics who have announced the most 
resolute programs of neutrality have found this out. Take 
care of the weight, the color, the shape of the poem, be fair 
to the explanation and description, the indisputable parts 
of the formal explication-the appreciation will be there, and 
it will be difficult to avoid having expressed it. 
Explicatory criticism (or explicatory evaluation) is an 
account of a poem which exhibits the relation between its 
form and its meaning. Only poems which are worth some-
thing are susceptible of this kind of account. It is something 
like a definition of poetry to say that whereas rhetoric-in the 
sense of mere persuasion or sophistic-is a kind of discourse 
the power of which diminishes in proportion as the artifice 
of it is understood or seen through-poetry, on the other 
hand, is a kind of discourse the power of which-or the 
satisfaction which we derive from it-is actually increased 
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by an increase in our understanding of the artifice. In 
poetry the artifice is art. This comes close I think to the 
center of the aesthetic fact. 
IX 
ONE OF THE ATTEMPTS at a standard of poetic value most 
often reiterated in past ages has been the doctrinal-the 
explicitly didactic. The aim of poetry, says the ancient 
Roman poet, is double, both to give pleasure and to teach 
some useful doctrine. You might get by with only one or the 
other, but it is much sounder to do both. Or, the aim of 
poetry is to teach some doctrine-and to do this convincingly 
and persuasively, by means of vividness and pleasure-as in 
effect the Elizabethan courtier and the eighteenth-century 
essayist would say. But in what does the pleasure consist? 
Why is the discourse pleasurable? Well, the aim of poetry 
is really to please us by means of or through the act of 
teaching us. The pleasure is a dramatized moral pleasure. 
Thus in effect some theories of drama in France during the 
seventeenth century. Or, the pleasure of poetry is a pleasure 
simply of tender and morally good feelings. Thus in effect 
the philosophers of the age of reason in England and France. 
And at length the date 1790 and Immanuel Kant's Critique 
of judgment: which asserts that the end or effect of art is 
not teaching certainly, and not pleasure in anything like a 
simple sensuous way-rather it is something apart, a feeling, 
but precisely its own kind of feeling, the aesthetic. Art is 
autonomous-though related symbolically to the realm of 
moral values. Speaking from this nondidactic point of view, 
a critic ought to say, I should think, that the aesthetic merit 
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of Blake's London does not come about because of the fact 
that London in that age witnessed evils which cried to 
Heaven for remedy, or because Blake was a Prophet Against 
Empire, or a Visionary Politician, or because at some time, 
perhaps a few years after he had writen the poem, he may 
have come to view it as one article or moment in the de-
velopment of an esoteric philosophy of imagination, a Fear-
ful Symmetry of Vision, expanded gradually in allegorical 
glimpses during several phases of his life into a quasi-
religious revelation or privilege which in some sense, at 
moments, he believed in. Blake's London is an achievement 
in words, a contained expression, a victory which resulted 
from some hours, or days, of artistic struggle, recorded by 
his pen on a page of the Rossetti manuscript. 
Between the time of Immanuel Kant, however, and our 
own, some complications in the purity of the aesthetic view 
have developed. Through the romantic period and after, the 
poetic mind advanced pretty steadily in its own autonomous 
way, toward a claim to be in itself the creator of higher 
values-to be perhaps the only creator. Today there is noth-
ing that the literary theorist-at least in the British- and 
American-speaking world-will be more eager to repudiate 
than any hint of moral or religious didacticism, any least 
intimation that the poem is to measure its meaning or get 
its sanction from any kind of authority more abstract or 
more overtly legislative than itself. But on the other hand 
there has probably never been a generation of teachers of 
literature less willing to admit any lack of high seriousness, 
of implicit and embodied ethical content, even of normative 
vision in the object of their study. Despite our reiterated 
denials of didacticism, we live in an age, we help to make an 
. 242. 
What to Say about a Poem 
age, of momentous claims for poetry-claims the most mo-
mentous conceivable, as they advance more and more under 
the sanction of an absolutely creative and autonomous 
visionary imagination. The Visionary imagination perforce 
repudiates all but the tautological commitment to itself. 
And thus, especially when it assumes (as now it begins to 
do) the form of what is called the "Tragic Vision" (not "The 
Vision of Tragedy"), it is the newest version of the Ever-
lasting No. Vision per se is the vision of itself. "Tragic 
Vision" is the nearly identical vision of "Absurdity." (War-
weariness and war-horror, the developing mind and studies 
of a generation that came out of the second War and has 
been living in expectation of the third may go far to explain 
the phenomenon, but will not justify it.) Antidoctrine is of 
course no less a didactic energy than doctrine itself. It is the 
reverse of doctrine. No more than doctrine itself, can it be 
located or even approached by a discussion of the relation 
between poetic form and poetic meaning. Antidoctrine is 
actually asserted by the poems of several English romantic 
poets, and notably, it would appear, though it is difficult to 
be sure, by the "prophecies" of William Blake. The idea of 
it may be hence a part of these poems, though never their 
achieved result or expression. Any more than an acceptable 
statement of Christian doctrine is Milton's achieved expres-
sion in Paradise Lost, or a statement of Aristotelian ethics is 
the real business of Spenser's Faerie Queene. Today I be-
lieve no prizes are being given for even the best doctrinal 
interpretation of poems. (The homiletic or parabolic inter-
pretation of Shakespeare, for example, has hard going with 
the reviewer. ) On the other hand, if you are willing to take 
a hand in the exploitation of the neuroses, the misgivings, 
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the anxieties, the infidelities of the age-if you have talents 
for the attitudes of Titanism, the graces needed by an 
impresario of the nuptials of Heaven and Hell, you are likely 
to find yourself in some sense rewarded. It is obvious I hope 
that I myself do not believe the reward will consist in the 
achievement of a valid account of the relation between 
poetic form and poetic meaning . 
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Language and Myth, pp. 97-98, on "mere conceptual signs"; and Feidelson, 
p. 55: ."The l,~terary symbolist is inclined to consider poetry as peculiarly 
symbolic .... 
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ARISTOTLE AND OEDIPUS OR ELSE 
1 Raymond Wei!, Revue des Etudes Anciennes, LXI (January-June, 1959), 
174-75; Thomas G . .Rosenmeyer, American Journal af Philology, LXXX 
(July, 1959), 310-14; Frederick M. Combellack, Classical Philology, LIV 
(October, 1959), 261-65; G. M. Kirkwood, Classical Journal, LV (October, 
1959), 36-39; D. W. Lucas, Classical Review, N.S. IX (December, 1959), 
252-55; M. Joseph Costelloe, S.J., Classical Bulletin, XXXVI (March, 1960), 
59-60; W. J. Verdenius, Mnemosyne, IV.xii (1960), 256-58; Thomas Gould, 
Gnomon, XXXIV (December, 1962), 641-49. 
2 See Jacob L. Moreno, Psychoanalytic Treatment af Psychoses (New 
York, 1945). 
3 Else, p. 383, n. 4. But on p. 3, Else is content enough to believe that 
Aristotle sets up poietike in a "special, colloquially given sense of 'poetic 
art.'" 
4 In Ethics VII.4, incontinence ( acrasia) is described as hamartia fortified 
by vice (kakia). 
5 Poetics XIV uses this same allusion to the lost Cresphontes. 
6 Simonides of Ceos ( 556-467 ) as preserved in Plato's Protagoras. 
7 "Recognition [in Chapter XVI]," says Else, "becomes more purely a 
structural or plot device" ( p. 484). Yes, and thus it tells strongly against 
Else's theory. · 
THE CRITICISM OF COMEDY 
1 L. J. Potts, Comedy (London, 1949), pp. 10, 19-20. 
2 Cp. Jim Corbett, Man-Eaters of Kumaon (Oxford, 1946), pp. 97-98. 
3 See D. H. Monro, Argument of Laughter (Melbourne, 1951), especially 
pp. 214-19, 222-25, outlining the theories of Greig and Krishna Menon. 
4 Cp. A. 0. Aldridge, "Shaftesbury and the Test of Truth," PMLA, LX 
(March, 1945), 129-56. 
5 "The Psychology of Humor," American Journal af Psychology, XVIII 
( October, 1907 ) , 433-36. 
6 The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, trans. A. A. Brill (New York, 
1938),p. 803. 
7 Critique of Judgment, Book II, par. 54; The World as Will and Idea, 
Book I, chapter xiii. 
8 Cp. Maynard Mack, Introduction to Fielding, Joseph Andrews (New 
York, Rinehart Editions, 1948), p. xiv. 
9 See English Institute Essays 1948, ed. D. A. Robertson, Jr. (New York, 
1949 ). 
10 S,zlren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David F. 
Swenson (Princeton, 1944), p. 450 . 
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11 Joseph Jones, "Emerson and Bergson on the Comic," Comparative 
Literature, I (Winter, 1949), 63-71, quoting Emerson's Complete Works 
(Centenary Edition), VIII, 158-73. Proper quotations could of course be 
made to yield the opposite emphasis. The perception of the comic "appears 
to be an essential element in a fine character." 
12 Laughter, An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, trans. Cloudsley 
Brereton and Fred Rothwell (New York, 1928), p. 200. 
13 For a fairly recent instance, see Sir Alan Herbert, upon attempting a 
presidential address to the English Association upon the topic of the 
"English Laugh," greeted with pursed lips by an anonymous Times Literary 
Supplement arbiter (August 11, 1950, p. 501). "The trouble arises when 
the teacher uses his pointer . . . the sample joke assumes the wistfulness 
of a waning autumn light." 
14 L. J. Potts, once more, in a translation of the Poetics (Aristotle on the 
Art of Fiction, Cambridge, 1953) which has the great merit of making 
Aristotle speak as if he knew what he meant-in a more or less continuous 
discourse. 
THE CONCEPT OF METER 
1 Harold Whitehall, Seymour Chatman, Arnold Stein, John Crowe Ran-
som, "English Verse and What It Sounds Like," Kenyon Review, XVIII, 
411-77. 
2 "Linguistics, Poetics, and Interpretation: The Phonemic Dimension," 
Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLIII (October, 1957), 254. 
3 The question is, of course, a psychological one, but the psychologists 
have not dealt much with it. A search of Psychological Abstracts for the 
last twenty years turns up (XXI [September, 1947], 387) one article 
(abstract 3211) : Marguerite Durand, "Perception de dun~e dans les phrases 
rhythmees," journal de Psychologie Normale et Pathologique, XXXIX 
( 1946), 305-21. But Mlle. Durand apparently took isochronism for granted 
and had her passages ( French and Czech) spoken to the beats of a 
metronome. Albert R. Chandler, Beauty and Human Nature (New York, 
1934), pp. 244-56, gives a good account of some earlier investigations. Ada 
L. F. Snell, "An Objective Study of Syllabic Quantity in English Verse," 
PMLA, XXXIII ( 1918), 396-408; XXXIV ( 1919), 416-35, presents experi-
mental evidence against the assumption that readers of English verse observe 
any kind of "equal time intervals." 
4 A kind of middle or double service is performed by traditional marks 
of prosodic scansion-which in part, in large part, call attention to objective 
features of linguistic structure, but to some extent also are used for 
"promoting" or "suppressing" (or indicating the promotion or suppression 
of) such features in favor of a certain pattern. This double character of 
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scansion marks has perhaps caused much of the difficulty in metrical theory. 
5 We take this term from Leonard B. Meyer's excellent discussion of 
musical rhythm in Emotion and Meaning in Music (Chicago, 1956), pp. 
102-103. Pulse is the division of time into "regularly recurring, equally 
accented beats." What Meyer calls "meter" in music depends on pulse; 
but in this respect it is different from meter in verse. What he calls 
"rhythm" -e.g., the difference between an iambic and an anapestic or 
trochaic pattern-can occur without pulse and meter, he holds, as in plain 
chant or recitativo secco. 
6 Practical Criticism (New York, 1935), p. 232. 
7 Elizabeth Wright, Metaphor, Sound and Meaning in Bridges' "The 
Testament af Beauty" (Philadelphia, 1951), p. 26, says that Bridges' lines 
are to be timed equally, with the help of pauses at the ends of the lines. 
8 Yvor Winters, The Function of Criticism (Denver, 1957), pp. 79-100, 
109-23, expresses a view of English meter in general and of Hopkins which 
we take to be substantially in accord with our own. 
9 Alexander J. Ellis, "Remarks on Professor Mayor's Two Papers on 
Rhythm," Transactions af the Philological Society 1875-1876 (Strasburg, 
1877), p. 442, distinguished "nine degrees" of "force" or stress in English 
and likewise nine degrees of "length," "pitch," "weight," and "silence." 
10 The problem of "rising" and "falling" meters is one which we are 
content to touch lightly. Temporal theorists, working on the analogy of the 
musical downbeat, tend of course to make all meters falling. George R. 
Stewart, Jr., a moderate timer, makes the following revelatory statement: 
"If a person comes upon a road and walks a few rods before arriving at 
the first milestone, he will have to pass five milestones, counting the first, 
before he has walked four measured miles; in other words, since the start 
and the finish must be shown, five markers are necessary to establish four 
units. In verse the stresses are the markers, and the feet are the units. 
Five stresses can mark off only four intervals, so that what we ordinarily 
call a five-foot line might be more properly described as a four-foot line 
with a little left over at beginning and end" (The Technique of English 
Verse [New York, 1930], p. 42). (For Mr. Stewart "rising" and "falling" 
are qualities of phrasing, not of meter, p. 37.) Suppose, however, that we 
are counting not "measured miles" but precisely milestones-not equal times 
but precisely stresses. And suppose that a man walks not a "few rods" but 
a full mile before reaching the first milestone. The first slack syllable of 
the iambic line is as much a mile as any other slack syllable. The line 
begins at the beginning of that syllable. The iambic line which starts 
with a strong and then one weak syllable is a more difficult matter. But 
many such lines, like the one from Shelley's "Skylark" which we discuss 
above, can be shown in one way or another to be in fact iambic. The 
shape of the phrases is likely to have much to do with it. Other lines of 
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this sort, such as some in Tennyson's The Lady of Shalott, may in fact be 
ambiguous-that is, they may be susceptible of being satisfactorily read 
either as iambic or as trochaic. 
THE AuGUSTAN MODE 
1 F. R. Lea vis, Revaluation (London, 1936), p. 83. 
2 William Empson, Some Versions of Pastoral (London, 1950), p. 224. 
3 James Sutherland, A Preface to Eighteenth Century Poetry (Oxford, 
1950), p. 164. 
4 Review of Sutherland's Preface, Times Literary Supplement, November 
6, 1948, p. 624. 
5 George Sherburn, "The Restoration and Eighteenth Century," A Literary 
History of England, ed. A. C. Baugh (New York, 1948), pp. 929, 932. 
6 "Mr. Pope in the Field," Times Literary Supplement, April 20, 1951, 
p. 245. 
7 Edwin B. Burgum, "The Neo-Classical Period in English Literature: A 
Psychological Definition," Sewanee Review, LIII (Spring, 1944), 248. 
8 R. H. Griffith, "The Progress Piece of the Eighteenth Century," Texas 
Review, V (April, 1920), 229. 
9 Cp. Richard C. Boys, Sir Richard Blackmore and the Wits (Ann Arbor, 
1941). 
10 Maurice Johnson, The Sin of Wit (Syracuse, 1951), chapter III. 
11 W. H. Auden, "Alexander Pope," Essays in Criticism, I (July, 1951), 
211; the same in From Anne to Victoria: Essays by Various Hands, ed. 
Bonamy Dobree (London, 1937). 
12 Gilbert Highet, "'The Dunciad,'" Modern Language Review, XXXVI 
(July, 1941), 342. 
13 Letters to his Son, October 26, 1738, September 27, 1749. 
14 Warton, Essay on the Writings and Genius of Pope, Dedication ( 1756); 
Stockdale, An Inquiry into the Nature and Genuine Laws of Poetry (Lon-
don, 1798), pp. 11-21. 
15 On the meaning of the phrase "selling bargains," see Harold Williams, 
ed., Poems of Swift (Oxford, 1937), II, 590. 
16 Dehumanization of Art, trans. Helene Weyl (Princeton, 1948), p. 35. 
17 A. 0. Aldridge, "Shaftesbury and the Test of Truth,'' PMLA, LX 
(March, 1945), 129-56. 
18 Cp. L. I. Bredvold, "The Gloom of the Tory Satirists," Pope and His 
Contemporaries, Essays Presented to George Sherburn (Oxford, 1949), pp. 
1-19. 
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ELIOT's COMEDY 
1 T. S. Eliot, The Cocktail Party, A Comedy (New York, 1950); The 
Cocktail Party, performed at the Henry Miller Theatre (New York) by the 
Sherek Players, directed by E. Martin Browne. 
2 William Barrett, Partisan Review, XVII (April, 1950), 354-59; Wolcott 
Gibbs, New Yorker, XXV (January 28, 1950), 47-48; Margaret Marshall, 
Nation, CLXX (January 28, 1950), 94-95; Brooks Atkinson, New York 
Times, January 29, 1950. 
3 Henry Popkin, Kenyon Review, XII (Spring, 1950), 339. 
4 Reading in the light of Eliot's Idea of a Christian Society, one reviewer 
has called them members of the "clerisy," charismatic personalities (George 
Miles, Commonweal, LII (May 5, 1950), 107. 
PRUFROCK AND MAUD 
1 About the whole of The Family Reunion I find something hauntingly 
Tennysonian. The name of the dowager Amy and certain infelicitous family 
relationships tempt at least the jocular speculation that this is Eliot's 
version of Locksley Hall Sixty Years After. 
2 See Leonard Unger, "T. S. Eliot's Rose Garden," in his T. S. Eliot: 
A Selected Critique (New York, 1948), pp. 374-94. 
3 Perhaps the title of this poem and its opening lines will come to mind 
as one reads another passage in Maud (I, x, 2): " ... a lord, a captain, a 
padded shape, A bought commission, a waxen face." 
4 "And my heart," he says, "is a handful of dust." For a student of Eliot 
the phrase may chime with an earlier description of the Hall which is 
Maud's ancestral home, glimmering "by a red rock" (I, iv, 2). I am not 
tempted to say that this coincidence does much to improve our reading of 
The Waste Land, I, 24-30. 
Yet another passage in Maud suggests a grisly image in Part I of The 
Waste Land. "What will the old man say When he comes to the second 
corpse in the pit?" (II, v, 9) That corpse you planted last year in your 
garden, has it begun to sprout? 
5 North American Review, LXXVII (July, 1853), 4. Another poem which 
might be cited in this context, one of Tennyson's which Eliot most admires, 
is In Memoriam. See the stanzas about the "long unlovely street" quoted 
in Eliot's essay of 1936 on Tennyson and that of 1942 (note 6) . 
6 "The Voice of His Time," Listener, XXVII (February 12, 1942), 211-12. 
7 John C. Pope, "Prufrock and Raskolnikov," American Literature, XVII 
(November, 1945), 221. Eliot's subsequent advice to Professor Pope, that 
he had read Crime and Punishment during 1910 and 1911 in a French 
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translation and that Prufrock was completed in the summer of 1911 weakens 
the immediate "intentional'' significance of the many striking parallels of 
phrasal music which Professor Pope demonstrates between Prufrock and 
the Garnett translation of the novel published in 1914 (American Literature, 
XVIII [January, 1947], 319-21). 
s "In Memoriam," Essays Ancient and Modern (London, 1936), p. 182. 
9 "From Poe to Valery," Hudson Review, II (Autumn, 1949), 341-42. 
Tennyson found it necessary to disclaim identity with the protagonist of 
Maud (Hallam Tennyson, Memoir [New York, 1898], I, 402, 408 ). 
10 Cp. Yvor Winters, Primitivism and Decadence (New York, 1937), 
chapter II. 
11 "I affirm that it is not natural to be what is called 'natural' any longer. 
We have no longer the mental attitude of those to whom a story was but a 
story, and all stories good" (Arthur Symons, The Symbolist Movement in 
Literature [New York, 1908], p. 134). 
WHAT TO SAY ABOUT A POEM 
1 For information about this poem, I have consulted mainly, though not 
exclusively, Joseph H. Wicksteed, Blake's Innocence and Experience (Lon-
don, 1928) and Selected Poems of William Blake, ed. F. W. Bateson (New 
York, 1957). 
2 David V. Erdman, "Blake; The Historical Approach," English Institute 
Essays 1950 (New York, 1951), p. 200. 
3 Cp. Mark Scharer, William Blake, The Politics of Visjon (New York, 
1946), pp. 406-407. 
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